当公民面临生活方式重大变革或严重生存危机时，刑法应赋予邻近有能力提供援助者特定的法律义务，以确保他人得以从危难中脱身。随着社会进入信息时代，许多传统生活风险已变得可控，从而不应再将危机简单归咎于命运。因此，刑法需融入分配正义的理念，通过正义的平衡分配，实现真正的公正。当前国内研究多将社会团结义务仅作为紧急权基础的附属议题进行探讨，未能在刑法适用中进行系统化的整理。这种做法限缩了紧急权研究的思维范畴，忽略了紧急权背后所蕴含的团结义务的维度问题，未能构建一个有效的权衡框架来调和个体之间自由领域的界限。引入社会团结义务为法益冲突问题提供了一个可靠的解决方案。社会团结义务的思想基础包括社群主义团结、契约主义团结以及利他主义团结，它们在不同视角下围绕积极的自由观解释团结义务的根据。通过引入一种综合性的社会团结理论，本文实现了从理念到具体场景的转换，促使不同的团结思想基础与多维度下的团结义务之间建立联系。此外，该理论还明确了在维度交叉的情境中团结义务的适用位阶。社会团结义务的实现方式分为两种：一种是个体直接对法律共同体承担的特殊责任；另一种是通过社会内部各个小型共同体成员间的互助义务间接实现。社会团结理论提供了一种动态的责任领域模型，该模型能够灵活地处理个体自由领域之间的冲突与融合问题。动态责任模型十分有限地范围内容许与责任主义相悖的情况，这包括对个人责任原则的相对性突破和在特定范围内承认团体责任。在规范构建了社会团结义务的结构和适用层级后，能够有效界定其适用范围。总体而言，纵向坐标下的公民与国家权力机关之间的制度性职能团结优位于横向坐标下的公民之间的组织领域下的团结。然而，在个体面临生存危机或其未来长期生活方式受到重大影响的情况下，允许在一定程度上牺牲公共法益，以保障个体福祉，动态地调整自由领域。社会团结义务的极限问题核心在于可否从支配推导出义务，如若肯定“支配领域性”对团结义务的产生起到决定作用，则在强调个人责任原则的背景下，为了法律共同体存续，在最低限度上对共同体成员施加更高的团结要求。本文肯定举手不劳的见危不救具有刑事可罚性。社会团结义务对司法判决产生的隐蔽影响不容忽视。该研究为理解交通肇事逃逸致死与故意杀人罪界限、共同体关系与犯罪认定、自杀关联行为、组织体的行政配合义务，以及紧急避险合法性与免责性划分等关键议题提供了理论指导。

When citizens face significant lifestyle changes or severe existential crises, criminal law should impose specific legal obligations on those nearby who are capable of providing assistance, to ensure others can escape from peril. As society enters the information age, many traditional life risks have become controllable, and crises should no longer be simply attributed to fate. Therefore, criminal law needs to integrate the concept of distributive justice, achieving true justice through the balanced distribution of justice. Current domestic research often discusses the obligation of social solidarity merely as a subsidiary topic under the basis of emergency rights, without systematically organizing it in the application of criminal law. This approach narrows the scope of thought in the study of emergency rights, overlooking the dimension of solidarity obligations inherent behind emergency rights, and fails to build an effective balancing framework to harmonize the boundaries of freedom among individuals. Introducing the obligation of social solidarity offers a reliable solution to conflicts of legal interests. The ideological foundation of the obligation of social solidarity includes communitarian solidarity, contractualist solidarity, and altruistic solidarity, which interpret the basis of solidarity obligations from different perspectives around the concept of positive freedom. By introducing a comprehensive theory of social solidarity, this paper achieves the transition from the abstract to specific scenarios, facilitating the connection between different bases of solidarity thought and multidimensional obligations of solidarity. Moreover, this theory also clarifies the applicability and hierarchy of solidarity obligations in intersecting dimensions. The realization of the obligation of social solidarity is twofold: one is the special responsibility that individuals directly bear to the legal community; the other is indirectly achieved through the mutual aid obligations among members of various small communities within society. The theory of social solidarity offers a dynamic domain model of responsibility that can flexibly address the conflicts and integration issues between individual freedoms. This dynamic responsibility model is very limited in scope and content, allowing for deviations from the principle of individual responsibility and recognizing collective responsibility within a specific range. After the structure and applicability levels of the obligation of social solidarity are normatively established, its scope can be effectively defined. Overall, institutional functional solidarity between citizens and state authorities under the vertical coordinate takes precedence over solidarity within the organizational domain among citizens under the horizontal coordinate. However, in situations where individuals face existential crises or their future long-term lifestyles are significantly affected, it allows for the sacrifice of public legal interests to a certain extent to protect individual welfare, dynamically adjusting the domain of freedom. The core issue of the limits of social solidarity obligations is whether obligations can be derived from dominance. If the "domain of dominance" is confirmed to play a decisive role in the emergence of solidarity obligations, then in the context of emphasizing the principle of individual responsibility, higher solidarity demands are imposed on community members at a minimum level for the survival of the legal community. This paper affirms that the failure to lend a hand in the face of danger has criminal culpability. The subtle influence of social solidarity obligations on judicial decisions cannot be ignored. This research provides theoretical guidance for understanding key issues such as the boundaries between traffic hit-and-run resulting in death and intentional homicide, community relations and crime determination, suicide-related behaviors, the administrative coordination obligations of organizations, and the legality and exemption of emergency avoidance.