霍布斯在《利维坦》中借用包括“信约”“授权”“赠与”及“人格”在内的多个法学概念来构建他的社会契约理论。该文通过还原这些概念在法律体系与法学理论中的含义和用法，并将它们同霍布斯的表述进行对比，来解读这些概念在霍布斯的理论中所发挥的作用，进而澄清《利维坦》文本中的歧义。 在政治契约论发展史上，霍布斯首创了单一社会契约论。不同于以往的契约论者，他既不承认人民与统治者之间缔结了统治契约，也不认为人民、统治者和上帝之间订立了神圣契约，而是用唯一的社会契约来解释国家的建立。在他的理论中，契约没有在臣民和主权者之间建立相互的义务关系，而是使缔约者之间互负按约建立国家的义务。霍布斯使契约论的基本理论构造发生了转变，为后世社会契约论的发展奠定了基础。 文章根据《利维坦》的描述，将按约建国的过程分解为四个事件：订立社会信约、选举主权者人选、对主权者赋权和创建国家人格。在霍布斯的理论中，信约的概念起到了不可或缺的作用，但是臣民与主权者之间的权力与义务关系实际上是通过授权与转让建立的。从民事契约的构成要件来看，社会信约的订立要求有确定的当事方，从而明确了一国民众的范围；社会信约中的作为义务和对价是对主权者赋权；由于赋权行为在选举主权者之后才实施，所以约定的内容属于面向未来的允诺。就授权和转让所能够创设的权利义务关系而言，对主权者赋权应当理解为通过这两个行为共同完成。这是因为未经授权主权者便无权替臣民处分权利，若无权利的转让臣民就不可能负有服从于主权者意志的义务。此外，国家人格的形成也不是立约行为的直接效果，而是所有人授权行为的结果。 文章进一步提出，现代民商法学的法律行为理论和社团理论可以用于诠释社会契约理论，使其理论结构更加明晰。法律行为可以分为单方、双方和共同法律行为以及决议，它们分别同霍布斯理论中的授权与转让、社会信约的订立、国家人格的创设和主权者人选的选举相对应。这种分类方式有助于澄清不同行为的性质以及它们所引发的效果。负担行为与处分行为的届分则有助于解释立约行为和赋权行为的区别与联系。同时，基尔克关于社团是由共同行为创设的观点可以更充分地阐释国家人格的由来。

In Leviathan, Hobbes borrows legal concepts including “covenant” “authorization” “gift” and “person” to build his social contract theory. This article interprets the function of these concepts in Hobbes’s theory by reconstructing their meanings and usage in legal systems and legal theories, and compare them with Hobbes’s expression, to clarify the ambiguities in the text of Leviathan. In the history of the development of political contract theory, Hobbes first created the sole social contract theory. Unlike past contractarians, Hobbes did not admit that the people and the ruler made a rulership contract, nor did he believe that there is a covenant between the people, the ruler, and God. Rather, he explained the establishment of a state solely with the social contract. In his theory, the covenant does not create a relationship of mutual obligations between the subjects and the sovereign but obliges the contracting parties to establish the state. Hobbes changed the fundamental theoretical structure of the contractarian theory, laying a foundation for future social contract theories. This article divides the process of establishing a state by covenant into four events according to the description in Leviathan: the conclusion of social contracts, the election of the sovereign candidate, the empowerment of the sovereign, and the creation of the state personality. In Hobbes’s theory, the covenant plays an indispensable role, but the relationship of power and duty between the subject and the sovereign is in fact formed through authorization and alienation. According to the elements of a civil contract, the conclusion of a social contract requires defined parties, thus making clear the scope of a state’s population; the obligation and consideration is to empower the sovereign; since the empowerment is performed after the selection of the sovereign, the content of the covenant is a promise facing the future. In terms of the relationship of rights and obligations that authorization and alienation can create, the empowerment of the sovereign should be understood as being accomplished by both actions. This is because the sovereign has no right to act on behalf of subjects without authorization, and the subjects cannot be obliged to submit to the will of the sovereign without the alienation of rights. In addition, the formation of state personality is not the direct effect of the covenant but the consequence of everyone’s authorization. The article further proposes that the legal actions theory and corporation theory of modern civil and commercial law can be applied to social contract theory, clarifying its theoretical structure. Legal actions can be separated into unilateral, bilateral, and joint legal actions, and resolutions, which correspond to authorization and alienation, the conclusion of social contracts, the creation of state personality, and the election of the sovereign candidate. This way of categorization helps clarify the nature of different actions and the effects they may cause. The division of the act of debt and the act of disposition helps explain the difference and connection between the conclusion of covenants and the act of empowerment. Meanwhile, Gierke’s opinion that corporations are created by joint actions can better explain the origin of state personality.