伴随着我国资本市场改革纵深推进，我国相关监管部门已通过立法等多种渠道和手段提升上市公司治理能力和信息披露质量，坚持“建制度、不干预、零容忍”的执法策略，遏制上市公司违规行为的发生并提升违规行为的稽查能力，切实保护投资者权益。但近年来，以康美药业等为典型代表的上市公司虚假陈述、不实披露、财务造假等违规行为仍屡见不鲜，因此，仅依靠外部监督措施仍无法有效抑制上市公司的违规倾向。 考虑到上市公司违规行为可能与其内部经营压力、财务风险等因素相关，而财务杠杆与二者联系紧密，本文从上市公司财务杠杆角度出发，以我国2006年至2020年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本，基于Logit回归模型和部分可观测的Bivariate Probit模型研究总体杠杆率、按期限和结构进一步细分的杠杆率水平与公司违规行为的关系，并通过内生性检验、替换被解释变量、替换解释变量、改变控制变量等方法进行了稳健性检验。 研究结果表明：第一，上市公司总体杠杆率的提升增加了违规行为的发生概率，具体而言，长期、短期杠杆率均与违规行为发生概率呈现显著的正相关关系，但短期杠杆率对违规行为的影响更加显著；银行信用杠杆率与违规行为发生概率呈现显著的正相关关系，商业信用杠杆率的提升却显著降低了违规行为发生概率。第二，财务杠杆的提升对不同类型上市公司违规行为的影响程度亦不相同，其中对信息披露类违规行为的影响效果最明显。第三，去杠杆背景下，国有企业财务杠杆与违规行为的正相关关系有所削弱，但非国有企业财务杠杆与违规行为的正相关关系更加明显。第四，上市公司财务杠杆对违规行为的影响效果受信息不对称程度的影响，信息不对称程度与公司违规倾向呈现显著的正相关关系，而与违规被稽查概率呈现显著的负相关关系。 本文在一定程度上补充了财务杠杆与违规行为关系的相关文献，进一步从杠杆结构、杠杆期限、违规类型以及具体的影响路径等方面丰富了财务杠杆与违规行为关系的相关研究，这将为我国相关部门从上市公司财务杠杆角度降低公司违规行为发生概率、提升监管机构对违规行为的事前监管和稽查能力提供可以借鉴的思路和针对性的政策建议。

With the deepening steps of the capital market reform in China, relevant regulatory authorities in China have adopted legislation and other methods to improve the governance capacity and information disclosure quality of listed companies. They adopt the nine-character policy of establishing a system, non-intervention, and zero tolerance to curb listed companies’ occurrence of violations and enhance the ability to inspect violations to effectively protect the rights and interests of investors. However, in recent years, misrepresentation, false disclosure, financial fraud and other violations of listed companies are still common, typically represented by Kangmei Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Therefore, external supervision measures alone cannot effectively curb the tendency of listed companies to violate regulations.Considering that the violations of listed companies may be related to their internal operating pressures, financial risks and other factors, meanwhile financial leverage is closely related to operating pressures and financial risks, this paper starts from the perspective of listed companies’ financial leverage and takes China’s A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2020. Basing on the logit regression model and the partially observable Bivariate Probit model, this paper studies on the relationship between the overall leverage ratio, the leverage ratio broken down by term and structure and corporate fraud. The robust test is conducted through endogeneity test, substitution of explained variables, substitution of explained variables and change of control variables.The results show that: first, the increase of overall leverage ratio of listed companies increases the probability of corporate fraud. Specifically, both long-term and short-term leverage ratio have a significant positive correlation with the probability of violations, but short-term leverage ratio has a more significant impact on violations. There is a significant positive correlation between bank credit leverage ratio and corporate fraud, but the increase of commercial credit leverage ratio reduces the probability of corporate fraud. Second, the increase of financial leverage of listed companies has different effects on different types of corporate fraud, among which the most obvious effect is on information disclosure violations. Third, the implementation of deleveraging policies weakened the positive relationship between SOEs’ financial leverage and irregularities, but increased the positive relationship between non-SOEs’ financial leverage and irregularities. Fourth, the influence of the financial leverage on corporate fraud is affected by degree of information asymmetry, which is positively correlated with the tendency of corporate fraud, and negatively correlated with the probability of corporate fraud being detected.This paper supplements relevant literature of discussing financial leverage and corporate fraud to a certain extent, and further enriches relevant studies on the relationship between the two aforementioned variables from the aspects of leverage structure, leverage term, types of corporate fraud and specific impact paths. This will provide reference ideas and targeted policy suggestions for relevant departments in China to reduce the occurrence probability of corporate fraud and improve the regulatory agency’s ability to inspect corporate fraud.