以市长热线为代表的公民问责制度日益成为社会治理的重要形式。公民问责制度如何影响街头官僚避责行为？既有街头官僚研究关注公民个体属性与互动中的行为对街头官僚决策的影响，而较少关注公民问责制度的作用。问责与避责研究提出制度路径与微观心理路径来解释问责压力与微观行为的关系。但上述两种路径均无法说明行动者对问责压力的意义建构。而以我国政府为背景的问责与避责研究提供了问责压力层级传递过程的洞见。但既有研究更多关注层级政府间的压力传导和回应策略，对单一组织内部，尤其是街头官僚如何理解与应对公民问责制度的压力关注较少。而针对避责行为的分析较少关注互动情境中的策略。为弥补上述不足，本研究以结合了新制度主义与符号互动论传统的栖居制度主义理论为视角，采用“制度-组织-社会互动”多层分析框架展开分析。本研究以市长热线制度和110接警为经验场景，分析公民问责制度对街头官僚避责行为的影响机制。为此，研究者开展了8个月的民族志调研。调研过程中，研究者参与日常接警工作，结合深度访谈、参与式观察、档案资料收集等方式收集了各类一手田野资料，并展开分析。本研究发现：第一，公民问责制度通过组织内部的“缓冲-强化”逆向过程影响街头官僚避责行为。一线管理者依靠专业知识和关系工作实现责任转移、责任消解和责任疏缓，以此缓冲外部公民问责制度的压力。公民诉求类型影响组织对问责压力的缓冲效果：专业型诉求压力得到有效缓冲；关系型诉求压力只能得到有限缓冲。街头官僚基于其职业身份通过情境叠加机制放大投诉责任的不确定性；通过关系压力机制将外部公民问责压力转化为组织内部关系压力，从而强化了公民问责制度的压力，并产生了保守的派警倾向与弥散的情绪压力后果。第二，街头官僚通过“情境避责”规避互动情境中的公民问责压力。在情境避责中，街头官僚通过情境定义识别互动中的问责风险。街头官僚通过构建互动“后台”，采取保守的行动脚本控制情绪和语言表达。最后，街头官僚通过框架策略重新界定公民诉求，纠正偏离的互动情境，规避公民问责压力。框架策略依赖组织原有的惯例和文化等框架资源。本研究分析了公民问责制度对街头官僚避责行为的影响，提出组织内部的“缓冲-强化”逆向机制，丰富了公民问责制度对街头官僚避责行为影响的机制解释；提出“情境避责”策略，丰富了避责策略的类型与分析维度。
Citizen accountability institutions, exemplified by the Mayor’s Hotline, have increasingly become a crucial form of governance. The behavior of street-level bureaucrats （SLBs） significantly influences the quality of public services. How do citizen accountability institutions affect the blame-avoidance behavior （BAB） of street-level bureaucrats? Existing studies on SLBs primarily focus on how citizen’s attributes and behaviors influence SLB’s discretion, while paying less attention to the impact of citizen accountability institutions. Studies of accountability and BAB propose institutional approach and micro-psychological approach to explain the relationship between accountability pressure and micro-level behaviors. However, both approaches fail to adequately explain how actors attribute meanings to accountability pressures. Research on accountability and blame avoidance within the context of the Chinese government offers insights into the hierarchical transmission of accountability pressure. Nonetheless, most of these studies focus on the transmission of pressure and coping strategies among different levels of government, with less attention given to how SLBs within a single organization perceive and respond to the pressures. Research on BAB neglects interactional situation.To address these gaps, the dissertation adopts inhabited institutionalism perspective, integrating theoretical traditions from new institutionalism and symbolic interactionism, and employs a multi-level analytical framework of “institution-organization-social interaction” to explore the impact mechanisms of citizen accountability institutions on SLB. Against the empirical scenarios of Mayor’s Hotline institution and 110 emergency call, the study analyzes the influence of citizen accountability institutions on the BAB of SLB. To this end, the researcher conducted an eight-month ethnographic study, participating in daily emergency call taking, and collected various first-hand field data through in-depth interviews, participatory observation, and archival data collection.The findings are as follows: First, the citizen accountability institution influences SLB behavior through an internal organizational “buffering-reinforcing” reverse mechanism. Frontline supervisors rely on professional knowledge and relational work to achieve accountability transfer, accountability dilution, and accountability alleviation, thereby buffering external citizen accountability pressures. The effectiveness of the organization’s buffering of accountability pressure is mediated by the type of citizen complaints: pressure from professional complaints is effectively buffered, while pressure from relational complaints is only partially buffered. Street-level bureaucrats, based on their professional identity, amplify the uncertainty of accountability through a mechanism of situational uncertainty chains; they convert external accountability pressure into internal relational pressure through a relational pressure mechanism, thereby reinforcing citizen accountability pressure, which results in a conservative dispatching disposition and leads to diffused emotional pressure. Second, street-level bureaucrats evade pressures in interactive situations through “situational blame avoidance”. In situational blame avoidance, street-level bureaucrats identify risks of being blamed in interactions by situation definition. By constructing a “backstage”, they adopt conservative scripts to control emotional and verbal expressions. Finally, street-level bureaucrats use framing strategies to redefine citizen demands, correct deviated interactive situations, achieve interactional reintegration, and evade citizen accountability pressures. These framing strategies rely on the organization’s existing routines, culture, and other resources.This study analyzes the impact of citizen accountability institutions on street-level bureaucrat behavior, proposing the “buffering-reinforcing” reverse mechanism, enriching the explanation of the mechanisms by which citizen accountability institutions influence street-level bureaucrat behavior. Additionally, it introduces the “situational blame avoidance” strategy, revealing the micro-interactional processes involved in blame avoidance strategies.
