股权激励个人所得税作为资本市场税收体系的组成部分，其重要性随着A股市场股权激励步入“常态化”阶段而日益凸显。但是，现有文献对股权激励中的个人所得税问题及其潜在影响欠缺深入研究。本文手工搜集了2007年至2022年间沪深A股上市公司的股权激励行权信息，结合制度背景对股权激励个税的计税节点与经济收益实现不一致、课税基础与经济收益不匹配、高税收负担的制度性特征予以总结。在此基础上，本文分别以股权激励个税诱发的激励对象的个税纳税筹划动机、个税纳税资金筹措动机以及收入补偿动机为视角，分析了股权激励实施主体和参与主体的决策逻辑，全面地探究我国股权激励个人所得税的经济后果。本文主要的实证发现如下：（1）个税纳税筹划动机会导致公司通过策略性信息披露压低行权日股价，以降低员工股权激励个税。这具体表现为公司在行权日前一个月内披露的坏消息数量较行权日后显著增加。当预计行权税负越高、员工现金报酬越低、市场情绪高涨、有CEO或董事长行权、公司信息环境越差、股权激励成本税盾效应越弱、税收征管强度越小时，上述现象更为明显。此外，策略性信息披露使得行权日前各窗口期内的股票累计超额收益率显著低于行权日后，实现了纳税筹划效果；（2）个税纳税资金筹措动机会导致参与行权的内部人的减持倾向、减持金额和减持获利程度在行权后个税纳税期间显著上升，且现象强度随其股权激励个税的增加而突显。当内部人首次参与行权、财富积累程度较低时，上述现象更加明显。此外，减持对公司未来业绩表现存在负面影响，但个税纳税期限延长能够有效抑制内部人在行权后减持；（3）收入补偿动机还会导致管理层从事真实盈余管理的短视行为。这具体表现为管理层在行权后个税纳税期间的真实盈余管理程度随其股权激励个税的增加而显著上升，但应计盈余管理并未显著变化。当管理层现金报酬越低、公司估值越高、公司信息环境或治理水平越差时，上述现象更加明显。最后，真实盈余管理显著提高了公司实现避亏的概率，有利于降低股票波动率和维持股价稳定，但并未提振股价。总体而言，本文填补了已有文献在股权激励个人所得税经济后果研究上的缺欠，拓展了我国股权激励整体实施效果的研究视角；同时，本文丰富了资本市场税收效应的相关研究。此外，本文结论也对进一步完善股权激励个税的税收征管制度、充分发挥股权激励的长期激励效果、建立科学的资本市场税收体系具有政策意义和实践价值。

The taxation of equity-based compensation is a core component of the securities tax system. It has gained prominence since equity incentive plans in the Chinese A-share market have entered the “normalization” stage. However, extant literature appears to overlook the issue of individual income tax of equity incentives and its potential consequences. This thesis hand-collects the vesting details of equity incentives of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2007 to 2022, and analyses the institutional features of the individual income tax of equity incentives (i.e., inconsistency between the taxing node and the realization of equity gains, mismatch between tax base and equity gains, high tax burden) in China. Next, this thesis investigates how the motivations of participants’ individual tax avoidance, tax funding, and income replacement, which are caused by the individual income tax of equity incentives, would affect the firms’ strategic disclosure, insiders’ equity selling, and firms’ earnings management, respectively.The main empirical results are as follows: (1) The equity incentive plan participants’ motive for individual tax avoidance would drive firms to use a strategic disclosure approach to depress the stock price on the vesting date, thereby lowering the individual income tax that employees must pay on equity incentives. Specifically, firms prefer to release more bad news but withhold more good news in the month leading up to the equity vesting date as opposed to the month following the equity vesting date. Bad news disclosed by these firms, however, is hardly to be explained by their fundamental information. The effect of individual tax avoidance on the time-selection disclosure strategy is more pronounced when the tax burden on equity vesting is expected to be higher, when employees receive lower cash compensation, when market sentiment is stronger, when there is a CEO or chairman involved in the equity vesting, when firms have a poorer internal and external information environment, when firms could only benefit from lower tax shields on the equity-based compensations, or when firms face less intensive tax enforcement. Further, strategic disclosure of bad news results in a significantly lower cumulative abnormal stock return in each window prior to the equity vesting date than that in the subsequent window. (2) The motivation for individual tax funding would affect insiders’ (i.e., directors and senior executives) decisions to sell their equity. Specifically, compared to insiders not involved in the equity vesting in the same firm, insiders involved in the equity vesting tend to sell larger amounts of their unrestricted firm equity. Insiders would also generate higher trading profits to compensate for the decrease in their after-tax equity gains. The equity individual income tax raises the intensity of the above phenomenon, highlighting insiders’ motives for both individual tax funding and income replacement. The effect is more pronounced when insiders participate in equity vesting for the first time or when they do not amass much fortune. Further analyses show that the insiders’ equity selling behavior has negative effects on the firm’s future earnings performance. However, the extension of the tax payment deadline could deter insiders from selling their equity. (3) The motive for income replacement also exacerbates managerial myopia. Specifically, executives use real earnings management rather than accrual earnings management to inflate earnings before the tax payment due date, and this tendency significantly increases with the individual income tax on equity incentives. The effect of equity individual income tax on real earnings management is more pronounced when executives receive lower cash compensation, when firms have higher valuations, or when firms have poorer information environment and corporate governance. Finally, real earnings management does not boost stock prices, rather, it significantly increases the probability of avoiding loss and helps to reduce stock volatility.Overall, this thesis plays an important complementary role in assessing the economic consequences of individual income tax of equity incentives, and broadens the understanding of the overall effects of equity incentive plans in China. It also enriches studies on taxation and its effects on capital markets, and provides micro evidence of the spillover effects of individual income taxes. Furthermore, this thesis sheds some light on how to improve the taxation of equity-based compensation, realize the positive long-term effects of equity incentive plans, and establish a scientific securities tax system.