当前，创新已经成为企业获取持续竞争优势的重要手段。在企业融资和优化治理结构的过程中，如何保留控制权以实施创新驱动战略就成了值得关注的问题。因此，双重股权机制应运而生，以保障创始人及其团队对公司的控制权，并激发其他治理主体持续投入创新的积极性。在引入双重股权的配置结构中，如何强化和推进企业创新行为成为亟待研究的重要议题。本研究旨在研究美股的双重股权结构对企业创新的影响。本研究基于对现有文献的回顾和梳理，选取了截止2021年在美国上市的97家中概企业，用研发投入作为企业创新的衡量标准，通过搜集这些上市企业的招股书中关于双重股权结构的信息，并将企业其他财务指标作为控制变量，建立多元线性回归模型。同时还对模型进行了内生性检验、稳健性检验和异质性分析等。本文实证研究了企业采用双重股权制度对企业创新的影响，并引入多个控制变量来提高模型整体的显著性水平。通过模型结果和分析表明，双重股权结构的制度在一定程度上可以促进企业创新。公司的价值更多地依赖于企业家、管理团队和核心员工的创新和经验。双重股权结构可以让企业家和管理团队保持对公司的控制力，不受投资人的掣肘，从而更加专注地提高企业的创新能力。由于高等级股权持有者可以通过控制权来影响企业的经营决策，因此他们会更加关注企业的长期发展和创新，而不是短期利益。相比之下，普通股东往往更加注重企业的短期收益，对企业的长远发展和创新投入可能不够。分行业看，双重股权结构对科技型企业的创新投入影响更为显著。这可能是因为高科技行业的企业更加需要进行长期的研发投资，而双重股权结构可以提供更好的长期激励机制，从而促进企业的创新。此外，政策制定者在制定具体政策时，不仅需要考虑到其在促进企业创新方面的积极作用，还需要加强对双重股权结构下公司治理的监管，包括惩罚滥用特别表决权行为、引入监事制度来保障公司的信息披露和监督机制、提升信息披露要求标准等，以确保中小股东的权益得到保护，防止大股东的控制权滥用。

Currently, innovation has become an important means for companies to gain sustainable competitive advantages. In the process of corporate financing and optimizing governance structures, how to retain control rights to implement innovation-driven strategies has become a significant concern. Therefore, the dual-class share structure has emerged to safeguard the control rights of founders and their teams and to stimulate the enthusiasm of other governance entities to continue investing in innovation. In the context of introducing the dual-class share structure, it is crucial to strengthen and promote corporate innovative behavior, which is an important topic that requires immediate research attention. This study aims to investigate the impact of the dual-class share structure in the US stock market on corporate innovation.This study is based on a review and analysis of existing literature and focuses on 97 Chinese concept stocks listed in the United States as of 2021. R&D investment is used as the measurement of corporate innovation. The study collects information on the dual-class share structure from the IPO prospectuses of these listed companies and includes other financial indicators as control variables. A multiple linear regression model is constructed. The study also conducts tests for endogeneity, robustness, and heterogeneity analysis. The empirical research in this paper investigates the impact of adopting a dual-class share structure on corporate innovation, while incorporating multiple control variables to enhance the overall significance level of the model.The results and analysis of the model indicate that the dual-class share structure can promote corporate innovation to a certain extent. The value of a company is more dependent on the innovation and expertise of entrepreneurs, management teams, and core employees. The dual-class share structure allows entrepreneurs and management teams to maintain control over the company without being constrained by investors, enabling them to focus more on enhancing the company‘s innovation capabilities. As higher-class shareholders have the power to influence corporate decisions, they are more likely to prioritize the long-term development and innovation of the company rather than short-term interests. On the other hand, common shareholders often emphasize short-term returns and may not be as concerned about the long-term development and innovation of the company. The study found that the impact of the dual-class share structure on corporate innovation is more significant in high-tech industries. This may be because companies in high-tech industries require long-term R&D investments, and the dual-class share structure provides better long-term incentive mechanisms to promote innovation.Furthermore, when formulating specific policies, policymakers need to consider not only the positive effects of the dual-class share structure in promoting corporate innovation but also the need to strengthen regulatory measures on corporate governance under this structure. This includes penalizing the abuse of special voting rights, introducing a supervisory board system to ensure information disclosure and oversight mechanisms, and enhancing standards for information disclosure requirements. These measures are necessary to protect the rights and interests of minority shareholders and prevent the misuse of control by major shareholders.