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财政“省直管县”改革对县级财政收入影响的实证研究

An Empirical Study on the Impact of the Fiscal Reform of "Provincial Directly Administered County" on County Level Financial Revenue

作者:曹泽
  • 学号
    2021******
  • 学位
    硕士
  • 电子邮箱
    cao******.cn
  • 答辩日期
    2023.05.18
  • 导师
    韩廷春
  • 学科名
    公共管理
  • 页码
    55
  • 保密级别
    公开
  • 培养单位
    059 公管学院
  • 中文关键词
    省直管县,县级财力,倾向得分匹配 - 双重差分法
  • 英文关键词
    Provincial Directly Administered County, County Level Financial Revenue, Propensity Score Matching - Difference In Difference Method

摘要

我国的市一级政府虽然在特定历史时期发挥了重要作用,但近些年来普遍集中县级政府财力以实现自身的优先发展,阻碍了县级财政的正常运转和县级经济的有序发展。基于主张下放财权给地方政府的财政分权理论和主张减少财政层级的扁平化理论,各省自2003年开始实行财政“省直管县”改革,在财政收支方面给予县级政府更大的自主权、在财政转移支付方面由省县两级直接建立联系,以此增加县级政府的财政收入。2013年在已经完成财政部关于推进改革的任务后,又有省份出台了新的改革举措,在建立“省直管县”财政体制方面继续进行尝试。本文基于全国20个省份2000至2020年的县级面板数据,利用倾向得分匹配-双重差分法,定量分析2013年后新实行的财政“省直管县”改革对县级财政收入状况有何影响。因为只有在各省已经积累了足够经验且没有中央政府干扰时实行的改革,其产生的效果才能成为评价这项政策的有效依据。本文从相对财政收入状况的视角出发,按照中央政府的指导意见选取与粮食、油料、棉花、生猪生产相关的解释变量建立倾向得分计算模型,构造“反事实”状态解决由样本自选导致的内生性问题,在所有非改革试点中匹配出和试点实行改革前相似的县(市),匹配结果通过平衡性检验和共同支撑性检验后再进行双重差分计算,排除不可观测因素以及和时间同步变化因素的干扰,最后得出改革在整体上的效果。另外为了验证研究结论,以同样的方法对较有代表性的山西、山东两省改革进行定量分析,探究财政“省直管县”改革未能取得预期效果的可能原因。研究发现2013年后新实行的财政“省直管县”改革整体上不仅没有给县级财政部门缓解压力,甚至还在一定程度上加剧了县级政府的财政困难,与这项政策的设计初衷背道而驰。最新实行财政“省直管县”改革的山西省、山东省也均未实现预期目标,但是靠近山西省会太原市的试点改革效果较好,与整体情况具有明显差异,说明更靠近省级政府部门可能会因为地理距离上的优势得到更多关注和照顾。为了完善财政“省直管县”改革、提高县级财政收入,本文以调整省级以下财政管理体制、深化行政管理体制改革、完善财政转移支付制度和缩小地区经济发展差距四个视角提出相应的政策建议。

Although the city level government has played an important role in a specific historical period, in recent years it has generally concentrated the financial resources of the county level government to realize its own priority development, which has hindered the normal operation of the county finance and the orderly development of the county economy. Based on the theory of fiscal decentralization, which advocates decentralization of financial power to local governments, and the theory of flattening, which advocates reduction of financial hierarchy, the provinces began to implement the reform of "provincial direct management of county government" since 2003, giving county-level governments greater autonomy in terms of fiscal revenue and expenditure, and establishing direct links between the provincial and county levels in terms of financial transfer payments, so as to increase the fiscal revenue of county-level governments. In 2013, after completing the task of promoting reform by the Ministry of Finance, some provinces introduced new reform measures and continued to try to establish a fiscal system of "direct provincial control over counties".Based on the county-level panel data of 20 provinces from 2000 to 2020, this paper uses propensity score matching - difference in difference method to make a quantitative analysis of the impact of the newly implemented financial reform of "direct provincial management of counties" after 2013 on county-level fiscal revenue. Only when the provinces have accumulated enough experience without interference from the central government can the effect of reform be a valid basis for evaluating the policy. In this paper, from the perspective of relative fiscal revenue, explanatory variables related to grain, oil, cotton and pig production were selected in accordance with the guidance of the central government to establish a propensity score calculation model, and a "counterfactual" state was constructed to solve the endogenous problems caused by sample self-selection. In all non-reform pilots, counties (cities) similar to those before the reform were matched. After the matching results pass the balance test and the common support test, the differential calculation is carried out to eliminate the interference of unobserved factors and factors that change synchronously with time. Finally, the overall effect of the reform is obtained. In addition, in order to verify the research conclusions, a quantitative analysis is carried out on the representative reforms of Shanxi and Shandong provinces with the same method to explore the possible reasons for the failure of the reform of "direct provincial management of county finance" to achieve the expected results.The study found that the fiscal reform of "direct provincial control over county" implemented after 2013 did not relieve the pressure on county-level financial departments on the whole, and even exacerbated the financial difficulties of county-level governments to a certain extent, which was contrary to the original intention of this policy. Shanxi Province and Shandong Province, which recently implemented the reform of "direct provincial management of county finance", also failed to achieve the expected target. However, the pilot reform near Taiyuan City, the capital of Shanxi Province, had a better effect, which was significantly different from the overall situation, indicating that the closer to provincial government departments may get more attention and care due to the advantage of geographical distance.In order to improve the financial reform of "direct provincial management of county" and increase the county fiscal revenue, this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from four perspectives: adjusting the financial management system below the provincial level, deepening the reform of the administrative management system, improving the financial transfer payment system and narrowing the regional economic development gap.