数字经济背景下，数字平台实施的自我优待行为成为竞争法领域的关注焦点之一，但对如何长效治理数字平台的自我优待行为尚未达成共识。首先，需要对数字平台的自我优待行为定性。数字平台的自我优待是指数字平台在提供交易场所和信息服务的同时，基于自身在数字经济中的结构性位置，跨界开展自营业务，凭借制定规则的权力、积累的大数据、算法和资本等资源或其他优势给予自营业务特别待遇。这与现行反垄断法中的差别待遇、搭售和拒绝交易等行为有交叉重合之处，但并不完全一致。作为极具延展性的概念，自我优待的行为表现形式多样。对此，根据数字平台开展自营业务的方向，可以将自我优待行为划分为横向、纵向和混业的自我优待三种类型。在反垄断法视角下，数字平台在双重身份下的自我优待会导致利益冲突、同时影响平台内和平台间市场竞争、具有不完全排他性等特征。数字平台有动力且能够实施自我优待行为，源于数字平台进入市场存量竞争阶段，其结构优势能够规模化聚合市场需求和资源，并借此传导市场力量，通过开展自营业务实现跨界竞争。其次，需要辩证审视数字平台实施自我优待行为的竞争效果。数字平台自我优待行为具有一定的公平合理性，且不具有天然违法性。参考“可竞争性市场理论”“动态竞争理论”和“提高竞争对手成本理论”等观点，分别对横向、纵向和混业的自我优待从平台内和平台间市场竞争效果分析展开讨论。其中，横向自我优待的竞争影响主要体现在对创新效率和平台内竞争对手的挤压—转移效应；纵向自我优待的竞争影响主要体现在对平台自身交易成本内部化，提高平台效率和对平台间不兼容可能导致锁定效应增强；混业自我优待主要体现在跨市场交叉影响。总之，数字平台的自我优待行为并不必然对市场产生排除、限制竞争效果，需要根据不同的行为类型具体权衡有利和不利的竞争效果。最后，需要剖析数字平台自我优待行为的反垄断治理现状并提出适配的规则构想。反垄断监管机构出于多种因素考量没有正式出台文件就数字平台的自我优待行为作出回应。可以先行结合反垄断法修正案第9条和第22条，适用滥用市场支配地位的分析框架治理自我优待行为，但存在不完全适配的困境。对此，参考域外经验后，需要转变反垄断监管理念；加强数字平台内部自治和数字平台外部治理协同，引导和加强数字平台的反垄断合规建设；完善数字平台事先预防和事后监管制度体系，落实数字平台的法律义务和法律责任。

In the context of the digital economy, self-preferential behaviour implemented by digital platforms has become one of the focuses of attention in the field of competition law, but no consensus has been reached on how to govern the self-preferential behaviour of digital platforms in the long run.Firstly, it is necessary to qualify the self-preferential behaviour of digital platforms. Self-preferential treatment by digital platforms refers to the fact that digital platforms, while providing trading venues and information services, carry out self-operated business across borders based on their structural position in the digital economy, and give special treatment to their self-operated business by virtue of the power to make rules, accumulated resources such as big data, algorithms and capital, or other advantages. This is cross-cutting and overlapping with, but not entirely consistent with, differential treatment, tying and refusal to deal under existing antitrust laws. As a highly scalable concept, self-preferential treatment can take many forms. In this regard, according to the direction of digital platforms in conducting self-operated business, self-preferential behaviour can be classified into three types of self-preferential behaviour: horizontal, vertical and mixed. From the perspective of antitrust law, self-preferential treatment by digital platforms in their dual capacity can lead to conflicts of interest, affect both intra- and inter-platform market competition, and be characterised by incomplete exclusivity. Digital platforms are motivated and able to implement self-preferential behaviours because they have entered the stage of market stock competition, and their structural advantages enable them to aggregate market demand and resources on a large scale, and use them to channel market forces to achieve cross-border competition through self-operated businesses.Secondly, it is necessary to dialectically examine the competitive effect of self-preferential behaviour of digital platforms. Self-preferential behaviour of digital platforms is fair and reasonable and not naturally illegal. With reference to the "Competitive Market Theory", "Dynamic Competition Theory" and "Raising Competitors‘ Costs Theory", we have discussed the effects of self-preferential behaviours in horizontal, vertical and mixed industries from the perspective of intra-platform and inter-platform market competition, and have discussed the effects of self-preferential behaviours in digital platforms. The analysis of the competitive effects of horizontal, vertical and hybrid self-preferentiality from intra-platform and inter-platform markets is discussed. Among them, the competitive effects of horizontal self-preferential treatment are mainly reflected in the squeeze-transfer effect on innovation efficiency and intra-platform competitors; the competitive effects of vertical self-preferential treatment are mainly reflected in the internalisation of the platform‘s own transaction costs, the improvement of the platform‘s efficiency, and the enhancement of lock-in effects that may be caused by the incompatibility of inter-platforms; and the mixed-sector self-preferential treatment is mainly reflected in the cross-market cross-influence. In short, the self-preferential behaviour of digital platforms does not necessarily have the effect of excluding and restricting competition in the market, and it is necessary to weigh the competitive effects according to different types of behaviour.Finally, it is necessary to analyse the current state of antitrust governance of self-preferential behaviours on digital platforms and propose appropriate rules. Antitrust regulators have not formally responded to the self-preferential behaviour of digital platforms due to various factors. It is possible to apply the analytical framework of abuse of dominant market position in conjunction with the amendments to Articles 9 and 22 of the Antimonopoly Act to regulate self-preferential behaviour, but there is a dilemma of incomplete adaptation. In this regard, with reference to extra-territorial experiences, it is necessary to change the concept of antitrust regulation; strengthen the synergy between internal autonomy of digital platforms and external governance of digital platforms; guide and strengthen the construction of antitrust compliance of digital platforms; and improve the system of ex ante prevention and ex post supervision of digital platforms, and implement the legal obligations and legal liabilities of digital platforms.