斯宾诺莎的形而上学极具独创性。然而，如何恰当地理解斯宾诺莎形而上学体系，一直是学界争论不休的话题。本文借助当代形而上学中的奠基概念和随附概念，尝试解释斯宾诺莎实体一元论的三大核心范畴（实体、属性、样态）间的深层结构关系，并讨论用奠基-随附解释可能产生的理论后果。 奠基是哲学史上非常重要的概念，在当代形而上学研究中得到复兴，成为重要的理论资源。奠基与随附概念为理解斯宾诺莎形而上学提供了有力的工具和资源。在罗卡和谢弗等学者的先行工作基础上，本文尝试引入当代的形而上学概念工具——奠基与随附，来理解和解释斯宾诺莎形而上学框架的深层结构。本文将从纵向维度将实体-样态的关系解释为奠基关系；从横向维度将思维属性与广延属性、思维样态与广延样态之间的关系解释为随附关系。 本文从纵、横两维度系统考察斯宾诺莎实体一元论。纵向维度论证实体、属性、样态关系具备奠基关系的某些特征。论证分三方面：将实体理解为奠基者、将实体-属性-样态间关系理解为奠基关系、以奠基理论为关系框架理解斯宾诺莎实体一元论。奠基指在本体论层面，较基础事物是较不基础事物的原因、根据或基础。在假设奠基解释成立的前提下，本文将实体-样态关系解读为奠基者与被奠基者的非还原因果奠基统一关系，认为被奠基者不可被还原为奠基者，即样态的整体不可被还原为实体。本文最终将论证当代的奠基概念和斯宾诺莎的因果概念具有结构上的内在一致性，奠基较好地刻画了斯宾诺莎的实体-样态关系。 横向维度以广延属性和思维属性的关系为研究主线，论证斯宾诺莎的心物或心身平行论，应被系统理解为思维与广延分别在属性和样态层面的随附论。随附分三个层次：思维属性与广延属性、思维与事物、心灵与身体。随附是一种模态共变关系，刻画了二者共同变化的必然联系。斯宾诺莎的思维属性和广延属性是一体两面的。本文主张属性间和样态间均具备随附关系的特征，属性和样态又都奠基于实体。这种理解为心灵哲学在非还原的物理主义和性质二元论之外开拓了第三条道路，那就是斯宾诺莎的概念二元和本体一元的心物观。 分析哲学与哲学史研究的结合，既拓宽了分析哲学的研究范围也丰富了哲学史研究的传统解释维度。一方面，当代分析形而上学中的奠基概念与随附概念等工具更能充恰地刻画斯宾诺莎形而上学的深层结构；另一方面，本文的分析表明，斯宾诺莎的哲学在很多方面可以丰富乃至修正当代形而上学和心灵哲学的相关理论。
Spinoza‘s metaphysics is highly original. However, how to properly understand his metaphysical framework is a controversial issue in scholars. Theories of grounding and supervenience in contemporary analytical metaphysics are powerful conceptual tools and theoretical resources for understanding Spinoza‘s metaphysics. Borrowing theoretical or conceptual tools (e.g., grounding, supervenience) from contemporary analytical metaphysics, and developing the pioneering work of Spinoza experts like Michael Della Rocca and metaphysicians like Jonathan Schaffer, this thesis attempted to reinterpret and reveal the deep structure of Spinoza‘s metaphysical framework (i.e., substance, attributes, modes), and discuss possible consequences or difficulties in the interpretative line. This thesis systematically examined Spinoza‘s monism of substance from two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The vertical dimension refers to the study of the relationship between substance and modes, arguing that the substance-modes causal relationship within Spinoza‘s monism of substance exhibits the characteristics of a grounding relationship. Assuming the interpretation of the grounding relationship is reliable, it further advocates that this grounding relationship is a non-reductive counterfactual relationship. Non-reductive grounding refers to the fact that substance is more fundamental than the total composition of all modes, so the totality of modes (grounded) cannot be reduced to substance (the ground); counterfactual grounding refers to: if the substance (ground) does not exist, then all modes (grounded) do not exist either. Non-reductive counterfactual grounding better characterizes the relationship between substance and modes. The horizontal dimension refers to: taking the relationship between the attribute of extension and the attribute of thought as the main line of research, arguing that traditional research on Spinoza‘s "parallelism" of attributes is a misunderstanding, and in fact, all attributes are identical, not parallel. This conclusion can be corroborated by specific texts in both Spinoza‘s mind-body relationship (i.e., the relationship between the thinking entity and the extended entity) and the mind-body relationship (i.e., the relationship between a person‘s thought and body) theories. This thesis further pointed out that although the interpretation based on identity is theoretically consistent with Spinoza‘s original intention, the relationship between attributes is more suitably understood and characterized using supervenience. The attributes of extension and thought are a horizontal attendant relationship. It is difficult for people to understand how two kinds of attributes can be ontological one and the same, while epistemological independent of each other. Compared to this, the supervenience account emphasizes more on portraying the simultaneous occurrence of attributes, to some extent avoiding the ontological commitment burden of the identity explanation, and promoting a deeper understanding of Spinoza‘s attribute relationships. The combination of analytical philosophy and study of Spinoza‘s philosophy not only expands the working scope of analytical philosophy but also enriches interpretive dimensions of Spinoza‘s philosophy. The thesis added a case to this combination. On the one hand, the grounding and supervenience concepts in contemporary analytical metaphysics provide a systematic conceptual tool for Spinoza‘s metaphysical framework, allowing us to re-anchor his metaphysical system and thereby gain a new understanding; on the other hand, our analysis indicated that Spinoza‘s philosophy can enrich and even revise the relevant theories of contemporary metaphysics and philosophy of mind in many aspects.
