本文主要基于《中华人民共和国公司法（修订草案一审稿）》（于2021年12月24日公布）和二审稿（于2022年12月30日公布）的第191条针对实质董事制度在我国的应用作出研究。影子董事、事实董事作为英美法系的舶来概念，与我国公司法语境下的概念—“实际控制人”有异曲同工之妙，皆能够起到规制不正当干涉公司事务行为的作用，但二者在诸多方面均有不同。我国虽设有实际控制人条款及禁止股东权利滥用的一般规则，却在对控制权的规制上具有一定的局限。实际控制人条款的规制基点在于支配公司而非影响董事，规制主体未能涵盖所有能够指使董事或实际行使董事职权之人，规制行为范畴不够周延，在责任承担方面亦因对实际控制人义务性质认识的不明晰使得责任追究存在实操上的难度。影子董事的含义是某一主体虽不是董事，但是他的指示或指令被公司董事遵循，且该遵循已成为董事一种习惯性的行为；事实董事的含义是未经法定选任程序或选任程序存在瑕疵而实际执行董事职务之人，二者共同构成“实质董事”并被赋予董事应承担的责任。修订草案第191条被认为是中国版的“影子董事”制度，但该新增制度未能与我国现有制度构建起系统的控制权人规制体系。本文先对英国、澳大利亚、新西兰、韩国及我国台湾地区的立法例予以介绍，对影子董事、事实董事及其责任承担问题作出阐述，接着结合司法案例分析了现行《公司法》中公司控制权规制条款的局限性。本文认为，实质董事的理论基点在于“关键资源理论”，但在规制主体、行为类型及认定标准、责任性质及范围方面，第191条尚存在完善空间。具体而言，该条的适用主体范围应拓展至一般主体，行为类型中应增加事实董事之情形，法律责任性质为侵权责任。同时，本文认为“指使/指示”行为的认定标准可参考证券法上的认定，分析了该条与其他董事责任条款的衔接问题，并提出应注意该条文与现行公司法中关联交易、禁止股权滥用原则的互动配合以构建适应我国国情的控制权人规制的规范体系。

This essay mainly focused on factual directors in China based on the First Revised Draft and the Second Revised Draft of People‘s Republic of China Company Law. Shadow director and De Facto Director have similarities with "Actual Controller" in China. They can both regulate improper interference in the affairs of the company. However, the basic point of regulation of the actual controller clause is to dominate the company rather than influence the directors. The clause fails to cover all the people who can instruct the directors or actually exercise the powers of the directors. The ambiguity of the nature of the obligation makes accountability difficult in practice. A shadow director is a person who is not a director but the directors of the company are accustomed to acting on his instructions or directions, while a de facto director is a person who actually performs the duties of a director without a statutory election process or with a flawed election process, and together they constitute a "factual director" and are subject to director liability. The Revised Draft added Article 191, which is considered to be the Chinese version of the "shadow director". However, it fails to build a systematic framework of company controller regulation with the existing system in China. The essay firstly introduces the legislative examples in the UK, Australia, Korea and Taiwan and analyzes the limitations of the control provisions in the current Company Law based on some judicial cases. The theoretical basis of factual director lies in the "key resource theory", but there is still room for improvement in Article 191 in terms of regulatory subjects, behavior types and identification standards, and the nature and scope of responsibilities. Specifically, the scope of applicable subjects should be extended to general subjects, the situation of de facto directors should be added to the type of behavior, and the nature of legal liability should be tort liability. In addition, the essay analyzes the identification standard of "instructing" behavior and the connection with other directors‘ liability clauses, and puts forward that we should pay attention to the interaction and coordination of this clause with the current company law‘s related party transactions and the principle of prohibiting the abuse of equity in order to construct a legal system of control person regulation that adapts to China‘s national conditions.