长期以来产业政策的主流文献集中在“是否应该制定产业政策”这一问题上，一些更加贴近社会现实的研究被遮蔽，特别是近年来产业政策在各国普遍复兴的背景下，很多学者呼吁研究重点应转向“如何制定并实施产业政策”。本文回应了这一呼吁，以政治经济学和公共政策学视角讨论了产业政策的执行问题。由于政策执行发生在特定的制度框架中，且国家的政治经济体制深刻塑造了产业政策的执行过程，因此本文重点考察制度安排对产业政策执行的影响机制。本文基于比较制度分析框架，以中国、日本和美国三个国家为背景，从理论上依次探讨了中央层面制度安排、央地关系制度安排以及政企关系制度安排分别对产业政策执行的作用机制。首先在分析中央层面制度安排对产业政策执行的影响时，本研究将政策执行过程描述为决策部门与执行部门间的互动，讨论了关于“决策权-执行权”分配的制度安排与执行部门的特定考核和激励模式的适应机制。再者，分析央地关系制度安排的影响时，本研究从嵌入自主性分离的视角将中国央地间的产业政策执行理解为一次信号传递博弈，从地方横向竞争的视角将日本央地间的产业政策执行理解为一个纵向项目拍卖过程，从产业地理政治的视角将美国央地间的产业政策执行理解为法案通过前后的资源配置，进而推导并总结出不同国家央地间的互动模式。最后，在分析政企关系制度安排的影响时，本研究将政府与企业对产业政策讨价还价的过程抽象为一个不完全契约框架下政府或企业一体化对产业政策剩余分配的影响机制，此外还从逆向选择与道德风险两个角度分析了企业在政策执行过程中的策略性行为。而后，本文以各国新能源汽车产业政策作为实证案例，对理论分析中得到的初步论点逐一检验，最终得到了三项主要结论。第一，各国中央层面关于“决策权-执行权”分配的制度安排决定了与其相适应的对政策执行部门的考核和激励方式，进而塑造了执行部门的行为模式。第二，央地关系制度安排中的信息结构、激励模式以及产业地理政治因素会对央地间产业政策的责任划分与资源投入形成影响。第三，政府与企业就产业政策剩余收益分配的谈判取决于双方的一体化能力，此外政府对企业的补贴政策在资金规模层面与时间维度层面分别可能诱发企业的逆向选择与道德风险行为。由此，本文为产业政策执行的相关研究提供了一个系统的理解框架，也为制度分析的政治经济学理论提供了新的实证支持。

For a considerable period, the predominant literature on industrial policy has primarily examined the question of "whether industrial policy should be formulated," neglecting some research that pertains more closely to social realities. Particularly in recent years, as industrial policy has experienced a widespread resurgence across various nations, numerous scholars have advocated for a research shift towards "how to formulate and implement industrial policy." This paper heeds this call and explores implementation issues pertaining to industrial policy from the perspectives of political economy and public policy. Given that policy implementation takes place within a specific institutional framework, and the political and economic systems of a country significantly shape the implementation process of industrial policy, this study primarily focuses on examining the impact mechanism of institutional arrangements on the implementation of industrial policy.Based on the comparative institutional analysis framework, this paper examines the role of central-level institutional arrangements, central-local relationship institutional arrangements, and government-enterprise relationship institutional arrangements in the implementation of industrial policy, using China, Japan, and the United States as case studies. Firstly, the impact of central-level institutional arrangements on industrial policy implementation is analyzed by considering the interaction between decision-making and implementation departments. The study explores the adaptation mechanism of institutional arrangements for the allocation of decision-making and execution powers, as well as the specific assessment and incentive models for implementation departments. Furthermore, the impact of central-local relationship institutional arrangements is analyzed by viewing the implementation of industrial policy between central and local governments through different perspectives. In China, it is understood as a signal transmission game in terms of embedded autonomy separation. In Japan, it is seen as a vertical project auction process involving local horizontal competition. In the United States, it is viewed as resource allocation before and after the passage of the bill, from the perspective of industrial geographical politics. The study deduces and summarizes the interactive modes between central and local governments in different countries. Lastly, the impact of government-enterprise relationship institutional arrangements is analyzed by abstracting the bargaining process between the government and enterprises regarding industrial policy within an incomplete contract framework. The study also considers the strategic behavior of enterprises during the policy implementation process from the perspectives of adverse selection and moral hazard.Subsequently, this paper conducts empirical tests using the new energy vehicle industry policies implemented in various countries as case studies to validate the initial arguments derived from the theoretical analysis. The study derives three main conclusions from these empirical investigations. Firstly, the institutional arrangements at the central level, which determine the allocation of decision-making and execution powers, shape the behavior patterns of implementation departments by establishing compatible assessment and incentive methods. Secondly, the information structure, incentive models, and factors related to industrial geographical politics within the central-local relationship institutional arrangements influence the division of responsibilities and resource investments in industrial policies between the central and local governments. Thirdly, the negotiation between the government and enterprises regarding the distribution of residual benefits from industrial policies relies on the integration capabilities of both parties. Additionally, the government‘s subsidy policies for enterprises may lead to adverse selection behavior concerning fund size, as well as moral hazard behavior in the time dimension. Therefore, this paper presents a systematic framework for comprehending the implementation of industrial policy, offering new empirical evidence to support the political economy theory of institutional analysis.