2018年《公司法》对回购相关规则进行修订之后，我国资本市场迎来回购潮：上市公司股份回购积极性显著提升，回购频次和金额较之前大幅增加。值得关注的是，回购新政出台于市场信心低迷、股权质押风险集中释放的2018年年底，业界认为，修改回购规则有助于稳定市场信心、降低整体质押风险。本文基于2019至2022年的上市公司样本，运用Probit模型探究控股股东股权质押与上市公司股份回购之间的关系，重点通过实证的方法研究控股股东股权质押影响上市公司回购意愿的机制。研究发现，控股股东股权质押比例显著促进上市公司实施股份回购，主要原因在于较高比例股权质押的上市公司控股股东面临股价下跌造成的丧失控制权的风险，需要通过股份回购这一有效的市值管理手段稳定股价从而缓解控制权转移风险；利用回购新规的再融资优惠政策推动实施再融资以缓解股权质押带来的融资约束不是控股股东较高比例质押上市公司实施回购的主要原因。本文还发现，控股股东较高比例质押的上市公司回购股份的动机不在于向市场传递股价被低估的信号并在此基础上进一步通过事件研究法和多元回归分析研究控股股东较高比例股权质押与上市公司回购预案公告市场反应的关系。研究发现，控股股东较高的质押水平与公司回购预案公告的市场反应存在明显的负相关关系，分析师关注可以显著强化控股股东较高水平股权质押对市场反应的削弱作用。本文在发现控股股东股权质押水平正向影响公司回购意愿的基础上，深入探究股权质押影响股份回购决策的原因并进一步研究了控股股东较高比例股权质押和回购预案公告市场反应的关系及分析师关注在其中发挥的作用，丰富了现有股权质押与股份回购的相关研究。本文的研究结论对监管机构和投资者具有一定参考价值。

Share repurchases have been booming in China since the amendment of Corporate Law was passed. Notably, the new repurchase guideline encouraging share repurchases was released against the background of the 2018 share pledge crisis and was viewed as an effective way to reduce systematic risk caused by share pledge defaults. Using China A-share panel data from 2019 to 2022, this paper studies the effect of share pledge on share repurchases with focus on the mechanism of how share pledge influences the motivation of share repurchase. The results indicate that, controlling shareholder’s share pledge significantly increases the propensity to engage in share repurchases. This is because controlling stakeholders with relatively high pledge proportion are faced with risks of losing their control rights and are motivated to take advantage of share repurchase as a useful tool to stabilize the share price. While leveraging the favorable seasoned equity offering policy to ease financial constraints caused by share pledge is not the major reason why controlling shareholders with high portion of share pledge are inclined to repurchase shares. This paper also finds that signaling is not the main purpose of company whose controlling shareholder pledged relatively high portion of its shares to repurchase shares. Further analysis shows that controlling shareholder’s relatively high pledge proportion has significantly negative impact to short-term market effect of share repurchase announcement and analyst coverage can significantly enhance such negative impact. This study enriches existing paper concerning the relation between share pledge and share repurchases through further exploring the reasons behind the higher propensity of controlling shareholder with relatively high pledge proportion to promote share repurchases as well as examining the impact of share pledge towards short-term market effect of share repurchase announcement. The conclusions of this study can provide support for decisions of relevant regulators and investors.