过度投资在企业投资中普遍存在，对于企业业绩、经营风险与资本市场表现等产生全面的不利影响。本文试图说明企业过度投资的动因所在，进而探讨过度投资行为对于企业价值的影响作用及发挥作用的内在机制，并藉此就有效控制企业过度投资倾向等提出管理方面的建议。 本文选取2011-2020年间中国上市公司作为样本，结合实践进行理论研究、建立假设、构建经济模型和实证分析，检验了外部融资约束、代理成本和内部控制质量三大内外部因素对于过度投资的影响；验证了过度投资和企业价值的关系，并说明了管理层过度自信和风险偏好两类认知偏差对于前述关系的调节作用。 本文研究发现：（1）强融资约束会使企业被迫放弃过度投资决策，因此融资环境宽松的企业更需要提防管理层出现过度投资倾向；（2）管理层会出于自利动机进行过度投资，扩大企业规模，提升短期表现；（3）良好的内部控制体系可以有效控制非效率决策，避免意愿性和操作性的过度投资；（4）过度投资会损害企业价值，且损害作用传导快，影响充分；（5）过度自信的管理层更加容易忽视过度投资的负面信息，加剧过度投资对于企业价值的损害；（6）高风险偏好的管理层容易表现出非理性的激进决策风格，加剧过度投资对于企业价值的不良影响。
Over-investment is a common phenomenon in enterprise investment, which has a comprehensive adverse effect on enterprise operation, risk and capital market performance. This paper attempts to explain the motivation of over-investment, and then discuss the influence of over-investment behavior on the enterprise value and the internal mechanism of its role. Finally, the paper puts forward some management suggestions on controlling the tendency of over-investment. The paper conducts research on listed enterprises in China from 2011 to 2020, conducts theoretical analysis, hypotheses, economic models and empirical analysis in combination with practice, and tests the influence of external financing constraints, agency costs and quality of internal control system on over-investment. This paper verifies the relationship between over-investment and enterprise value, and moderating effect of managerial overconfidence and risk preference on this relationship. The results show that :(1) firms with strong financing constraints are forced to abandon over-investment, while firms with weak financing constraints need to be more cautious about over-investment. (2) The management will over-invest to expand the size and short-term performance of the enterprise out of self-interest; (3) An effective internal control system can control inefficient actions and avoid intentional and operational over-investment; (4) Over-investment will damage enterprise value, and the damage impact is fast and sufficient; (5) Overconfident management is more likely to ignore the negative information, which exacerbates the damage of over-investment to enterprise value; (6) Managers with high risk preference tend to exercise irrational radical decisions, which exacerbates the negative impact of over-investment on enterprise value.
