公司法人制度是应社会经济发展需要而创设的法律文明，是平衡各方利益的制度选择，推动了经济发展和社会进步。然而，随着公司的快速发展，董事职权日益扩张，甚至有董事掌握了公司的控制权，董事与股东沆瀣一气，损害第三人和社会公众利益的情形频频发生。公司法人制度产生之初的平衡格局被打破，现有的法律制度又难以解决这一问题，失衡的利益格局迫切需要新的法律制度来平衡。《公司法修订草案》一审稿与二审稿第190条所确立的董事对第三人责任制度正是在社会变迁中为满足各方利益平衡的客观需要而出现的一项特殊法律制度。本文第二章在对法人机关理论再思考的基础上进行利益衡量，指出法人机关理论并不排除董事对第三人的责任，其本身并非董事对第三人责任制度建立的理论障碍，对公司法人机关理论的绝对化认识需要适时修正，坚持公司法人制度与让董事对第三人承担责任并不矛盾，让董事在特定情形下对第三人承担损害赔偿责任，可以对失衡利益格局关系进行重新布局和调整，有效实现董事、公司和第三人等诸多利益群体之间的利益平衡。董事对第三人制度本是对公司法人制度的例外设计，《公司法修订草案》一审稿和二审稿通过190条直接进行了一般性规定，扩张了其适用范围。为了尽量减少这一例外制度对公司法人制度的冲击，需要设置科学合理的适用条件。本文第三章通过对董事对第三人责任的性质进行分析，指出该责任具有特殊性，在兼顾一般性和特殊性的基础上，对《公司法修订草案》一审稿与二审稿第190条所确立的董事对第三人责任的构成要件进行了深入的探讨。最后，虽然董事对第三人责任制度能够制约董事滥权行为，更有效地保护第三人利益，但若该制度适用不当，会大大加重董事负担，降低董事的工作积极性，严重时甚至会产生驱离效应，对董事职业队伍造成负面影响，最终阻碍公司的健康发展。因此，有必要就董事对第三人责任进行限制。本文第四章从限制董事责任的角度出发，指出董事对第三人责任包含了赔偿第三人损失和合理惩戒董事的双重功能，应该通过协调两种功能，在保护第三人利益的同时避免过度赔偿带来的问题，形成合理的董事履职约束机制。就董事承担的责任而言，是否为连带责任还有待商榷，结合实践情况采用连带责任与补充责任的梯度设计也许更为合适。根据第三人所受侵害以及董事主观要件的不同，让董事对第三人承担不同的责任。此外，除了对董事承担责任的形式进行讨论，还可以考虑扩充其他的董事责任限制制度，比如董事责任保险制度。

The corporate system is a legal civilisation created in response to the needs of social and economic development, and is an institutional choice to balance the interests of all parties, promoting economic development and social progress. However, with the rapid development of companies, the powers of directors have been increasingly expanded, and some directors have even taken control of the company, and there have been frequent instances of directors acting in collusion with shareholders to the detriment of third parties and the public interest. The balance that existed at the beginning of the corporate system has been broken, and the existing legal system is unable to solve this problem.The system of directors‘ liability to third parties established by Article 190 of the First and Second Drafts of the Draft Revised Company Law is a special legal system that has emerged in the midst of social changes to meet the objective need for a balance of interests between all parties. Chapter 2 of this article weighs the interests on the basis of rethinking the theory of corporate body, and points out that the theory of corporate body does not exclude the liability of directors to third parties, and is not in itself a theoretical obstacle to the establishment of the system of directors‘ liability to third parties, and that the absolute understanding of the theory of corporate body needs to be amended in due course. The directors can bear the liability for damages to third parties under certain circumstances, which can rearrange and adjust the imbalanced interest pattern relationship and effectively achieve the balance of interests among many interest groups such as directors, companies and third parties.The directors‘ system for third parties, which was originally designed as an exception to the corporate legal person regime, was directly regulated in general terms by the Draft Revision of the Companies Law in the first and second instance through Article 190, which expanded its scope of application. In order to minimise the impact of this exception on the corporate legal person system, it is necessary to set scientific and reasonable conditions for its application. Chapter 3 of this article analyses the nature of directors‘ liability to third parties, points out the special nature of this liability and, on the basis of balancing the general and the special nature, discusses in depth the constituent elements of directors‘ liability to third parties as established by Article 190 of the First and Second Drafts of the Draft Revised Company Law.Finally, although a system of directors‘ liability to third parties can restrain directors‘ abusive behaviour and more effectively protect the interests of third parties, if the system is not properly applied, it can greatly increase the burden on directors, reduce their motivation and, in serious cases, even have a repellent effect, negatively impacting the professional ranks of directors and ultimately hindering the healthy development of the company. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the liability of directors to third parties. Chapter 4 of this article, from the perspective of limiting directors‘ liability, points out that directors‘ liability to third parties includes the dual functions of compensating third parties for their losses and reasonably disciplining directors, and that a reasonable restraint mechanism for directors‘ performance should be formed by coordinating the two functions to protect the interests of third parties while avoiding the problems caused by excessive compensation. As far as the liability of directors is concerned, it is debatable whether it should be joint and several, and it may be more appropriate to adopt a gradient of joint and several liability and supplementary liability in the light of the practical situation. Depending on the infringement suffered by the third party and the subjective elements of the director, the director may be held liable to the third party in different ways. In addition, in addition to discussing the forms of directors‘ liability, consideration could be given to expanding other systems for limiting directors‘ liability, such as a directors‘ liability insurance system.