出售式重整是将债务人企业的营业转让给投资人，并以所得对价清偿债权人。其优势在于把清算制度中的资产出售和注销债务人，与重整制度追求企业完整运营事业的社会价值的目标相结合。然而，我国破产制度起步较晚，相关制度及学界缺乏对于出售式重整资产转让的价值公允性问题研究。在此背景下，本文提出了两大核心问题：其一，出售式重整中资产转让价值的批准制度为何？其二，如何确定出售式重整中资产转让价值公允性的判断标准？实践层面，虽然中美两国出售式重整的目的具有相似性，但中美关于出售式重整的立法、实践操作不尽相同。美国出售式重整依托破产法第363条可以避开重整计划快速出售，效率相对显著，但其存在规避相关保障措施、程序滥用的可能性；中国则往往依托重整计划进行，但是在拟转让资产价值批准制度不明，资产转让的价值标准等方面均缺乏明确指导，估值方式尚不完善且缺乏保护资产出售价值最大化原则规则的情况下，制度优势难以发挥，资产转让的价值公允性也难言实现。理论层面，各国破产法目前并未就破产估值应采用哪种价值标准提供明确指导，且关于破产财产价值评估的传统方法普遍囿于难以充分体现代理成本、时间成本等因素的问题。本文认为上述实践层面的问题实际上源于制度层面的不足。因此，可以从如下方面回应上述困境：首先，厘清出售式重整的价值选择之自治、公平及效率要求，并明确资产转让的估值批准主体及批准内容，以该等主体之批准行为作为资产转让交易之前提。在此基础上，基于国外实践、国内制度基础及价值标准比较层面明确将“公允市价”作为出售式重整的价值标准。其次，分析出售式重整中可能影响资产价值公允性判断的因素及衡量方式。最后，重构我国出售式重整资产转让的价值公允性改良进路：第一阶段，基于“公允市价”价值标准及出售式重整的价值选择统一价值公允性判断标准。第二阶段，借鉴美国经验，完善交易前价值评估机制：在评估主体层面，鼓励以自我估值为主，分场景结合中立评估及市场评估；在程序性规则层面，完善信息披露制度及异议表达制度。第三阶段，补充价值调整机制：通过构建价值调整机制对企业价值进行回溯，基于客观实际纠偏，将对过程的成本计量转嫁到对结果的判断，最终保障拟转让资产的价值公允性。

The sale-model reorganization is the transfer of the debtor’s business to bankruptcy investors, and the pay the proceeds of the transfer to creditors. Its advantage lies in combining the asset sales and cancellation of debtors in the liquidation system with the goal of pursuing the social value of the complete operation of the enterprise in the reorganization system. However, bankruptcy system in China started relatively late, and relevant laws have not established a value fairness judgment standard for asset transfer in the sale-model reorganization, nor have the laws answered how to protect assets in the sale-model reorganization to obtain value fairness in the transfer process. Under this background, two core questions can be raised: firstly, what is the approval system of the value of asset transfer in the sale-model reorganization? Secondly, how to determine the evaluation standard for the value fairness of asset transfer in the sale-model reorganization?From the perspective of legal practice, although the purpose of the sale-model reorganization in China and the United States is similar, the legislation and practice of the sale-model reorganization in China and the United States are not the same. The sale-model reorganization in the United States relying on section 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code can avoid the reorganization plan to sell quickly, the efficiency is relatively significant, but there is the possibility of procedural abuses and circumventing the relevant safeguards; China tends to rely on the reorganization plan, but lacks clear guidance in terms of approving the value of assets to be transferred, the value standards for asset transfers, and the valuation methods are not yet perfect, and there is a lack of principles and rules to protect the maximum value of asset transfer. As a result, the advantages of the system are difficult to play, and the value fairness of the asset transfer is also difficult to achieve. From the perspective of the theory, bankruptcy laws in China do not currently provide clear guidance on which value standard should be used for insolvency valuation, and traditional methods of assessing the value of the insolvency assets are generally limited by the difficulty of adequately reflecting factors such as agency costs and time costs.The above dilemma can be addressed from the following aspects: firstly, clarify the requirements of autonomy, fairness and efficiency for the value principles of the sale-model reorganization, and specifies the subject and content of the valuation approval for the asset transfer, and takes the approval of such subject as the prerequisite for the asset transfer transaction. Based on foreign practices, domestic institutional foundations and value standards comparison, the “fair market value” (“FMV”) should be clarified as the value standard of the sale-model reorganization. Secondly, analyze the factors that may affect the value fairness of asset in the sale-model reorganization and the way of measurement. Finally, reconstruct the way to improve the value fairness of asset transfer in China’s sale-model reorganization:Specifically, in the first phase, to unify a value fairness judgment standard based on the FMV value standard and the value selection of the sale-model reorganization. In the second phase, learning from the sale-model reorganization the United States, improve the pre-transaction value evaluation mechanism: from the perspective of the value evaluation subject, encourage self-evaluation as the main approach, and combine neutral test and market test in different scenarios; from the perspective of procedural rules, improve the information disclosure regulations and objection raising system. In the third phase, supplement the value adjustment mechanism (“VAM”): It can be considered to encourage the construction of a VAM to backtrack the value of the enterprise in time, based on objective reality to achieve correction. This can not only avoid violating the absolute priority principle under bankruptcy reorganization, but also transfer the cost measurement regarding the process to the judgment of the results, and ultimately ensure the value fairness of the assets to be transferred.