“双循环”政策下，供应链的稳定成为重要经济目标，而日益完善的股权激励制度与愈发活跃的产业集群给上述目标带来机遇与挑战。在此背景下，理解企业股权激励对供应链产出的影响非常重要。本文从供应链中客户公司业绩的独特视角切入，探究供应商股权激励对供应链的影响。供应商实施股权激励后，会进行横向或纵向业务扩张。多元的业务来源使供应商对原有客户的依赖程度降低，进而提升其相对于客户公司的议价能力。客户公司被迫妥协让步，这会促使供应链利益重新分配，对客户公司的业绩造成不利影响。本文基于2006-2019年A股上市公司披露的前五大供应商与前五大客户数据构建了A股市场的供应链网络，实证检验企业是否股权激励与客户公司业绩的关系，以此探究企业股权激励的供应链溢出效应。研究发现，在控制了时间个体固定效应和部分客户公司特征后，供应商是否股权激励的虚拟变量与客户业绩显著负相关。此外，本文对亿纬锂能及其主要客户进行案例分析，为上述基本回归结果提供现实依据。为缓解内生性问题，本文使用工具变量法、倾向得分匹配法和处理效应模型进行稳健性检验。具体而言，选择供应商的管理层平均任期和区域股权激励特征作为工具变量，并分别采取工具变量法和系统广义矩估计进行检验；采用倾向得分匹配法处理样本选择偏误问题；使用处理效应模型处理样本自选择问题。本文还选取替换被解释变量和替换解释变量的方法从不同维度进行稳健性检，且上述检验的回归结果与基本回归一致。此外，企业股权激励对客户业绩的负向影响存在股权激励标的物、客户企业性质、客户企业所在地上市公司数量等方面的异质性。最后本文从供应链议价能力的角度实证检验供应商企业股权激励影响客户企业绩效这一过程的具体机制。本文的创新点在于新的研究对象（供应商股权激励与客户业绩）、新的代理变量（股权激励虚拟变量）、新的机制路径（供应链议价能力）。本文的研究结论能为政府、监管机构、企业和投资者的决策提供参考。
The stability of the supply chain under the "dual circulation" policy have become important economic goals, which make it important to understand the impact of corporate equity incentives on supply chain output.After the implementation of equity incentive, suppliers will carry out horizontal or vertical business expansion. Diversified business sources reduce the dependence of suppliers on original customers, thus improving their bargaining power relative to customer companies. Customer companies are forced to compromise, which will lead to the redistribution of supply chain benefits, which will have a negative impact on the performance of customer companies.Based on the data of the top five suppliers and customers disclosed by A-share companies from 2006 to 2019, this paper constructed the supply chain network of the market, and explored the spillover effect of corporate equity incentives. After controlling time and individual fixed effects, supplier equity incentives are significantly negatively correlated with customer performance. In addition, this paper analyzes the cases of EVE and its main customers to provide realistic basis for the paper. To alleviate the endogenous problem, this paper used instrumental variable method, propensity score matching method, and treatment effect model for robustness testing. Specifically, the average tenure of management and regional equity incentive characteristics of suppliers were selected as instrumental variables. Substituting explanatory and explained variables were used to test robustness. All the results are consistent with basic regression. In addition, the negative impact of equity incentives on customer performance is heterogeneous in terms of equity incentive targets, customer enterprise properties, and the number of listed companies where customer enterprises are located. Finally, from the perspectives of the change of bargaining power, this paper discusses the mechanism of the effect. The innovation of this paper lies in new research objects, proxy variables, and mechanism paths.
