公司治理研究认为股权结构会解决公司治理中的代理问题，在改善公司业绩方面有积极的作用。而创新在促进企业业绩方面在众多经济学文献中已得到广泛验证。本文结合创新理论、代理理论和信息不对称理论，通过国内外相关文献总结得出股权集中度的不同会影响企业的研发投资决策。因此本文通过实证研究来论证股权集中度与企业创新的相关性。本文使用采用2003-2022年A股上市公司第一大股东股权占比、专利总申请量、发明专利申请数量等数据，通过模型回归方法，完成了股权集中度与企业创新的相关性研究，得出主要研究结论如下：（1）股权集中度对企业创新呈现“倒U型”关系，即当股权集中度低于极大值点时，随着股权集中度的增加，股东对管理层的监督效应会促进企业的创新；当股权集中度高于极大值点时，随着股权集中度进一步的增加导致大股东对小股东利益的侵占效应，从而抑制企业的创新。（2）企业股权制衡度有差异，股权集中度对企业创新的影响程度亦有所差异，股权制衡度负向调节股权集中度与企业创新关系；（3）高股权集中度对成熟企业创新有明显促进作用；（4）高股权集中度对企业创新的促进效应在制度环境较差的地区更加明显。本文进一步做了内生性检验，在模型中加入被解释变量的滞后一期值，检验结果显著；也做了稳健性检验，采用前三大股东持股比例之和替代原有的第一大股东持股占比、采用企业专利总数和企业创新效率来替代原有的企业专利申请数，检测的结果均显示股权集中度对企业创新呈现“倒U型”关系。最后从得到的研究结论出发，分别从企业角度、政府角度提出了相应的对策建议，以促进企业更积极地进行创新，助力我国创新能力的提升。

Corporate governance research suggests that ownership structure can address agency problems in governance, thereby positively impacting firm performance. Meanwhile, the role of innovation in enhancing firm performance has been extensively validated in numerous economic studies. Drawing on innovation theory, agency theory, and information asymmetry theory, this paper synthesizes relevant domestic and international literature to conclude that varying levels of ownership concentration by major shareholders affect firms‘ research and development (R&D) investment decisions. Consequently, this study carries out empirical analysis to establish the relationship between the ownership concentration and corporate innovation.Drawing on shareholding information from the largest stakeholders, as well as total and invention patent filings of A-share listed companies over the years 2003 to 2022, this research applies regression analysis to explore the correlation between concentrated ownership concentration and corporate innovation. The main research findings are as follows: (1) The ownership concentration exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with corporate innovation, indicating that as ownership concentration increases below the maximum point, shareholder supervision enhances innovation; however, when ownership concentration exceeds the maximum point, further increases lead to a dominating effect by major shareholders over minority shareholders, thereby inhibiting innovation. (2) There are variations in corporate ownership balance, and the impact of ownership concentration on firm innovation also varies. Corporate ownership balance negatively moderates the relationship between ownership concentration and firm innovation. (3) High ownership concentration significantly promotes innovation in mature firms. (4) The promotion effect of high ownership concentration on firm innovation is more pronounced in regions with poor institutional environments.This paper further conducts endogeneity tests by adding the lagged one-period value of the dependent variable in the model, with significant results. Robustness tests are also performed, with significant results when substituting the aggregate shareholding of the top three shareholders with that of the largest shareholder and when using total patents and corporate innovation efficiency to replace the original number of patent applications, confirming that the ownership concentration exhibits an inverted U-shaped relationship with corporate innovation. Finally, based on the research findings, corresponding policy recommendations are proposed from both the perspectives of enterprises and governments to encourage firms to engage more actively in innovation, thereby assisting in enhancing China‘s innovation capabilities.