信息传递是行政组织有效运行的基础，是部门之间沟通和协调的重要渠道，是科层体系决策和执行的联系纽带。然而，对于科层组织而言，信息失真是内生于组织运行过程中的常见问题，表现为信息在组织间自下而上传递时的扭曲、瞒报，与信息真实值存在差异的现象，对组织的科学决策和有效运转具有极大的负面影响。本文从三级科层组织和“控制权”理论出发，将中国政府划分为委托方（中央政府）、管理方（省级政府）、代理方（市级政府），分析各层级政府的行为选择，以及由此产生的信息失真现象，主要回答三个问题：（1）科层体系内的非正式关系如何影响组织的环境治理成效？是否引起组织的信息失真？（2）以中央环保督察为代表的督察行动是否能推动环境治理的改善？能否有效降低地方的信息失真现象？（3）中间政府的治理注意力如何影响地方政府的环境执行和信息失真？研究建立了科层内部的三级政府分析框架。首先，从代理方视角出发，在对官僚制、绩效管理相关文献进行梳理的基础之上，建立了非正式关系影响组织信息失真的分析路径，提出上下级官员间的非正式关系通过“放松监管力度”和“降低造假风险”两个渠道引起地方环境数据失真的逻辑路径，并基于自建的城市级官员数据库、卫星监测与城市报告的污染物数值进行验证。其次，从委托方视角出发，评估环保领域的督察行动在应对信息失真方面的有效性，分析其受到阻力的因素和机制，并对比督察行动的短期和长期作用。最后，从管理方视角出发，分析其环境治理注意力对下级政府的环境政策执行、环境信息真实度的影响，由此尝试提出科层组织应对信息失真的有效路径。研究的主要结论为：第一，官员间的非正式关系会提升城市的污染物实际值、降低污染物汇报值，从而加剧科层组织的信息失真。随着非正式关系网络强度提高，失真程度越大。第二，中央环保督察的运动型治理模式能有效推动地方进行环境治理、降低污染物数值，但同时也加剧了组织的信息失真。上级制度压力越大，城市的信息失真程度越高；但督察行动对信息失真的影响不具有长期性。第三，管理方在环境领域的治理注意力有助于改善代理方的环境治理成效，同时降低代理方的信息失真程度。其影响过程会因城市的外部制度压力、内部官员特征有所不同。本文的研究丰富和扩展了信息传递及信息失真理论，揭示了中国场景下正式与非正式制度影响信息失真的运作逻辑，对破解环境治理领域的信息难题提供了新的分析视角和政策启示。

Information transmission is the basis for the effective operation of an administrative organization, an important channel for communication and coordination between departments, and a link between the decision-making and execution of the bureaucratic system. However, information distortion is a common problem inherent in the operation of the organization. It has a great negative impact on the scientific decision-making and effective operation of the organization.Starting from the three-level bureaucratic organization and the “control rights” theory, this paper divides the Chinese government into the principal (central government), the supervisor (provincial government), and the agent (municipal government), and analyzes the behavior choices of the governments at each level, and the resulting information distortion phenomenon. We mainly answer three questions: (1) How do informal relationships within the bureaucracy affect the organization’s environmental governance effectiveness? Does it cause information distortion in the organization? (2) Can the policy actions represented by the central environmental protection inspector improve the environmental governance? At the same time, can it effectively reduce the local information distortion? (3) How does the governance attention of the intermediate government affect the environmental enforcement and information distortion of the local government?First of all, from the perspective of the agent, the study establishes an analytical framework for the influence of informal relationships on organizational information distortion on the basis of sorting out relevant literature on bureaucracy and performance management. The two channels of “loosening regulation strength” and “reducing the risk of fraud” lead to the logical path of distortion of local environmental data. We conduct regression analysis based on the self-built city-level official database, satellite observation and official reported pollutant data. Secondly, from the perspective of the principal, it evaluates the effectiveness of the central environmental inspector’s sports governance in dealing with information distortion, analyzes the factors and mechanisms of resistance, and compares the short-term and long-term effects of environmental inspectors. Finally, from the perspective of the supervisor, it analyzes the impact of the environmental governance attention on the implementation of environmental policies of lower-level governments and the authenticity of environmental information, thereby trying to propose an effective path for bureaucratic organizations to deal with information distortion.The main conclusions of the study are as follows: First, informal relations between officials will increase the actual value of pollutants in the city and reduce the reported value of pollutants, thereby increasing the information distortion in bureaucratic organizations. As the strength of the informal relationship network increases, the degree of distortion increases. Second, the sports governance model of the central environmental protection inspector can effectively promote local environmental governance and reduce the value of pollutants, but at the same time, it also exacerbates the information distortion in the organization. The greater the institutional pressure, the higher the degree of information distortion in the city; but the impact is not long-term. Third, the supervisor’s attention for environmental governance helps to improve the governance effectiveness of the agent and reduce the information distortion of the city at the same time. Its influence process will vary due to the city’s external institutional pressure and the characteristics of internal officials. The research enriches and expands the theory of information transmission and distortion, and reveals the operational logic of formal and informal institutions affecting information distortion in the context of China. In practice, it provides new analytical perspectives and policy implications for solving information problems in the field of environmental governance.