21世纪以来，比较政治学研究重点逐渐转向权威主义，众多研究试图解答：为何权威主义得以存续和稳定？在此领域，政治吸纳的解释产生较大影响，然而该理论也存在局限。同样具备吸纳性制度，不同政权的结局却差别迥异。鉴于此，本文具体探究如下问题：在民主化的时代，为什么同样存在政治吸纳，有些权威主义国家得以实现政权存续和稳定，而有些国家却未能避免政体崩溃的命运？本研究认为，影响政权存续的因素除体制外的社会挑战外，还有来自统治集团内精英的背叛和分裂。既有政治吸纳理论仅能解释政权何以消解体制外挑战，却难以回答政权如何应对来自体制内因素的威胁。并且，将体制外的反对力量吸纳到体制内，可能仅是将危险从体制外带进体制内，反而增加原有反对派从内部反噬政权的风险。因此，本文用“执政党实力”对政治吸纳理论加以完善，提出“政治吸纳与执政党实力”的理论解释框架。政权如要实现存续和稳定，除吸纳外，还有赖于执政党实力的作用，强执政党实力和高政治吸纳更易促进政权存续。原因在于，政治吸纳有助政权吸纳体制外力量、壮大政权的支持基础，消解体制外的不满和威胁；而强大的执政党实力有助于维护统治集团内部的稳定，调节体制内精英矛盾，避免吸纳进体制内的精英反噬政权、促进精英凝聚力的形成，维持执政联盟的稳定。当体制外的威胁被消除、体制内的风险降低时，政权更易存续。相反，政权极易垮台。为检验本理论假设，在既有研究基础上，本文整理完善了从1946年到2020年全球范围内包含282个权威主义政权的全新跨国政体数据库（简称GARD），对权威主义存续进行实证考察。同时，还选择新加坡、坦桑尼亚、肯尼亚（1963-2002）、菲律宾（1972-1986）和乌干达（1971-1979）这五国案例进行比较分析。借助定量和比较案例研究的混合方法，本研究认为，制度性吸纳和执政党实力对权威主义的存续至关重要，当政权具有强大执政党实力和较高程度的政治吸纳时，政权更容易实现存续和稳定，实证分析的结果对本文的理论框架提供了强有力的证明。本研究为权威主义的存续和稳定提供了较为系统、全面的新解释，丰富了比较政治学界对政治吸纳以及权威主义既有的认识。同时，本研究也在一定程度上矫正了“转型研究范式”对权威主义认识的局限，较为深刻地揭示出执政党对于相关国家政权存续的深刻意义。

Since the 21st century, the focus of comparative politics research has gradually turned to authoritarianism. A large body of literature tried to answer why authoritarianism survives and remains stable. In this field, the interpretation of political co-optation has a great influence, but the theory also has limitations. There are also co-optation institutions, and different regimes have very different outcomes. In view of this, this paper specifically studies the following questions: in the era of democratization, why does political co-optation also exist? Some countries have achieved the political survival, while others have failed to avoid the fate of regime collapse?This study holds that the factors affecting the survival of the regime are not only social challenges outside the system, but also elite betrayal and division within the ruling group. The existing co-optation theory can only explain how the regime solves the challenges outside the system, but it cannot answer how to deal with the threats from within the system. Moreover, the inclusion of the opposition from outside the system may only bring danger from outside the system into the system, increasing the risk of the opposition from inside the system against the regime. Therefore, this paper uses "the ruling party strength" to perfect the explanation of political co-optation, and puts forward the theoretical explanation frame of “political co-optation and the ruling party strength”. In other words, the role of political co-optation in the survival and stability of the regime depends on the guarantee of the strength of the ruling party, and strengthening the strength of the ruling party and high political absorption can promote the survival of the regime more easily. The reason is that political absorption helps the regime to co-opt forces outside the system, expand the support base of the regime, and eliminate the dissatisfaction and threat outside the system. The strong strength of the ruling party helps to maintain the stability within the ruling group, adjust the contradictions among the elites, promote the formation of elite cohesion, and maintain the ruling coalition. Regimes are more likely to survive when threats outside the system are removed and risks within the system are reduced. On the contrary, regimes fall easily. In order to test the theoretical hypothesis of this paper, based on the existing research, this paper collates and improves the new Transnational Regime Database (GARD), which contains 282 authoritarian regimes worldwide from 1946 to 2020, and makes an empirical study on the survival of authoritarianism. At the same time, five cases from Singapore, Tanzania, Kenya(1963-2002), the Philippines(1972-1986) and Uganda(1971-1979) are selected for comparative analysis.Using a combination of quantitative and case study method, this paper studies suggest that institutional co-optation is critical to the survival and the ruling power of authoritarianism, when the regime has strong when the ruling power and higher degree of political co-optation, regime are easier to implement survival and stability, the results of the empirical analysis of the theoretical framework of this paper provides a strong proof. This study provides a systematic and comprehensive new explanation for the existence and stability of authoritarianism, and enrichis the existing understanding of political co-optation and authoritarianism in the field of comparative politics. At the same time, this study also corrects the limitations of the "transformation research paradigm" in understanding authoritarianism to a certain extent, and reveals the profound significance of the ruling party for the survival of the relevant state power.