本文研究的核心问题是我国商业银行是否如实落实监管部门对其理财产品进行净值化披露的要求。近年来，理财产品已经成为中国民众最为常用的金融工具之一，截止2017年底，理财产品存续余额已高达约30万亿元人民币（约占当年全国GDP的35%），已经成为保证中国金融系统不发生系统性风险的关键，从而引发了监管部门的高度关注。本文研究不同风险和不透明度特征对商业银行是否落实监管要求的影响，深入分析其中的机制，力求为监管部门改善监管效能提供参考。 本文的主要发现如下。第一，商业银行在净值化转型、权益类理财产品占比提升等方面并没有完全按照监管的要求如实落实对理财产品的整改。第二，这一现象是监管部门与商业银行博弈的均衡。具体机制是监管部门的目标是双重的，即，理财行业规范化和透明化以及防止信息不当披露引发系统性金融风险，因此均衡结果是监管部门在一定程度上“默许”不同风险和不透明度的银行采取不同程度的信息披露。 为了论证上述分析和观点，本文基于2015Q1至2021Q3中国60家主要商业银行共约68.5万条理财产品的样本数据，使用面板回归模型进行实证研究，并采用面板回归模型结构性变化识别方法进行进一步讨论。实证研究结果支持本文的上述分析和观点。本文实证研究发现：（1）风险和不透明度越高的银行，其理财产品真净值化率越低，而伪净值化率越高，因而说明发行伪净值型理财产品是银行通过博弈规避监管的一种方式；（2）出于短期内对风险、客户流失、投研资源等方面的权衡，银行理财产品的真净值化率和权益类产品占比这两项监管指标存在“跷跷板效应”，即，对于理财产品真净值化率更高的银行，会对其权益类理财产品的占比造成挤出效应，且这一挤出效应主要在严监管周期显著。而理财产品的伪净值化率则不存在上述对权益类产品的挤出效应；（3）此外，由于总体不断加码的监管压力，对于风险和不透明度越高的银行，其理财产品规模的增速越慢，且其理财产品实际收益率低于预期的比例越高。

This paper studies whether Chinese commercial banks have faithfully followed regulatory requirements for wealth management products (WMPs) over the net worth transformation (NWT) of WMPs. WMPs have become one of the most commonly used financial instruments by people in China, as its balance had already reached around 30 trillion CNY by 2017 (35% of the national GDP that year). The regulation is critical to prevent systemic financial risks, and results of this paper can provide references to regulators. This paper finds that commercial banks have not fully followed regulatory requirements for WMPs in terms of NWT and increasing shares of equity WMPs, which is due to the equilibrium of games between banks and regulators. Under the dual goals (i.e., implementing the reform on WMPs and preventing systemic financial risks), regulators "acquiesce" in different responses from banks with different risks and opacity characteristics. In order to justify the analysis above, this paper conducts empirical research based on 15Q1-21Q3 data on 685 thousand WMPs issued by 60 major banks in China, using both panel regression models and panel regression structural changes identification method. This paper finds that: (1) Risk and opacity of banks are negatively and positively correlated with true- and pseudo-net-worth rate of WMPs respectively, as banks can avoid supervision by issuing pseudo-net-worth WMPs; (2) There's a "seesaw effect" between two regulatory indicators – true-net-worth ratio and proportions of equity WMPs, due to each bank's total capacity of bearing short-term risks and reform pressure. Specifically, banks with higher true-net-worth rate tend to "crowd out" equity WMPs, with this effect more significant during stricter supervision periods; (3) In addition, risk and opacity of banks are generally negatively and positively correlated with the growth rate of WMPs' scale and proportions of WMPs whose actual rate of return are lower than expected.