2016年起，我国开始新一轮市场化债转股，A股上市企业纷纷开始在破产重整中应用债转股这一清偿方式。2020年疫情爆发后，银行不良贷款逐年增加，急需寻求化解破产企业贷款转为不良贷款的方法。在政策支持和银行需求的双重背景下，本文选取2018年抚顺特钢破产重整中商业银行47亿元债权转为股权并于3年内成功退出的案例进行分析，为商业银行提供破产重整中债转股的理论支持和实践经验。 本文采取文献研究、案例研究和问卷调查结合的研究方法。首先以前人研究为出发点，总结出银行视角债转股制度，银行接受债转股的降低不良贷款率、减少信息不对称等动因，和接受债转股后资本充足率下降、收益率与退出途径不确定性高、增加管理层道德风险等弊端。进而对银行调查问卷和抚顺特钢重整中债转股这一案例，从银行债转股的不利因素、接受债转股的动因、转股后措施、退出途径和银行视角适于债转股的公司特点等多个方面，采取理论分析和实际案例情况结合的方式进行分析。 最终本文得出如下5方面结论：（一）银行选择债转股这一清偿方式从风险监管指标方面利大于弊；（二）银行选择债转股这一清偿方式从收益率角度利大于弊；（三）银行应在设立好监管措施的情况下向债转股企业提供扶持；（四）银行股权投资一般通过集中竞价和大宗交易退出；（五）银行应选择在重整中解决重大问题并获得扶持的企业进行债转股。同时本文也为全体商业银行提出建议，在疫情爆发后不良贷款率提升、利润增速放缓的大背景下，可以适当提高对上市公司破产重整中债转股这一清偿方式的接受度，并对转股后公司采取适当监管措施，以期在二级市场以合理价格处置所获股权，提高整体清偿率和收益率，化解破产企业不良贷款。

Since 2016, China has started a new round of market-based debt-to-equity conversion, and A-share listed enterprises have started to apply debt-to-equity conversion as a liquidation method in bankruptcy restructuring. after the outbreak of the epidemic in 2020, banks' non-performing loans have increased year by year, and there is an urgent need to seek ways to resolve the conversion of loans of bankrupt enterprises into non-performing loans. Under the dual background of policy support and bank demand, this paper selects a case of commercial banks converting 4.7 billion yuan of claims into equity in the bankruptcy restructuring of Fushun Special Steel in 2018 and successfully exiting within three years for analysis, so as to provide commercial banks with theoretical support and practical experience of debt-to-equity conversion in bankruptcy restructuring.This paper adopts a combination of literature research, case study and questionnaire survey. Firstly, we summarize the bank perspective debt-to-equity system, the motivation of banks to accept debt-to-equity conversion to reduce the non-performing loan ratio and information asymmetry, and the disadvantages of accepting debt-to-equity conversion to reduce the capital adequacy ratio, high uncertainty of yield and exit path, and increase the moral risk of management. The paper then analyzes the bank's questionnaire and the case of debt-to-equity conversion in Fushun Special Steel's restructuring by combining theoretical analysis and practical case studies in terms of the disadvantages of debt-to-equity conversion, the motivation of accepting debt-to-equity conversion, the post-conversion measures, the exit path and characteristics of companies whose bank perspective is easy to profit from debt-to-equity conversion. The findings are generalized to debt-to-equity cases involving creditors between October 2016 and May 2021.Finally, the paper draws the following five conclusions: (a) banks choose debt-to-equity conversion as a liquidation method to improve risk regulation indicators; (b) under certain conditions, banks may obtain higher returns by choosing debt-to-equity conversion as a liquidation method; (c) banks should provide support to debt-to-equity conversion enterprises with good regulatory measures in place; (d) banks' equity investments are generally exited through centralized bidding and block trading; (e) banks should select enterprises that solve major problems in restructuring and receive support for debt-to-equity conversion. At the same time, this paper also makes suggestions for all commercial banks that, against the background of rising NPL rate and slowing profit growth after the outbreak of the epidemic, they can appropriately increase their acceptance of debt-to-equity conversion as a liquidation method in bankruptcy restructuring of listed companies and take appropriate regulatory measures for the companies after the conversion, with a view to disposing of the acquired equity at a reasonable price in the secondary market, improving the overall liquidation rate and yield, and resolving the NPLs of bankrupt enterprises.