工业化的快速推进带来我国化工企业蓬勃发展，同时也导致安全生产事故频 发，威胁社会长治久安。为快速有效缩减事故影响，既有制度对政府官员应急处置行为作出了明确规定。然而，具体实践中许多基层官员面对事故危机的首要反应并非主动应对，而是更多地表现出瞒报甩锅等消极应对的行为悖论。已有研究对危机情景下这一现实悖论的解释尚不充分。据此，本研究提出以下研究问题:(1)基层官员危机避责行为的主要表现?(2)危机情景、制度约束与认知差异对基层官员危机避责行为的影响机制?(3)激励基层官员危机情景下积极履职的有效途径? 本文以危机决策理论中制度主义分析与认知主义分析视角为理论基础，构建基于我国现实背景的制度约束、认知差异对基层官员危机避责行为影响的综合性 分析框架。遵循混合研究设计路径，本文首先基于典型案例研究思路选取2018 年A省两起危险化学品企业非法生产导致的较大爆炸事故开展案例研究，检验制度约束对基层官员危机避责行为的影响。随后，对全国东中西部六省市地基层官员开展问卷实验，综合检验制度约束与认知差异对基层官员危机避责行为的影响机制。本文发现:第一，基层官员危机避责行为基于价值取向差异可划分为消极违规 型避责与积极合规型避责两类。违规型避责表现包括舆论管控、转移责任、弄虚做假、拖延应对与恪守成规。合规型避责表现包括主动弥补与保守补过。第二，制度约束与认知差异会综合影响基层官员危机避责行为。以较大级别危机情景为例，模糊责任、高压问责、低资源约束是加剧基层官员危机避责行为的制度因素。侥幸心理、从众心理与整体环境风险感知是加剧基层官员危机避责行为的认知因素，但个体问责风险感知影响并不显著。模糊责任与高压问责会显著影响基层官员由合规型避责转向违规型避责，而“关系”这一非制度资源对合规型与违规型避责的影响都是正向的。第三，相比日常情景与较大危机情景，特别重大危机情景下问责压力对避责行为的影响发生负向反转。个体问责风险感知则由较大危机时不 显著变为负向显著。第四，基层官员危机避责行为选择具备动态调适性，瞒报谎报等极端避责行为出现是多重因素叠加的后果。本文研究贡献在于:(1)拓展了基层官员危机避责行为选择的理论性解释，对危机决策理论进行了本土化细化和补充。(2)开展分类学研究，揭示了基层官员在相似危机情景下采取合规与违规这一差异化避责行为选择的影响机制。本文对完善安全生产领域激励制度设计，推动责任政府建设提供一定政策启示。

The rapid progress of industrialization has brought about the vigorous development of China‘s chemical enterprises, and also led to frequent safety production accidents, threatening the long-term stability of society. In order to quickly and effectively reduce the negative impact of accidents, the existing policy has made clear requirements for the emergency response process of government officials. However, in practice, many grassroots officials‘ first response to the accident crisis is not to take the initiative, but more to show the paradox of behavior choice that they are unwilling to take responsibilities. Previous studies have not fully explained the paradox of reality in the crisis situation. Accordingly, this study raises the following research questions: (1) What are the main strategies of grass-roots officials‘ crisis avoidance behavior? (2) How do crisis situation, institutional constraints and cognitive differences affect grass-roots officials‘ blame avoidance behavior? (3) What are the effective ways to encourage grass- roots officials to actively perform their duties under the crisis situation? Based on the perspective of institutional analysis and cognitive analysis of crisis decision-making theory, this paper constructs a comprehensive analysis framework of the impact of institutional constraints，cognitive difference on grass-roots officials‘ crisis blame avoidance behavior based on the reality of China. Following the mixed research design, this paper first selects two explosion accidents caused by the illegal production of dangerous chemicals enterprises in A province in 2018 to carry out the case study to test the impact of institutional constraints on the crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass- roots officials. Subsequently, a large-scale survey experiment was carried out for grass- roots officials in six cities in the east, middle and west of the country to comprehensively examine the impact mechanism of institutional constraints and cognitive differences on the crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials. The findings of this paper are as follows: First, the crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials can be divided into two types based on the difference of value orientation: negative non-compliance type and positive compliance type. Non- compliance type of blame avoidance behavior includes public opinion control, responsibility transfer, false reporting, delay in response and compliance with regulations. The compliance type of blame avoidance behavior includes responsive to public opinion and conservative compensation. Second, institutional constraints and cognitive difference will comprehensively affect the crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials. Taking a larger level crisis situation as an example, fuzzy responsibility, high accountability and low resource constraints are the institutional factors that aggravate the crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials. The fluke psychology, conformity psychology and overall environmental risk perception are the cognitive factors that aggravate the crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials, but the impact of individual accountability risk perception is not significant. Further, fuzzy responsibility and high-pressure accountability will significantly affect the shift of grass- roots officials from compliance to non-compliance blame avoidance, and the impact of "guanxi", a non-institutional resource, on compliance to non-compliance type is positive. Third, compared with the daily situation and the larger level crisis situation, the impact of accountability pressure on blame avoidance behavior has a negative reversal under the largest crisis situation. The risk perception of individual accountability changed from non-significant to negative significant in largest crisis situation. Fourth, the choice of crisis blame avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials has dynamic adaptability, and the occurrence of extreme blame avoidance behavior such as concealment and false reporting is the result of multiple factors. The research contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) Based on the actual institutional background of China, it expands the theoretical explanation of the choice of crisis avoidance behavior of grass-roots officials, and makes localized refinement and supplement to the crisis decision-making theory. (2) Taxonomic research has been carried out to reveal the influence mechanism of grass-roots officials‘ choice of two differentiated blame avoidance behavior type under similar crisis situations. This paper provides some policy implications for improving the design of incentive system in the field of safety production, cultivating civil servants to perform their duties, and promoting the construction of responsible government.