改革开放以来,国有企业党的领导在实践中遇到挑战,出现党的领导弱化、淡化、虚化、边缘化问题,同时也引发了理论方面的质疑和争议。研究党的领导与现代公司治理融合问题具有重要的实践和理论意义,不仅有助于加强国有企业党的领导,而且能够为回应有关国有企业党的领导的质疑提供学理支撑。基于对于中国共产党领导国有企业的理论分析和历史考察,只有坚持党的领导和完善公司治理统一起来,不断调整和优化党的领导制度,从制度层面促进党的领导与现代公司治理深度融合,才能够既强化和完善党对国有企业的领导,同时适应和推动国有企业改革与发展。本文以国有企业党的领导制度为研究对象,探讨新时代党的领导与现代公司治理制度融合的主要逻辑。进入新时代以来,党中央提出“两个一以贯之”的新论断和“中国特色现代国有企业制度”新命题,都为党的领导与国有企业公司治理相融合提供了政策支撑。在此背景下,国有企业党的领导制度不断创新发展,为解决党的领导与现代公司治理融合难题提供了丰富的经验支撑。在决策环节,通过决策权配置、组织嵌入、讨论前置的制度创新,促进党组织融入现代企业决策体系,在纠偏决策偏差、削弱“内部人控制”问题、提高决策科学化民主化水平等方面充分发挥党的领导作用。在执行环节,在坚持党管干部原则的基础上引入市场化机制,完善干部选任和考核制度,强化对于经理层的激励效应;改进党建工作制度,强化党建责任制,促进党建与业务深度融合,发挥党组织的资源整合与组织动员优势,进而形成促进执行的强大驱动力。在监督环节,不断完善党内监督体系和监督制度建设,迅速扭转国企管党治党宽松软的状况,在继续完善出资人监督和企业内部监督制度的基础上,以党内监督统领国企大监督格局,建立协同监督的制度和机制,提高国企监督的整体效能。新时代国有企业党的领导制度的创新实践表明,党的领导和现代公司治理不仅可以相融共存,还可以互相促进,形成和谐共生的关系。党的领导制度将党的领导深度融入公司治理各环节,把党的政治优势转化为公司治理效能,进而提升国有企业决策科学性、执行力和监督效果。党的领导与国有企业公司治理的制度融合有其独特的体制背景、组织基础和制度支撑,中国特色政治经济体制为制度融合提供体制支撑,中国共产党的自主性与适应性特征是制度融合的重要条件,国有企业党的领导制度的制度创新深刻塑造了制度融合的模式。中国国有企业的实践充分论证了党组织存在于现代企业中的合法性与合理性,而且使党的领导已经成为中国特色现代企业制度的特色和优势,为现代企业制度构建提供了中国方案。
Since the reform and opening up, the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has encountered challenges in practice, resulting in issues such as weakened, diluted, virtual, and marginalized leadership. At the same time, this has also sparked theoretical questioning and controversy. The study of the integration of party leadership and modern corporate governance has important practical and theoretical significance, which can not only help strengthen the leadership of parties in SOEs but also provide theoretical support to respond to doubts about their leadership. Based on theoretical analysis and historical research on the leadership of CPC in SOEs in China, only by insisting on the leadership of the party and improving the corporate governance system can we continuously adjust and optimize the leadership system of the party, promote the deep integration of party leadership and modern corporate governance from the institutional level, and strengthen and improve the party‘s leadership of SOEs while adapting and promoting their reform and development. This article takes the party‘s leadership system of SOEs as the research object, and explores the main logic of the integration of party leadership and modern corporate governance systems in the new era..Since entering the new era, the CPC Central Committee has put forward a new proposition of "China‘s socialist modern SOE system with Chinese characteristics", and has promoted the innovative development of the leadership system of the CPC in SOEs, providing rich experiential support for solving the difficult problem of integrating the leadership of the CPC and modern corporate governance. In the decision-making process, through institutional innovation such as decision-making power allocation, organizational embedding, and pre-discussion, the party organization is integrated into the modern corporate decision-making system, fully exerting the leadership role of the CPC in correcting decision-making biases, weakening the problem of "internal control", and improving the scientific and democratic level of decision-making. In the execution process, on the basis of adhering to the principle of the CPC‘s management of cadres, market-oriented mechanisms are introduced, the system for selecting and assessing cadres is improved, and the incentive effect on management is strengthened. The system of party building work is improved, the responsibility system of party building is strengthened, and the deep integration of party building and business is promoted. The advantages of resource integration and organizational mobilization of the party organization are then leveraged, forming a powerful driving force for execution. In the supervision process, the internal supervision system and supervision system construction of the party are continuously improved. The loose and soft state of party governance in SOEs is quickly reversed. Based on the continued improvement of the supervision system of investors and internal supervision system of enterprises, the internal supervision of the party leads the overall supervision of SOEs. A collaborative supervision system and mechanism are established, and the overall effectiveness of SOE supervision is improved.The integration of party leadership and corporate governance in state-owned enterprises has its unique institutional background, organizational foundation, and institutional support. The special political and economic system in China provides institutional support for the integration of these two systems. The independence and adaptability of the Communist Party of China are important conditions for this integration, and the innovative leadership system of state-owned enterprises has profoundly shaped the model of institutional integration. The practice of Chinese state-owned enterprises fully demonstrates the legitimacy and rationality of party organizations in modern enterprises, and makes party leadership a characteristic and advantage of the Chinese modern enterprise system, providing a Chinese solution for building modern enterprise systems.