厘清黑格尔的“自我表现”观念对于我们理解黑格尔的自由观具有独特的意义。 本文认为，在《精神现象学》中“德行与世界进程”与“事情本身”两个小节中， 黑格尔发展出了一种本文称作“特殊性个体的自我表现”的自我表现理论。在这 一理论中，自我表现活动的主体并非宏大的“宇宙精神”，也不是纯粹理性的个 体，而是具有特殊性的个体——一种具有对世界的独特理解，并在此之上形成了 特定自我构想的个体；而“特殊性个体的自我表现”指的则是，具有特殊性的个 体将自己的自我构想转变为现实世界中的“作品”。通过对“德行与世界进程” 和“事情本身”两个小节的考察，本文尝试重构“特殊性个体的自我表现”。分 而言之，在“德行与世界进程”一节中，黑格尔将具有特殊性的个体确立为表现 活动的主体；在“事情本身”一节中，黑格尔进一步建构了特殊性个体表现自我 的诸环节。首先，黑格尔指认了特殊性个体自我构想的三个特征：它建立在对世 界的独特理解之上；它应当能够被清晰化为一系列和谐融洽的命题；它同时是自 我理解和自我筹划。其次，黑格尔认为，说具有特殊性的个体将其自我构想转变 为现实的“作品”，也就是在说构成了个体自我构想的诸命题被普遍承认为适合 于描述个体在现实中所创造的“作品”。最后，黑格尔指出，追寻普遍承认的特 殊性个体是“自否定”或自我限制的个体，他无法单方面决定哪些命题是真正适 合于描述其“作品”的命题。因此，如下情况总是可能的：一些个体自我构想之 外的命题被普遍承认为真正适合于描述个体“作品”的命题，由此具有特殊性的 个体未能将其自我构想转变为现实的“作品”，而特殊性的个体也未能在其“作 品”中看到自己。就此而言，“自否定”或自我限制便给特殊性个体的自我表现 活动蒙上了一层阴影；可以说，失败的可能性总是伴随着特殊性个体的自我表现 活动。但是，在黑格尔看来，表现自我本就不是轻而易举的事情；唯有经过漫长、 艰巨乃至痛苦的劳作，个体才能将自我表现在世界之中，并从而实现“在他者中 与自身同在”。

Clarifying Hegel’s notion of self-expression is of unique significance for our understanding of Hegel’s idea of freedom. This paper argues that in the sections “Virtue and the Course of World” and “The Thing Itself” of Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel develops a theory of self-expression which this paper calls “Self-Expression of the Particular Individual”. According to theory, the subject of expressive activity is not a grand “cosmic spirit” or an individual equipped with pure reason, but a particular individual with a distinctive understanding of the world and a specific self-conception on the basis of above distinctive understanding; and “Self-Expression of the Particular Individual” means that the particular individual males his or her self-conception into a “work” in the actual world. By examining the sections “Virtue and the Course of World” and “The Thing Itself”, this paper attempts to reconstruct the “Self-Expression of the Particular Individual”‘. In the section “Virtue and the Course of World”, Hegel establishes the particular individual as the subject of expressive activity; in the section “The Thing Itself”, Hegel further specifies various aspects of “Self-Expression of the Particular Individual”. Firstly, Hegel identifies three characteristics of the particular individual’s conception of himself or herself: it is based on a unique understanding of the world; it should be able to be clarified as a series of harmonious propositions; and it is simultaneously self-understanding and self-project. Secondly, Hegel argues that to say that the particular individual makes his or her self-conception into a “work” of reality is to say that the propositions constituting the individual self-conception are universally recognized as suitable for describing the “work” brought about by the individual. Finally, Hegel points out that the individual seeking universal recognition of particularity is of “self-negativity”, in virtue of which he or she cannot unilaterally decide which propositions are really suitable for describing his or her “work”. Thus, it is always possible that some propositions outside the individual’s self-conception are universally recognized as truly suitable for describing the individual’s “work”, so that the particular individual fails to make his or her self-conception into a actual “work”, and the particular individual is unable to see himself or herself in his or her “work”. In this way, “self-negativity” casts a shadow over the self-expressive activity of the particular individual, and the possibility of failure always accompanies the self-expressive activity of the particular individual. However, for Hegel, self-expression is not an easy task; it is only through a long, arduous and even painful labour that the individual is able to express himself or herself in the world and thus to “be with oneself in an other”.