归类变更盈余管理，作为利用营业外收支分类变更增厚公司核心盈余的一种盈余管理方式，是相对应计、真实盈余管理更为隐蔽的一种盈利操纵手段。本文主要探讨了拟上市公司的归类变更盈余管理行为，验证了A股IPO中这一盈余操纵行为的存在性，并且从包括上市过会率、IPO排队时间成本、证监会处罚力度等多个监管环境指标出发，探讨监管环境变化是否会对管理层的归类变更盈余管理行为产生影响，并且这种影响在何种类型公司中更为显著。在存在性方面，与过往文献研究的结论相符，归类变更盈余管理行为在A股IPO公司之中显著存在，管理层存在调节营业外收支归类增厚核心盈余，以满足上市板要求或者提升发行价、吸引投资者认购的现象。就监管环境影响因素来看，与IPO成功与否直接相关的监管指标收紧，会对IPO中公司的归类操纵行为产生显著抑制效应，如行业过会率降低、上市排队天数增加，均对于归类变更盈余管理现象存在显著的负向抑制作用，这可能是公司考虑到IPO发行的失败风险、时间成本，提高了对于自身财务披露质量的要求。从不同所有权性质的公司来看，IPO监管环境收紧带来的抑制作用对于国企来说更为显著，这可能是因为国企管理层的业绩压力更小、政府关联更明显、受监管约束更明显。而对于与IPO不直接相关的监管因素，如证监会处罚行为，对于归类变更操纵行为未体现出显著的抑制作用。分所有权性质来看，证监会处罚力度的增加反而显著促进了非国有企业实施归类操纵现象，这可能是因为证监会处罚与IPO成功率不直接相关、且更多针对显性财务造假，反而驱使管理层采用更为隐蔽的归类变更盈余管理形式。基于以上结论，本文认为当前的IPO监管措施对于抑制归类变更盈余管理这一会计操纵行为存在一定的有效性，政策端可考虑进一步细化与营业外收支确认标准、核心盈余披露相关的监管原则和标准，以持续提高IPO公司的信息披露质量。
Classification shifting, as a way of earnings management, is a more invisible way of earnings manipulation than accrual or real earnings management. This paper mainly discusses the behavior of classification shifting earnings management of A-share IPO companies, verifies its existence in prospectus disclosure, and investigates the impact of the change in various regulatory factors, including CSRC IPO approval rate, IPO approval time cost, and CSRC punishment, on this shifting behavior. This paper examines whether a change in regulatory environment would effectively affect the classification shifting behavior of IPO companies and which type of company is more significantly impacted.The study shows that classification shifting exists significantly in A-share IPO companies given management’s incentive to meet listing requirements and boost offer price. For IPO-related regulatory factors, including CSRC approval and IPO approval time cost, the classification shifting is restrained by a tighter IPO regulatory environment, such as lower approval rate or longer days for approval. The restraining effect is more significant for state-owned enterprises, probably because SOE managers have less performance pressure, more government connections and more regulatory constraints.For non-IPO-related factors, such as CSRC punishment, the restraining effect is not as significant. For private-owned companies, increase on CSRC punishment even promotes companies’ classification shifting behavior, as punishment is more targeting severe financial fraud and may motivate management to use more invisible manipulation.Based on the above conclusions, this paper believes that the IPO regulation has shown some effectiveness for restraining classification shifting earnings management, and improving the quality of information disclosure of IPO companies. From a policymaking perspective, we could further refine the regulatory standards related to the classification of non-operating items and core earnings to further increase the earnings disclosure quality of IPO companies.
