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亚里士多德论欲望与情感在美德行为中的作用

Aristotle on Desires and Emotions and Their Roles in Virtuous Actions

作者:孙嘉婧
  • 学号
    2020******
  • 学位
    硕士
  • 电子邮箱
    sun******.cn
  • 答辩日期
    2023.05.19
  • 导师
    唐文明
  • 学科名
    哲学
  • 页码
    45
  • 保密级别
    公开
  • 培养单位
    069 人文学院
  • 中文关键词
    亚里士多德,欲望,情感,美德,行为
  • 英文关键词
    Aristotle, desire, emotion, virtue, action

摘要

在亚里士多德的伦理学中,欲望和情感都与美德有着密切的联系。伦理美德是灵魂中欲望性部分的的德性,它与行为和情感相关。一方面,仅仅具备美德是不够的,一个有德之人的美德要在现实行为中展现出来,而他的行为需要出自正确的选择,也就是出自正确的理性加欲望,如此,欲望就是美德行为的必要原因之一;另一方面,伦理美德与情感相关,美德是我们以合乎中道的方式体验到情感的状态。但是,亚里士多德在伦理著作中没有对欲望和情感分别进行详细的讨论,他往往以含糊的态度将欲望视为非理性欲望,并且将情感与非理性欲望混在一起使用,这也是部分研究者没有刻意区分欲望与情感的原因。考虑到在亚里士多德的著作中,欲望和情感有着各自的文化背景和丰富内涵,有必要从原则上区分这两者以及它们在美德行为中各自起到的作用。亚里士多德对欲望的考察分散在《灵魂论》、《论动物运动》等生物类著作中,而他对情感的考察集中在《修辞学》里,所以通过转向这些著作的论述,可以更好地理解欲望和情感各自的内涵以及功用。对欲望的讨论主要是关于欲望的三分,以及两种非理性欲望和一种理性欲望各自的对象,还有它们与理性的不同关系。而对情感的讨论则是基于《修辞学》中对情感的一般性定义,一是解释了情感与快乐和痛苦的关系,二是在认知层面讨论情感对判断的影响,以及情感产生所需要的认知条件,此外也解释了亚里士多德在不同著作中有所不一致的原因。在研究过程中,除了参考前人研究之外,主要是基于亚里士多德自身的文本逻辑进行梳理。从亚里士多德的著作中可以得出,虽然非理性欲望的确可以被包含在情感之内,而且二者均涉及了快乐和痛苦,但是欲望是一种感知到对象时主动引起身体运动的冲动,而情感在最广泛的意义上意味着主体被动地受到了影响。亚里士多德对欲望和情感在美德行为中的作用有着不同的强调,强调前者作为行为的动机,以及后者在认知层面的作用。对欲望和情感的具体研究有助于我们认识到,在亚里士多德的意义上成为真正的有德之人是极度困难的,尽管他的欲望和情感理论为我们理性主宰生活提供了可能。

In Aristotelian ethics, both desires and emotions are tightly connected with virtues. Moral virtue, which is concerned with actions and emotions, is the excellence of the desiring element in the soul. On the one hand, it is not adequate for a virtuous agent to possess virtue, for his virtue needs to be actualized in daily actions, which should be made by choice, namely by right reason and desires. Therefore, desire is one of the necessary causes of virtuous actions. On the other hand, moral virtue is concerned with emotions, for virtue is the state in which we feel emotions in an intermediate way. However, Aristotle hardly gives any detailed discussion to desires and emotions respectively in his ethical works, but often treats desires as irrational desires in an ambiguous way, or mix emotions with irrational desires, which is why some scholars have no intention to distinguish desires from emotions. Considering that in Aristotle’ s works, both desires and emotions have their own cultural backgrounds and rich connotations, there is need to distinguish them and their role in virtuous actions in principal. His study on desires disperses in biological works such as De Anima and De Motu Animalium, and his study on emotions concentrate in On Rhetoric, so by turning to these works, it will help to better understand the connotations and functions of desires and emotions respectively. The discussions of desires focus on the tripartition of orexis, and the objects of two irrational desires and one rational desire, as well as their different relations to reason. While the discussions of emotions are based on the general definition of pathos in On Rhetoric. Apart from explaining the connection between emotions and pleasures and pains, he impact of emotions on judgement and the cognitive conditions required in generating emotions is also taken into consideration. Besides, the inconsistencies in Aristotle’ s works are also explained to some extent. In addition to previous studies, Aristotle’ s textual logic is mainly referred to during the research.Conclusions can be drawn from Aristotle’ s works that, though irrational desires can be included in emotions, and both are concerned with pleasures and pains, desire is an impulse that positively causes the movement of the body when sensing its corresponding object, while emotion in its broad sense means being passively affected. For Aristotle, the role of desires and emotions in virtuous actions focus on different aspects. Desires are motives of actions, and emotions function on cognitive level. The detailed study on desires and emotions contributes to the recognition that, even though the theory of desires and emotions of Aristotle provides possibilities for reason to dominate our life, it is extremely difficult to become a real virtuous person according to his ideal.