内格尔的主要哲学思想庞博而深邃，横跨多个领域，每一个领域都充满真知灼见，以至于人们往往顾此失彼，难以抓住核心，不便于系统性地理解内格尔的哲学思想。本文尝试以主客观视角下的自我观为线索，立基于其伦理学视域，对其主要哲学议题进行有条理穿插，重构某些议题，并尝试进行新的解读。本文首先讨论了作为内格尔主客观结构基础，也就是内格尔有关人的形而上学的特殊自我观，这种自我观“分裂”由理性反思超然能力为两部分——主观部分与客观部分。这种“分裂”会导致一种冲突：一方面我们的理性使得我们具有寻求统一世界观的超然冲动，另一方面限于我们的特殊性、偶然性，这种统一的理想又是无法实现的。由此形成了我们看待事物认识世界的两种视角：主观视角与客观视角，并根据这两种视角对世界形成一些主观性的认识和客观性的认识，以及由此带来的有关客观性追求上需要注意的地方。随后，这种分裂带来自我内部的紧张，人们努力尝试寻求伦理层面的调和，这种调和以尝试为利他主义的可能性申辩而获得喘息的机会。但由于内格尔在伦理学上对客观价值和客观理由的过度推崇，会导致这种调和失败，个体内部的个人性部分与非个人性部分的关系会越来越紧张，此时我们不得不寻求一种政治上尝试，以求能通过依照道德分工的制度设计来外化个体内部的非个人立场，同时满足平等的理想，而将个人性立场与个人关切留给主体自身，追求自己向往的美好生活。但最后人们会发现，要么非个人立场的要求太高，以至于让人难以忍受，要么是个人立场对美好生活的向往太过热烈，自身内部的非个人关切丧失权重，进而产生道德挫败感。面临这种已然违背当初雄心的困境，我们通过仔细的分析就会发现，问题不在于制度或者冲突的立场，而是作为核心线索的自我建构出现了问题，以至于无论是伦理的还是政治的对自我内部双重立场的整合都无法成功。本文试图借助主体间性的思路对内格尔的特殊自我观进行重构，以实现主客互镜视野中的自我超越，从根源上调和自我内部两种立场的张力。
Nagel’s main philosophical thoughts are extensive and profound, spanning many fields, and each field is full of insights, so that people often lose sight of one or the other, making it difficult to grasp the core, and making it difficult to understand Nagel’s philosophical ideas in a systematic way. Based on his ethical perspective, this paper attempts to systematically interweave his main philosophical issues, reconstruct some issues, and try to interpret them in a new way.This paper begins with a discussion of Nagel’s special conception of self, which is the basis of Nagel’s subjective and objective structure. And this special conception of self which is “split” by the transcendental capacity of rational reflection into two parts: the subjective part and the objective part. This “split” will lead to a conflict: on the one hand, our reason makes us have the transcendent impulse to seek a unified world view, on the other hand, limited by our particularity, contingency, this ideal of unity is impossible to achieve. Thus, we have formed two perspectives of looking at things and understanding the world: subjective perspective and objective perspective, and according to these two perspectives, we have formed some subjective and objective understandings of the world, as well as the resultant need for attention regarding the pursuit of objectivity.Subsequently, this split creates tension within the self, and an effort is made to try to find a reconciliation at the ethical level, a reconciliation that gains respite in the form of an attempt to plead for the possibility of altruism. However, Nagel’s excessive respect for objective value and objective reason in ethics will lead to the failure of this reconciliation, and the relationship between the personal part and the impersonal part within the individual will become increasingly tense. At this time, we have to seek a political attempt to externalize the impersonal standpoints within the individual through the institutional design of moral division of labor. At the same time, the ideal of equality is satisfied, and the individual’s personal standpoints and personal concerns are left to the subject itself, and the pursuit of their own yearning for a good life. But in the end, we find that either the impersonal standpoints are too demanding to bear, or the personal standpoints are so passionate about the good life that the impersonal concerns within ourselves lose weight, resulting in moral frustration. In the face of this dilemma, which is already contrary to our original ambition, a careful analysis reveals that the problem is not the system or the conflicting standpoints, but the self-construction as the core clue, so that neither ethical nor political integration of the dual standpoints within the self can succeed. This paper attempts to reconstruct Nagel’s particular conception of the self with the help of the idea of intersubjectivity in order to realize self-transcendence in the vision of subject-object mutual mirror and to reconcile the tension between the two standpoints within the self from the root.
