网络技术的发展推动互联网平台规模不断扩大，互联网平台垄断已经从理论担忧变成现实威胁，互联网平台的掠夺性定价问题就是一个代表。相比于一般企业的掠夺性定价行为，互联网平台的掠夺性定价造成的危害更加严重，监管部门进行规制处罚更加困难。本文基于理论研究成果和国内外监管部门的司法实践，对互联网平台掠夺性定价的规制体系进行完善。反垄断价值取向影响着监管部门对具体规制手段的选择，本文首先对其进行分析。通过梳理哈佛学派、芝加哥学派和新布兰代斯学派的观点，本文认为哈佛学派和芝加哥学派的观点在互联网平台反垄断中存在局限，新布兰代斯学派更适应互联网行业的竞争特点与发展需要，应采取新布兰代斯学派作为互联网平台掠夺性定价规制的指导思想，坚持反垄断的多元价值目标，维护市场结构和竞争秩序。 以新布兰代斯学派的观点为指导，结合互联网平台掠夺性定价的特点，本文对掠夺性定价认定理论进行补充发展。在认定市场支配地位时，应结合网络效应、用户转换成本等因素界定相关市场、评估市场力量；在认定行为违法性时应对平台多边市场产品的价格与成本水平进行加权和加总，再进行价格比较，同时弱化补偿测验必要性；在认定排除限制竞争意图时，可采信关于经营者意图的直接证据，也可以结合成本价格比较情况对经营者意图进行推定；认定损害后果应当综合考量定价行为对市场竞争、市场创新、各市场主体福利造成的影响。基于掠夺性定价认定体系，结合国内外执法部门的实践，本文从反托拉斯和非反托拉斯两个层面，对互联网平台掠夺性定价的规制提出建议。对互联网平台掠夺性定价的反托拉斯规制应围绕保护竞争的目的，分阶段审查掠夺性定价的形式要件和实质要件，同时谨慎考虑当事人的效率和创新抗辩。非反托拉斯规制手段包括监管科技、提高算法透明度等，应构建完善的定价算法监管体系，对互联网平台进行事前监管、分级监管，提高监管效率。

With the rapid development of network technology and the expanding scale of networking platforms, the monopoly of networking platforms has turned into a real threat, among which predatory pricing is a representative. Compared with the predatory pricing behavior of traditional enterprises, the regulation of predatory pricing in networking platforms is more difficult and more serious. This dissertation improves the regulatory system of predatory pricing in networking platforms based on the theoretical research results and judicial practices of domestic and foreign regulatory authorities.Antitrust value orientation affects the specific regulatory approach to the monopoly problem, so this dissertation first analyzes the value consideration of predatory pricing regulation in networking platforms. By sorting out the views of the Harvard School, the Chicago School and the New Brandeis School, this dissertation concludes that the Harvard School and the Chicago School have limitations in the regulation of antitrust in networking platforms, while the New Brandeis School is more adapted to the characteristics and needs of the Internet industry. The New Brandeis School should be adopted as the guiding ideology for the regulation of predatory pricing in networking platforms. In particular, in determining the market dominance, defining the relevant market should take into account the mutual influence of the multilateral markets and assessing the market power should consider the network effect and user switching cost. In determining the illegality of the conduct, the prices of products in the multilateral market should be weighted and summed up with the cost level, while the necessity of the compensation test should be weakened. In determining the intent to restrict market competition, direct evidence about the enterprise's intent can be admitted, and the enterprise's intent can also be presumed in comparison with the cost and the price. In determining the damage consequences, the impact of the behavior on the market competition, the market innovation and the welfare of market players should be taken into account.Based on the determining predatory pricing, this dissertation proposes the regulatory measures of predatory pricing in networking platforms from antitrust and non-antitrust way. The antitrust regulatory measures of predatory pricing in networking platforms should focus on the purpose of protecting competition, examining the formal and substantive elements of predatory pricing in stages, while carefully considering the efficiency and innovation defenses of the parties. Non-antitrust regulatory measures include regulatory technology and improving the transparency of pricing algorithms, etc.