地方政府短视指地方政府牺牲长期的利益以实现短期目标的时间导向，是政府在短期和长期中进行权衡的视野偏好。地方政府短视是公共治理中的常见现象，蕴含时间导向的重要理论问题，对政府跨期决策具有重要意义。然而，该议题在目前的公共管理研究中尚未得到明晰的理论界定，也缺乏严谨的实证考察。本文提出，“不确定性”在当下已经成为治理常态，涉及政府跨期决策的导向，有助于我们深入挖掘地方政府治理的“时间”维度。因此，不确定性恰是中国的治理结构下地方政府短视的理论锚点，地方政府短视在不确定性决策环境中的成因和影响是亟待解决的问题。本文将不确定性决策环境划分为两个向度：不确定性作为影响政府短视的因素；不确定性作为决策情境。由此，提出主要研究问题：（1）不确定性的影响因素如何影响地方政府短视程度？（2）在不确定性决策情境中，地方政府短视将对政府行为有何影响？影响机制是什么？本研究结合具体制度背景研究进一步确定研究问题：以地方政府土地财政作为影响政府短视的不确定性因素，以政府创新与市场创新行为作为不确定性决策情境，将研究问题具体为（1）地方政府土地财政如何影响地方政府短视程度？（2）地方政府短视如何影响政府创新与市场创新？影响机制何在？本文建立不确定性中地方政府短视成因和影响的理论框架，应用文本分析和机器学习构建出政府短视的测量方案，实证检验地方政府短视在不确定性决策环境中的成因与影响。实证检验的主要结果为：第一，土地财政收入和波动性均会提升地方政府短视，具体表现为政府增加短期经济建设的财政支出、减少长期民生投资，研究使用工具变量法排除了因果推断内生性问题。第二，地方政府短视会提升政府创新水平，并受到创新资源约束和区域位置的影响。第三，地方政府短视会抑制市场创新的数量和质量，这一影响适用于探索性创新，对利用性创新的作用相反，具体机制为短视政府增加企业税负、从而挤出企业研发创新投入。本文有两点核心理论发现。第一，通过关注不确定性决定因素对地方政府短视的影响，我们发现官僚机构作为稳定科层组织与内部不确定性之间存在较强的张力，并且受制度约束和有限理性的支配最终体现为政府短视。第二，通过对比政府短视对政府创新和市场创新不同的影响，我们发现地方政府短视在不确定性决策情境中对具体决策的影响具体取决于不确定性与制度约束的关系。本文的研究旨在将“时间”带回公共管理，拓展对地方政府短视的认知，揭示不确定性环境中政府短视的成因和影响，为破解地方政府短视痼疾提供了新的分析视角和政策启示。

Local government myopia refers to the temporal orientation at the expense of long-term interests in order to achieve short-term goals, reflecting the trade-off between short-term and long-term perspectives in government decision-making. Local government myopia is a common phenomenon in public governance with important theoretical issues, which is of great significance to the government’s intertemporal decision-making. However, this issue has not yet been clearly defined theoretically in the current public management research, nor is it rigorously empirically investigated.This thesis proposes that uncertainty has become a normal state in governance at present, and it also involves the temporal orientation of government intertemporal decision-making, which will help us delve deeper into the “time” dimension of local governance and expand our understanding of China’s local government behavior. Therefore, uncertainty is right the theoretical anchor of local government myopia under China’s governance structure. Therefore, the causes and effects of local government myopia in uncertainty are regarded as crucial research issues. This thesis divides uncertainty into two dimensions: uncertainty as a factor affecting government myopia; uncertainty as decision-making scenarios. Therefore, we propose the main research questions: (1) How does uncertainty as the influencing factors affect myopia of local governments? (2) In the uncertain decision-making scenario, what impact will local government myopia have on government behavior? What is the causal mechanism? This research combines the specific institutional background in China to further narrow the research questions: we take the local government land-leasing system as the factor affecting the government’s myopia, and take government innovation and market innovation behavior as the uncertain decision-making context. The final specifical research questions are (1) How does government land-leasing affect local government myopia? (2) How does local government myopia affect government innovation and market innovation? What is the causal mechanism?Based on the theoretical framework, this thesis applies text analysis and machine learning to construct a measurement of government myopia, and empirically tests hypothesis about the causes and effects of local government myopia in uncertainty. The main empirical findings of the study are as follows. First, both land-leasing revenue and volatility will increase the local government’s myopia, which is specifically manifested in the government increasing fiscal expenditures for short-term economic construction and reducing long-term investment in social welfare. We use the instrumental variable method in the study to exclude the endogeneity of causal inference. Second, the local government’s myopia will improve the level of government innovation, which is affected by the constraints of innovation resources and regional location. Third, local government myopia will inhibit the quantity and quality of market innovation. This effect applies to explorative innovation, but has the opposite effect on exploitative innovation. The specific mechanism is that the myopic government increases corporate tax burdens, which thereby crowding out corporate innovation input. This thesis presents two core theoretical conclusions. Firstly, by examining the impact of uncertainty on local government myopia, we find that the bureaucratic organization, dominated by institutional constraints and limited rationality, has a strong tension between its stable hierarchical structure and internal uncertainty, which results in government myopia. Secondly, by comparing the impact of government myopia on government innovation and market innovation, we find that the impact of government myopia on specific decisions in uncertain decision-making scenarios depends on the relationship between uncertainty and institutional constraints. The research aims to enrich the theory of local government’s intertemporal decision-making, expand the cognition of local government’s trade-off between short-term and long-term, reveal the causes and effects of government’s myopia in uncertainty, and provide novel analytical perspective and policy implications for solving the local government’s myopia.