创新能力深刻影响着国家的经济增长（Solow, 1957）和企业的竞争力 （Porter, 1985）。从原创性而言，创新可分为渐进式创新（exploitative innovation） 和突破性创新（exploratory innovation）（He & Wong, 2004），前者指的是提升现有产品的技术水平，后者指的是开发新型技术。一般认为，突破性创新更容易带来技术溢出，因此起着更为重要的作用（Manso, 2011）。与生产或营销等常规业务不同，创新是一个长期过程，涉及失败的可能性很高（Holmstrom, 1989）。因此对大多数公司而言，激励创新是一项重要挑战。本文研究了资本市场中被动机构投资者对企业创新活动的影响及其作用机制，特别地，本文对渐进式创新和突破性创新的分野进行了细致刻画。通过对1984-2006年间2000余家公司的实证研究发现，被动机构投资者带来了对管理层更多的监督和更大的职业压力，导致其投资组合中的公司越来越关注对现有技术的开发，也即渐进式创新，同时减少了对新技术的探索，也即突破性创新。建立机构投资者与企业创新的因果关联需要解决内生性问题，因为机构投资者可以主动选择向哪个公司投资以获取最大化回报，他们可能选择投资于他们认为可能具有最大创新潜力的公司，或者投资于因其他原因而期望获得更高回报的公司。这些选择性偏差导致我们观察到的横截面相关性可能是对机构投资者对创新活动影响的有偏估计。为了解决内生性问题，我使用罗素指数的重组事件作为外生冲击，通过断点回归和工具变量法建立了机构投资者和企业创新的因果关系。在实证结果的基础上，我建立了包含异质创新决策的内生增长模型，与突破性创新相比，由机构投资者导致的企业向渐进性创新的转变会对技术溢出造成障碍，并减少行业内的竞争。最后，我利用来自发达经济体和发展中经济体的经验证据证实了理论模型中的假设。本研究对企业创新和经济增长领域的文献做出了原创性贡献，并在公司治理和公共政策方面具有重要的现实启发。一方面，应改善公司治理水平和高管薪酬结构，降低企业管理者从事创新活动的风险，培育能够容忍创新失败的公司文化，以吸引具有创新精神的工作者；与此同时，应建立合理的知识产权保护，在不损害技术溢出的状况下激励突破性创新。
Innovation is the fundamental force that shapes firm dynamics (Porter, 1985) and aggregate productivity growth (Solow, 1957). It can be divided into exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation. The former refers to improving the technology of existing products, and the latter refers to developing new technologies (He & Wong, 2004). Unlike routine tasks such as marketing or production, innovation is a long-term process that involves a high probability of failure (Holmstrom, 1989). Therefore, motivating innovation is a challenge for most firms (Manso, 2011).This paper studies the impact of passive institutional investors on corporate innovation and the underlying mechanisms. In particular, I focus on the distinction between exploitative innovation and exploratory innovation. Using a sample of more than 2,000 companies between 1984 and 2006, I find that passive institutional investors brought more monitoring and greater career concerns on the management, pushing portfolio companies to pay more attention on the exploitation of existing technology while reducing the exploration of new technology.It is difficult to establish the causality between institutional investors and corporate innovation due to a well-known endogeneity problem. That is, institutional investors can choose which company to invest in to maximize returns. Thus, they may choose to invest in companies that they believe may have the greatest innovation potential. In order to solve the endogeneity problem, I rely on the instrumental variable method and regression discontinuity design, and use the Russell 1000/2000 index annual reconstitution as an exogenous shock to establish a causal relationship between institutional investors and corporate innovation.Finally, I rationalize the empirical findings through an endogenous growth model that incorporates heterogeneous innovation decisions. The transition from exploration to exploitation driven by institutional investors will hinder technology spillovers and reduce competition. Theoretical assumptions are confirmed using empirical evidence from both advanced and developing countries.
