作为一项保障人的尊严的基本性权利，职业自由在世界范围多以直接或间接的方式写入宪法，但我国至今仍未将职业自由写入宪法。缺乏基本权利的宪法保障，公民择业从业过程中难以切实行使自由权利。本文以司法部对港澳台（中国籍）居民律师执业限制规定为切入点，通过对这一系列行政规定的合宪性分析，串联起职业自由的规范证成、保障范围及合宪性标准这三个关键问题，以为职业自由的教义学体系作一初步建构。本文第一章以引言形式介绍职业自由研究现状及本文的研究思路和方法。第二章旨在界定权利保障范围，实现职业自由作为基本权利的规范证成，具体分析《宪法》第33条人权条款、第42条劳动权两条解释路径的可行性，以及《宪法》序言第7自然段、第11条和第15条等条款所组成的“社会主义市场经济”的规范群，既然社会主义市场经济已经纳入了宪制结构的一部分，则通过对其条款的规范目的解释可得，劳动者选择、从事某职业的自由作为市场经济的结构性要素，就也要求被宪制结构所保障，社会主义市场经济作为宪法的客观制度，就也成为保障职业自由的客观制度，此亦即职业自由的制度性保障。第三章意在界定职业自由的保障范围。哪些主体可享有基本权利的保障，何种客体利益应得到基本权利保障。回溯到本文所讨论的实证问题上，“港澳台居民”模糊的公法身份定位使得职业自由的保障具有多重可能，通过对《香港基本法》、《澳门基本法》的体系解释和教义学分析，探究这一群体应在何种范围內享有职业自由的宪法保障。第四章试图建构中国式职业自由的合宪性标准。兼顾形式合宪性（法律保留）和实质合宪性（比例原则）两个面向，借用日本及德国的相关理论资源，阐述两国在合宪性的实质性判断上各自建立的不同模式及各自特点并加以吸收，以港澳台居民的律师执业限制案例讨论我国宪法体制下对职业自由规制合宪性的分析的判定基准，并由此展示该判准的实践合理性。

As a fundamental right ultimately aimed at protecting human dignity, freedom of occupation has been written into the constitutions of many countries around the world either directly or indirectly, but there is no written provision in the current Constitution of China. In the absence of written provisions in the Constitution, the question of how freedom of occupation should be guaranteed has become not only a practical issue but also a theoretical one worth exploring.This paper takes the Ministry of Justice‘s restriction on the practice of lawyers of Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan (Chinese nationality) residents as an entry point, and analyzes the constitutionality of a series of related administrative regulations, linking up the three key issues of normative evidence of freedom of occupation, the scope of protection and the standard of constitutionality, so as to provide a preliminary construction for the doctrinal system of freedom of occupation.Chapter 1 introduces the current state of research on freedom of occupation and the research ideas and methods of this paper . Compared with the lack of our Constitution, freedom of occupation as a fundamental right has been widely regulated in the constitutions of various countries. Domestic academics generally advocate that freedom of occupation should exist, but the doctrinal research on it is weak due to the lack of clear provisions. This chapter takes the restrictive provisions of the Ministry of Justice as a starting point to explore the paths and measures for making freedom of occupation a fundamental right within the framework of constitutional guarantees.Chapter 2 develops the normative justification of freedom of occupation as a fundamental right, analyzing the possibility of interpreting the human rights provisions of article 33 and the right to work of article 42 of the Constitution, as well as the normative grouping of the "socialist market economy" formed by the seventh preamble paragraph, article 11 and article 15 of the Constitution. In this regard, the paper argues that, since the socialist market economy has been incorporated as a component of the constitutional structure, the interpretation of the normative purpose of its provisions makes it possible to consider that, in this context, the freedom of workers to choose and engage in a certain occupation, as a structural element of the market economy, is also required to be guaranteed by the Constitution.Chapter 3 is intended to define the scope of the protection of freedom of occupation, and to explore which subjects are entitled to the protection of fundamental rights and which object interests should be protected. Returning to the case discussed in this paper, the ambiguous public law status of "Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan residents" makes it possible to guarantee their freedom of occupation in multiple ways, and through the systematic interpretation of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Macao Basic Law and doctrinal analyses, it will be explored how this group of people can be guaranteed by the Constitution.Chapter 4 attempts to construct a Chinese-style constitutionality standard for freedom of occupation. Taking both formal constitutionality (legal reservation) and substantive constitutionality (principle of proportionality) into account, the chapter borrows the relevant theoretical resources of Japan and Germany, illustrates the different modes of substantial judgment of constitutionality established by each of the two countries and their respective characteristics and absorbs them, and uses the case of restrictions on lawyers‘ practice for Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan residents to discuss the criteria for the analysis of the constitutionality of freedom of occupation under China‘s constitutional system, and thus shows the practical reasonableness of this criteria.