保险公司因为其集合风险和分散风险的特殊属性，保险公司扮演着社会“稳定器”和经济“助推器”的角色，而保险公司所经营的就是风险，因此保险公司的风险承担便是关注的重点，而良好的公司治理能有效提升公司对于风险管理的能力，又因为保险公司经营的特殊性，和一般企业相比保险公司外部治理更为重要，所以本文则主要从外部治理的角度来研究财产保险公司风险承担的问题。本文基于利益相关者理论、委托代理理论和前景理论，通过2016-2021年我国71家财产保险公司数据样本，在“偿二代”背景下，研究财产保险公司外部监管强度、市场竞争程度和消费者投诉3个外部治理变量对其总体风险、杠杆风险、承保风险和流动性风险4个风险承担变量的影响，基于以上相关理论和数据的研究，本文得出如下结论：（1）外部监管强度对于财险公司风险承担存在着显著正向作用，存在着监管宽容的现象，即监管机构给了保险公司时间和空间去补充资本从而降低保险公司补充资本的压力，这段期间财产保险公司可能为了尽快弥补缺失的偿付能力充足率而会去选择承担更大的风险，而市场竞争对总体风险、杠杆风险和承保风险有正向显著作用，而消费者投诉对于总体风险和承保风险有显著正向作用，对于杠杆风险有显著负向作用；（2）经过异质性检验发现，外部监管机制对于高股权制衡财险公司、低风险管理水平财险公司和中小规模财险公司有更显著的作用，对于市场竞争而言在高风险管理水平和中小规模财产保险公司有更显著的作用，而消费者投诉对于低股权制衡财险公司、低风险管理水平财险公司和中小财险公司有更显著的作用；（3）进行中介效应检验发现外部监管是通过影响非效率投资这个中介变量从而有效影响财险公司总体风险和承保风险；（4）进行外部治理变量之间的交叉影响研究，研究显示外部治理变量之间存在着部分的交互影响。基于上述结论，本文有如下政策建议：监管机构应该防止部分偿付能力充足率过低的财产保险公司承担更多风险，同时对不同规模、不同股权制衡和不同风险管理能力的财产保险公司实施差异化和更加灵活的外部监管制度和针对其消费者投诉引起更加足够的重视，同时也要加强对我国保险市场的建设和加大力度保护财产保险消费者的权益。
Insurance companies because of its special attributes of pooling risk and spreading risk, insurance companies play the role of social "stabilizer" and economic "booster". Risk is an important part of insurance company‘s operation, so their risk taking is the focus of attention. Good corporate governance can effectively improve the company‘s ability to manage risk. Insurance companies pay more attention to external governance than ordinary enterprises, so this paper mainly from the perspective of external governance to study the risk of property insurance company.Based on stakeholder theory, principal-agent theory and prospect theory, this paper, based on data samples of 71 property insurance companies from 2016 to 2021, and under the background of " China‘s second generation solvency supervision system ", This paper studies the influences of three external governance variables, namely external regulatory intensity, consumer complaints and market competition degree, on four risk bearing variables, namely overall risk, leverage risk, underwriting risk and liquidity risk of property insurance companies. Based on the above relevant theories and data, this paper draws the following conclusions:(1) The external regulatory intensity has a significant positive effect on the risk taking of property insurance companies, and there is a phenomenon of regulatory tolerance, that is, the regulator gives the insurance company time and space to replenish capital so as to reduce the pressure on the insurance company to replenish capital. During this period, the property insurance company may choose to undertake greater risks in order to make up for the lack of solvency adequacy ratio as soon as possible. Market competition has a significant positive effect on aggregate risk, leverage risk and underwriting risk, while consumer complaints have a significant positive effect on aggregate risk and underwriting risk and a significant negative effect on leverage risk; (2) Through heterogeneity test, it is found that external regulatory mechanism plays a more significant role in property companies with high equity balance, property insurance companies with low risk management level and small and medium-sized property insurance companies, and plays a more significant role in high risk management and small and medium-sized property insurance companies in terms of market competition. And consumer complaints have a more significant effect on low equity balance property insurance companies, low risk management level property insurance companies and small and medium-sized property insurance companies; (3) Through the intermediary effect test, it is found that external supervision effectively affects the overall risk and underwriting risk of property insurance companies by influencing the intermediary variable of inefficient investment; (4) The cross-influence research among external governance variables is carried out, and the research shows that there are some interactive influences among external govern-ance variables.Based on the above conclusions, this paper concludes with the following policy recommendations: Regulators should prevent some property insurance companies with low solvency adequacy ratio from taking more risks, and at the same time implement differentiated and more flexible external regulatory systems for property insurance companies with different scales, different equity checks and balances and different risk management abilities, and pay more attention to their consumer complaints. At the same time, we should strengthen the construction of our insurance market and strengthen the protection of the property insurance consumer rights.
