公司法视角下的利益相关者保护是近几十年来公司治理领域的重要议题。而公司职工作为公司最主要而又最弱势的利益相关者之一，有单独分析之必要。本文立足中国公司治理实践，主要研究公司法保护职工权益的理论基础和现实路径。公司法保护职工权益需要在理论上说明两个问题，即为什么劳动法等实体法的保护是不足的以及公司法保护职工权益的正当性何在。人力资本和劳动理论指出，职工向公司投入了专用性人力资本，与物质资本具有类似的属性，需要公司法设置一些能够把职工和公司的命运联系起来的制度安排。另一方面，劳动法等保障法难以涵盖公司治理中职工最为关切的问题，保护难免不周延；而无论是股东至上主义、利益相关者主义或者是最新提出的多元目的论下，都有保护职工权益的空间，公司法保护职工权益有其正当性。我国自建国以来素有保护职工权益的传统，目前存有职工管理参与和职工利益参与两种保护职工权益的模式。但通过实证研究，本文发现无论是职工董事、监事等制度性安排，还是职工持股计划的利益分享模式，都存在显著的缺陷，经常异化为防御收购的工具和利益输送的手段，在职工权益保护方面力有未逮。其他各国公司治理实践给中国提供了有益的参考。德国的共决制让职工可以参与公司的管理和表决，与股东共同决定着公司的经营；日本的终身雇佣制和主银行制让职工诉求充分得到反映，使职工权益在实质上得到了保护；荷兰对于重塑受信义务的成功和美国、英国对于重塑受信义务失败但有益的尝试让我们意识到想要以受信义务达到保护职工权益的效果，就必须改变股东至上主义。考虑中国现实，我国不具有德日的制度背景，外国的制度是有益的参考，但不能照搬照抄。本文结合国内公司治理现状和国外制度启示提出两条现实路径。保守的路径是以利益分享的完善取代职工管理参与的不足，让职工真正成为股东，从而消弭二者之间的利益分歧，形成紧密的利益共同体；激进的方案则是重塑董事受信义务，使董事决策按照公司利益的标准进行，保证董事是居中的决策者，而非股东意志的执行者。
Stakeholder protection from the perspective of corporation law has been an important issue in the field of corporate governance in recent decades. As one of the most important and weakest stakeholders, it is necessary to analyze the employees separately. Based on China's corporate governance practices, this article focuses on the theoretical foundations and practical approaches for the protection of employees' interests under the Corporation Law.To protect employees' interests under the Corporation Law, two questions need to be answered in theory, i.e., why substantive laws such as the Labor Law provide insufficient protection, and the legitimacy of the Corporation Law's protection of employees' interests. The theory of human capital and labor points out that the special human capital invested in the corporation by the workers has the similar attribute with the material capital，so it is necessary to set up some systems to connect the fate of workers with the corporation. On the other hand, Labor Law and other laws hardly cover all the issues that employees are most concerned with in corporate governance, and inadequate protection is unavoidable. There is room to protect employees' interests under the principle of shareholder supremacy, stakeholder principle and the newly raised multi-objective theory. Protection of employees' interests under the Corporation Law is justified to some extent.Since the founding of our country, it has been a tradition of protecting the interests of employees. At present, there are two modes for protecting the interests of employees: employee management participation and employee interest participation. But through empirical research, this article finds that both the employee director and supervisor arrangement and the benefit-sharing model of ESOP have obvious defects, which often alienate into the tool of defense against takeover and the means of benefit transfer.The corporate governance practices of other countries provide a useful reference for China. The German Communiqué enables workers to participate in the management and vote of the company, and determine the operation of the company together with the shareholders; the Japanese Lifelong Employment System and the Main Bank System fully reflect the demands of workers, and protect their interests in essence；The success in the Netherlands and the failed but useful attempts in the United States and the United Kingdom make us realize that if we want to use fiduciary duty to protect the interests of employees, we must change shareholder primacy.Considering the reality of China, China does not have the system background of Germany and Japan, the foreign system is a useful reference, but can not be copied. This article combines the domestic corporate governance status quo and foreign system enlightenment proposed two realistic paths. The conservative approach is to replace the lack of employee management participation with the improvement of benefit sharing, and make the employees really become the shareholders, so as to eliminate the interest divergence between them and form a close interest community. The radical solution is to reconstruct the fiduciary duty of directors, making their decisions according to certain criteria, ensuring that directors are neutral decision-makers rather than executors of shareholders' will.
