个人信息是否纳入反垄断法保护，是数字经济时代的重要议题。《个人信息保护法》为确保实现个人信息自决权，通过补强个人弱势地位保护自决的“选择能力”。信息自决权的充分实现需要以个人具有“选择能力”，以及市场上有充分的“选择机会”为前提。平台滥用支配地位强制收集个人的非必要信息，限制个人选择权导致竞争者缺乏竞争动力从而减少市场上的“选择机会”。《个人信息保护法》重点保护个人的“选择能力”但无法有效保护“选择机会”。而《反垄断法》在立法上具有保护消费者选择机会的立法目的，在反垄断执法中也将消费者选择机会作为重要参考因素。因此可与《个人信息保护法》形成对个人信息权益的双重保护。我国《反垄断法》尚未规定剥削性滥用制度，以剥削性滥用路径规制前述行为会颠覆《反垄断法》的分析框架并且出现法律适用的冲突。而排他性滥用路径坚持《反垄断法》的竞争法地位，高门槛要求也减少了反垄断执法的资源浪费，因而具有可行性。具体依据《反垄断法》第22条第1款第（5）项认定“强制收集个人非必要信息”是否构成“不公平的交易条件”，减少了消费者选择机会。个人与平台之间建立交易关系使得“个人”成为《反垄断法》意义上的“消费者”，判定平台是否具有市场支配地位时，即便在免费市场也需要划分相关市场，借助市场份额、用户数量、用户活跃度、网络效应等综合判定。评价“强制收集个人非必要信息”是否存在“强制”，应从个人而非平台的角度，判断个人对信息收集和使用程度是否享有选择权。效果要件围绕“消费者选择”展开，需要重点分析市场的进入壁垒、可期待市场中的消费者选择情况。抗辩理由首先要考虑是否保护消费者利益，其次考虑平台的商业模式（免费、付费）、平台收集信息的来源（第一方、第三方）、平台的创新与发展。

Whether personal information is included in the protection of the Anti-monopoly Law is an important issue in the era of Big Data. The Personal Information Protection Law protects the "ability to choose" for self-determination by reinforcing the vulnerability of individuals to ensure the realization of the right to self-determination of personal information. The full realization of the right to self-determination requires that individuals have the "ability to choose" and that there are sufficient "opportunities to choose" in the market. The abuse of dominant position by platforms to forcefully collect non-essential information from individuals and restrict individuals‘ right to choose leads to a lack of incentive for competitors to compete, thereby reducing the "opportunity to choose" in the marketplace. The Personal Information Protection Law protects the individual‘s "ability to choose" but not the "opportunity to choose". The Anti-monopoly Law, on the other hand, has the legislative purpose of protecting the consumers‘ opportunity to choose, and also takes the consumers‘ opportunity to choose as an important reference factor in the antimonopoly enforcement. Therefore, it can form a double protection for the rights and interests of personal information with the Personal Information Protection Law. The Anti-monopoly Law has not yet provided for an exploitative abuse regime, and the exploitative abuse route to regulate "compulsory collection" would overturn the analytical framework of the Anti-monopoly Law and create a conflict of law application. In contrast, the exclusionary abuse route upholds the competition law status of the Anti-monopoly Act, and the high threshold requirement reduces the waste of resources in antitrust enforcement, thus making it feasible. Specifically, Article 22(1)(5) of the Anti-monopoly Law determines whether the "compulsory collection of personal non-essential information" constitutes "unfair trading conditions" and reduces the opportunity for consumer choice. The establishment of a trading relationship between an individual and a platform makes the "individual" become "consumer" within the meaning of the Anti-monopoly Law, and in determining whether a platform has a dominant market position, even in a free market, it is necessary to divide the relevant market, with the help of market share, number of users, user activity, network effect, etc. To evaluate whether there is "compulsory" collection of personal non-essential information, we should judge whether individuals have the right to choose the extent of information collection and use from the perspective of individuals rather than platforms. The effect element revolves around "consumer choice", which requires an analysis of the barriers to entry and consumer choice in the expected market. The defenses should firstly consider whether the interests of consumers are protected, and secondly consider the business model of the platform (free, paid), the source of information collected by the platform (first party, third party), and the innovation and development of the platform.