“压力型体制”概念从一个重要视角描述和刻画了我国各级政府运行的一个典型特征。该体制在实践中可能导致层层加码、考核与督察力度增大、继而引发干部出现避责行为和职业倦怠等现象。因此对压力型体制下压力与避责行为的关系等问题的研究，成为公共管理领域的一个重要课题。 在基层社会治理中“上面千条线，下面一根针”形象地刻画了身处服务群众最前沿的基层干部的工作常态，他们需要将上级政府政策传达和落实到每一位群众，高工作负荷和压力在一定情况下可能会令干部产生“不出事”的避责思想和行为。随着2019年北京“接诉即办”逐步改革，这一实践成为社会治理现代化的良好示范，获得了政治机构的肯定和群众的认可，但与其相伴而生的是，基层干部面对大量的诉求单、7*24小时不停歇的高压态势，自身压力承受状态日趋饱和，高效率高质量地完成所有的群众诉求变得愈加困难，工作中选择逃避责任的可能性大幅增加，而这也将影响到基层治理的质效并令公共利益受损。 本文将北京市“接诉即办”作为一个典型的基层压力型体制研究场域，试图通过实证研究探讨压力源与避责行为和避责逻辑之间的关系。文中通过访谈剖析该体制下的工作压力源状况，描述基层干部的避责行为表现。通过调查问卷收集并分析数据，探究压力源与避责行为和避责逻辑之间的关系。基于访谈提炼出影响避责行为较为突出的因素，设计双因素两水平情景模拟实验，进一步剖析其影响因素及作用机制。 研究发现：第一，北京市从事“接诉即办”工作的基层干部群体总体上处于相对较高水平的压力状态，存在一定的避责现象。第二，其中不同特征人群在避责逻辑和公共服务动机方面存在一定差异，而在避责行为方面的表现趋同。第三，基层干部的避责行为是在压力型体制下不同压力源的作用下产生的，二者呈现正相关关系。第四，避责逻辑在压力源感知与避责行为之间起到部分中介作用，但公共服务动机并没有起到调节作用。第五，与没有考核或者部门协调不顺畅相比，在有考核的情况下或有部门协同支持的情况下，基层干部更不容易出现避责行为。 最后，本文针对目前基层治理中存在的强压力问题锐化、“接诉即办”制度机制设置迟滞化、政府责任边界模糊化等问题，提出了从源头改进压力型体制、优化考核与激励机制、赋权基层以实现权责匹配、责任共担促进多元参与治理等政策建议。

The phrase ＂a thousand lines above, a needle below＂ paints a vivid picture of grassroots cadres, and it is an accurate description of the pressure-based system that our government operates under. This situation at the grassroots level is more appropriate. Grassroots cadres are at the forefront of the need to communicate the implementation of each mass and people, and in certain situations, the ＂no accident＂ to escape accountability for the thinking and avoidance of responsibility. Beijing practice has improved as an excellent example of social governance modernization thanks to the ＂public complaints have been processed without delay＂ gradual reform in 2019. As a result, grassroots cadres must deal with a lot of requests, which come in at all hours of the day and night. It means that they are no longer able to complete all the mass demand with high efficiency and quality. This group is more likely to choose to avoid responsibility, which will harm the public interest and the caliber and efficacy of grassroots governance. Most of the literature relies on qualitative case studies rather than quantitative analysis to demonstrate how pressure from all directions will cause people to shirk their duties. By conducting in-person interviews, this paper investigated the pressure sources of the system in the context of the Beijing ＂public complaints have been processed without delay＂ system, as well as characterized and categorized grassroots cadres‘ avoidance actions. To investigate the connection between stressors, blame-avoidance behavior and blame-avoidance logic, data were gathered and analyzed through questionnaires. The two-factor two-level simulation scenario experiment that most significantly influences blame avoidance behavior was taken from the interviews to further examine its influencing elements, which is also based on the principle of within-subject design in psychology. This study discovered a connection between grassroots cadres‘ blame-avoidance behavior, logic, and perception of stressors. First, in a stress-based system, grassroots cadres‘ blame avoidance conduct is produced under the influence of various stressors, and there is a positive association between the two. Second, blame avoidance logic partially mediates the relationship between stressor perception and blame avoidance behavior, but public service motivation does not play a moderating role. Third, grassroots cadres are less likely to engage in blame avoidance behavior in the presence of assessment or with collaborative departmental support, compared to the absence of performance assessment or poor departmental coordination. Second, blame avoidance logic partially mediates the relationship between stressor perception and blame avoidance behavior, but public service motivation does not play a moderating role. The minor contributions of this study include: （1） describing and analyzing the evolution and practical operation of grassroots work under the pressure-based system of ＂public complaints have been processed without delay＂ in Beijing; （2） exploring the mechanism of stressors‘ effects on grassroots cadres‘ blame-avoidance behavior through quantitative research, illuminating the mediating function of blame avoidance logic, and providing some theoretical and practical implications for effectively avoiding blame; （3） investigating the key variables influencing blame avoidance behavior through scenario simulation, enhancing the study results, and providing policy inspiration for strengthening grassroots cadres and promoting the effectiveness of grassroots governance.