官员视角是我们理解中国地方政府治理的重要入口。“新官上任三把火”这句古谚突出了履新官员对于地区治理的重要性。本文以官员更替作为切入视角，研究地方政府行为的内在逻辑。主要回答问题：（1）官员更替是如何影响地方政府在不同领域的政府行为的？背后的基本逻辑是什么？（2）官员更替是如何影响地方政府在不同领域的治理绩效的？影响机制是什么？（3）前任去向如何影响官员更替对地方政府治理的影响效应？在对官员更替相关文献进行梳理的基础上，本研究构建统一的官员更替影响地方政府行为的分析框架，将前任官员去向纳入分析，并关注官员更替对不同领域、不同层次政府行为的影响。根据研究框架，本研究推导出官员更替如何影响地方政府在不同领域的行为策略。最后，本文聚焦经济增长、环境治理和民生保障三个治理领域，对三个治理领域进行类型界定，并提出待检验的核心研究假设。在实证研究上，本文首先通过对3000余份地方《政府工作报告》的文本分析，建立地方政府政策承诺数据库，发现地方政府政策承诺行为体现出“重经济、轻环境、轻民生”和“向上模仿”的特征。接着，本文利用政策承诺与官员数据，验证官员更替对地方政府政策承诺行为的影响效应，发现官员更替会导致地方政府提高经济增长领域或环境治理领域的政策承诺，降低民生保障领域的政策承诺；前任落马将进一步提高地方政府在环境治理领域的政策承诺。其次，本文利用地级市治理投入与官员数据，验证官员更替对地方政府治理投入行为的影响效应，发现官员更替会导致地方政府提高经济增长领域的治理投入水平，而不会提高其他领域的治理投入水平。最后，首先用计量分析方法检验对官员更替对治理绩效的影响效应，其次利用定性比较分析方法探讨官员更替影响治理绩效的作用机制。研究结论认为官员更替会对地方政府的政策承诺、治理投入、治理绩效产生差异化的影响。一方面，官员更替通过改变辖区政府的目标函数（使地方政府具有更强的效用动机和更低的风险厌恶水平），影响地方政府在政策承诺和治理投入方面的行为选择。此外，地方政府对于“风险-效用”的权衡同样会影响其行为选择，对于预期收益高的领域，地方政府的目标侧重获取政绩；对于潜在风险高的领域，地方政府的目标侧重规避风险。另一方面，官员更替通过影响地方政府偏好、破坏合谋、改变官员激励等渠道影响地方政府的治理绩效。最后，本研究还发现前任去向调节官员更替对于地方政府行为及治理绩效的影响效应。

The perspective of government officials is an important entry point for us to understand the governance of local government in China. The old proverb " A new broom sweeps clean" highlights the importance of new officials in regional governance. This article takes political turnover as an entry point to study the mechanism of local government behavior in China. The main answers to questions: (1) How does the political turnover affect local government actions in different fields? What is influence mechanism? (2) How does the political turnover affect the governance performance of local governments in different fields? What is the impact mechanism?（3） How does the former officials' direction affect the effect of official replacement on local government governance?Based on a review of the relevant literature on political turnover, this study builds a unified analysis framework for official turnover that affects local government behavior; the framework includes former officials in the analysis and focuses on the impact of official turnover on different areas and different types of government behavior. Based on the research framework, this study derives how political turnover affects local government behavior strategies in different fields. Finally, this paper focuses on the three governance areas of economic growth, environmental governance and people's livelihood security, defines the types of the three governance areas, and proposes core research hypotheses to be tested.In empirical research, first of all, this paper establishes a government policy commitment database by analyzing the text of more than 3,000 local "Government Work Reports". Next, this paper uses government policy commitment data and city-level official data to verify the effect of political turnover on local government policy commitment behavior. The study found that the political turnover will cause local governments to increase policy commitments in the economic or environmental fields and reduce policy commitments in the field of people's livelihood. In addition, the demotion of former officials will further increase local government policy commitments in the environmental field. Secondly, this paper uses prefecture-level municipal governance input data and official data to verify the effect of political turnover on local government governance input, and finds that political turnover will cause local governments to increase investment in the economic field, but not increase input in other fields. Finally, this study examines the relationship between political turnover and governance performance. First, this study uses the quantitative analysis method to examine the effect of official replacement on governance performance. Second, it uses qualitative comparative analysis to discuss the mechanism of official replacement's impact on governance performance.The conclusion of the study is that political turnover will have a differential impact on local government's policy commitment, governance investment, and governance performance. On the one hand, official replacement affects local government behavior choices in terms of policy commitment and governance input by changing the objective function of the jurisdictional government (making the local government have a stronger utility motive and a lower level of risk aversion). In addition, the local government's "risk-utility" trade-offs will also affect its behavior choices. For areas with high expected returns, the local government's goals focus on obtaining performance; for areas with high potential risks, the local government's goals focus on avoiding risks. On the other hand, political turnover affects local government performance through channels that affect local government preferences, disrupt collusion, and change official incentives. Finally, this study also found that the former officials' direction will regulate the effect of official replacement on local government governance.