近年来，我国地方政府债券市场在取得快速发展的同时，也暴露出“两个倒挂”等问题：一些地方债发行利率低于同期国债利率，同时发行市场利率低于二级市场利率。此外，商业银行特别是大型商业银行承销地方债占比高的现象也引发关注。本文将商业银行与地方政府之间的利益互换关系定义为银政关系，并证明了这种关系的存在是导致地方债发行“两个倒挂”的原因。本文从地方债发行视角出发，对银政关系的作用机制及影响进行了研究，发现了如下结论：第一，银政关系确实存在。研究发现，我国地方债发行定价无法由传统定价模型完全解释，同时商业银行承销行为等要素会显著影响利率定价，促使地方债定价向下偏离。在引入银行端数据后发现，商业银行的低利率承销行为是为了拉近与地方政府关系，以获得更多的政府资源，即银行与政府之间存在利益交换。第二，银政关系中，地方政府和商业银行议价能力不同，其中地方政府占主导地位。本文构造了议价能力指标，并通过实证分析发现，银政关系中地方政府的议价能力大于商业银行，使得地方债定价更有利于地方政府。造成议价能力差异的主要原因是，商业银行面临市场竞争，而地方政府则垄断资源。同时，本文发现商业银行面临的跨行业竞争会促使其拉近地方政府关系，接受更低利率的地方债承销。第三，银政关系分别对商业银行、地方政府产生影响。对于商业银行，更强的银政关系将提高其经营绩效体现，但收益会随着竞争的加剧而减弱；同时，银政关系所带来的低成本资金会显著提高政府部门的公共支出。更进一步，银政关系会以政府资源配置为中介变量，拉动投资、促进区域经济发展；但银政关系通过科技要素助推经济增长的作用有限。在创新性方面，本文从地方债发行承销的角度出发，使用银行端数据，首次对银政关系进行了定义和量化表征；同时开创性地对银政关系的作用机制进行了梳理，对银政关系的多方影响进行了分析。相比此前研究，本文在银政关系、地方政府债券分析等维度的分析有了较大的拓展。同时，本文的研究对推动地方政府债券市场化发行、规范银行业竞争、约束地方政府行为等方面具有一定的参考意义。

While achieving rapid growth over the years, the local government bond market in China has also exposed problems, especially, the “two inversions” – the issuance rate of certain local government bonds being lower than that of treasury bonds, and the rate in the issuance market lower than in the secondary market. Also of concern is the high proportion of commercial banks, large-scale ones in particular, in local government bonds underwriting. This dissertation defines commercial banks’ quid pro quo relations with local governments as bank-government relations, and reveals that such relations are the cause of the above-mentioned “two inversions” phenomenon. From the perspective of local government bond issuance, this dissertation studies the mechanism and impact of bank-government relations, and comes to the following conclusions. Firstly, bank-government relations do exist. It is found that traditional pricing models fall short of explaining the issuance pricing of local government bonds in China. Pricing of interest rate is, in effect, noticeably correlated with elements like the underwriting of commercial banks, which pushes the rate to diverge in a downward direction. It is evident by further studying data from banks that commercial banks underwrite the bonds at a low interest rate to improve relations with local governments in exchange for more resources. In other words, quid pro quo relations exist between the two sides.Secondly, local governments dominate in bank-government relations whereas commercial banks are weak in bargaining power. By introducing bargaining power indicators and based on an empirical analysis, this study shows that local governments are in a stronger bargaining position than commercial banks, so bonds are priced in their favor. The main reason for this disparity is the competition banks face for resources often monopolized by governments. Besides, it is demonstrated that cross-industry competition induces commercial banks to seek closer ties with local governments, and they are thus more likely to accept lower interest rate for underwriting. Thirdly, bank-government relations have an impact on commercial banks and local governments respectively. For banks, good relations with governments improve their business performance, yet the yield will be lower if competition gets fiercer. For governments, low cost capital greatly increases their public spending. Furthermore, government resources allocation, as a mediator in the relationship, can boost investment and the regional economy. However, technological factors only play a limited role.The contributions of this dissertation are as follows. It for the first time defines and quantitatively characterizes bank-government relations, using bank data, from the perspective of local government bond underwriting. It is also of pioneering significance to study the mechanism of bank-government relations and the various impacts. As compared with earlier studies, this dissertation remarkably extends the research scope of bank-government relations, and local government bond analysis, among others. In addition, the study provides helpful implications for promoting market-based issuance of local government bonds, improving regulation of bank competition, and restraining local government behavior.