中国上市公司控股股东的减持乱象屡见不鲜，市场对控股股东的减持行为给予了高度关注。从控股股东持股的整个生命周期来看，其股权变动的特征为从IPO到IPO后的第10年一直减少，之后维持在一个稳定水平。本文围绕这一现象，结合理论和实证分析，深入探究其背后的动因和机制。本文创新性地构建了一个符合中国市场特色的控股股东股权动态变化理论模型，发现在上市初期，控股股东风险厌恶导致的分散投资需求是控股股东减持的动力，在减持过程中，股票价格相对真实价值的偏离程度也会影响控股股东的股权动态。偏离的一部分是来自于中国特色的“壳价值”，这是由于中国市场对IPO的严格管制所产生的。控股股东在减持的过程中，会考虑大额减持对市场价格的影响，因为市场价格来自于投资者的预期，因此控股股东会选择分次逐步减持到最优的持股比例。本文使用中国市场2005-2022年的上市公司数据，对理论模型的基本假设和结论进行了实证检验，为中国上市公司控股股东股权动态变化提供了新的证据。本文发现控股股东的持股比例越高，控股股东的工作越努力，企业的人力资源投入回报率和人均研发投入越高，导致未来企业的总资产收益率，股票回报和夏普比率提高。本文检验了控股股东股权比例减少的影响因素，发现控股股东的持股比例越高，风险厌恶程度越高、股票较真实价值的偏离程度越大，壳价值含量越高，未来控股股东越可能进行大比例的减持。本文创新性地使用中国市场2014-2022年的调研纪要数据，对控股股东在减持过程中的操纵行为进行了实证检验。本文发现控股股东在减持公告月附近会组织更多数量的机构调研，发布内容更多，语调更正面的调研纪要。这种策略会影响投资者对公司未来发展的预期，具体表现为提升股票未来短期的异常收益率和异常换手率，这些影响能够为控股股东的减持创造有利的市场条件，缩短他的减持周期。此外，在减持期间，控股股东在调研纪要中对公司新闻和经营状况的解读与非减持期间存在显著差异。这些发现为其操纵行为提供了强有力的证据。本文提出如下政策建议：鼓励增持，回购，分红等行为；逐渐放松IPO管制；调整减持预披露时间；完善中小投资者与上市公司的沟通渠道。
Irregularities in shareholding reductions by controlling shareholders of Chinese listed companies are frequently observed, attracting significant attention from the market. From the perspective of the entire lifecycle of controlling shareholders' ownership, their ownership characteristics exhibit a continuous decrease from the IPO to the 10th year post-IPO, after which they stabilize at a certain level. This thesis analyzes and examines the underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon from both theoretical and empirical perspectives.This thesis constructs a theoretical model of the dynamics in the ownership of controlling shareholders. It finds that in the early stages after listing, the controlling shareholders' risk aversion and the resulting need for diversified investment drive their reductions in shareholdings. During the process of reducing shareholdings, the extent to which the stock price deviates from its true value also affects the dynamics of the controlling shareholders' ownership. Part of this deviation arises from the uniquely Chinese shell value which is a result of the strict regulation of IPOs in the Chinese market. Controlling shareholders, during the process of reducing their holdings, will consider the impact of large-scale reductions on market prices, as market prices are derived from investors' expectations. Therefore, controlling shareholders will opt for gradual reductions in multiple steps to achieve the optimal shareholding ratio.This thesis empirically tests the basic assumptions and conclusions of the theoretical model using data from listed companies in the Chinese market from 2005 to 2022. It finds that the higher the ownership of the controlling shareholders, the harder the controlling shareholders work, and the higher the return on human resource investment and per capita R&D investment of the enterprise. This leads to improvements in the future ROA, stock returns, and Sharpe ratio. The thesis also examines the factors influencing the reduction of controlling shareholders' ownership. It finds that the higher the ownership of the controlling shareholders, the higher their risk aversion, and the greater the deviation of the stock price from its true value, the more likely the controlling shareholders are to conduct large-scale share reductions in the future.This thesis uses investor meeting minutes data from the Chinese market from 2014 to 2022 to examine the self-serving behavior of controlling shareholders in manipulating stock prices during the reduction of their holdings. It finds that controlling shareholders organize a greater number of institutional meetings around the months of the share reduction announcements and release more content-rich and positively toned meeting summaries. The publication of these summaries influences investors' expectations of the company's future development, specifically manifesting as increased short-term abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume of the stock. These effects create favorable market conditions for the controlling shareholders' share reductions, thereby shortening their reduction cycle. Additionally, we find that controlling shareholders interpret actual news and operational conditions differently in the meeting summaries during the reduction period compared to non-reduction periods. This provides strong evidence for their manipulative behavior.This thesis puts forward the following policy recommendations: encourage share purchases, repurchases, and dividends; gradually relax IPO regulations; adjust the pre-disclosure period for share reductions; and improve the communication channels between retail investors and listed companies.
