摘 要 在系统回顾国内外监管研究的基础上，本文指出政府监管政策始终受发展偏好与安全偏好的双重影响，当前监管乱象频发的原因可归结为简政放权改革促使地方政府追求发展目标而忽略了规制目标，致使市场监管效能中的安全因素下降。 进一步，本文选取相关场景案例及Ｈ市Ｔ地区作为研究对象，围绕研究问题运用案例研究、访谈调研、模型构建等方法展开综合分析。首先，本文总结了简政放权后的当地监管效能相关问题，指出市场监管面临的新要求和挑战。其次，本文从微观层面构建了一个基于监管对象理性人假设的市场监管效能函数，从宏观层面构建基于监管目的是社会总福利最大化假设的宏观市场监管效能函数。在此基础上，本文按事前、事中、事后等监管环节详细分析和论证了各相关因子对市场监管效能的影响，并据此构建了引入多元监管主体的市场监管运行体系框架。最后，通过实证分析，本文得出“简政”放权或过度、监管体系调整滞后、监管职能弱化、行政处罚力度降低、监管检查频率降低、信息掌握不充分、信用公示制度不完善、信用惩戒机制不健全等八大因素是简政放权背景下监管效能不理想的主要原因。 在政策启示方面，本文提出转变监管理念、完善行政监管组织体系、完善权力事项清单、完善信用监管体系、构建社会共治格局等五大具体改革路径，以提升市场监管效能。本研究更关注于市场监管效能的影响机制及评估体系，对政府制定和调整简政放权政策及改进市场监管工作，有一定参考意义。
Abstract Based on a comprehensive review of domestic and international regulatory research, this paper highlights that government regulatory policies are always influenced by both development preferences and safety preferences. The current surge in regulatory chaos can be attributed to SADP reforms driving local governments to prioritize development goals over regulatory objectives, resulting in a decline in safety factors within market supervision efficiency. Furthermore, this study selects relevant scenarios and focuses on T District in H City as the research object. It employs methods such as case studies, interviews, and model construction to comprehensively analyze the research question. First, the paper summarizes the local regulatory issues after SADP implementation, identifying new requirements and challenges faced by market supervision. Next, it constructs a micro-level market supervision efficiency function based on the rational actor hypothesis of regulatory subjects and a macro-level function based on the assumption that regulatory purposes maximize overall social welfare. Building upon this foundation, the paper thoroughly analyzes and argues the impact of various factors on market supervision efficiency across different regulatory stages (pre-regulation, during regulation, and post-regulation). It also proposes a market supervision operational framework that incorporates multiple regulatory entities. Finally, empirical analysis reveals that seven major factors—excessive streamlining, lagging regulatory system adjustments, weakened regulatory functions, reduced administrative penalties, decreased inspection frequency, insufficient information grasp, imperfect credit disclosure systems, and inadequate credit punishment mechanisms—are the primary reasons for suboptimal regulatory efficiency under the SADP context. In terms of policy implications, the paper suggests five specific reform paths: shifting regulatory mindset, improving administrative regulatory organizational structures, refining the list of delegated powers, enhancing credit regulatory systems, and establishing a social governance pattern. This research focuses on the impact mechanisms and evaluation systems of market supervision efficiency, providing valuable insights for government policy formulation, SADP adjustments, and improvements in market supervision work.
