官俸是中国古代官员重要的合法收入之一。官俸数额的高低，官俸结构的变化，官俸制度的变迁都直接关系到每一位官员的日常生活和办公，还会对财权流动、官场风气等方面造成间接的影响。清承明制，清初俸制也是以明代俸制为蓝本建立的。经过顺康两朝的调整，文武、京外、满汉官员各自形成了一套官俸标准，名目和数额虽有差异，但结构上大体由正俸、生活补贴，以及办公补贴三部分组成。正俸和生活补贴主要根据官员的品级而定，办公补贴则与事务的繁简有关。种种迹象表明，清代官俸不仅是一种私人收入，同时还具有办公经费的性质，不仅需要应付日常办公，有时还需负担地方公共事务。官俸的公私双重性加上办公补贴数额与实际行政需求的脱节共同导致了清代官员合法收入普遍不敷支用的问题。雍乾时期，以“耗羡归公”和发放养廉银为代表，清代俸制经历了第一轮大规模改革。耗羡银留存地方，在使用上被划分为养廉银和存公银两个部分，增加了官员的办公补贴，同时将地方公共事务开支从官俸的支用范围中剥离出去，部分地实现了公私分离。将耗羡银提解布政司后再进行分配和发放的做法使得省级政府在一定时期内获得了可供灵活调配的经费，由此出现了清代省级财政的雏形。嘉道时期，第一轮俸制改革的后续问题逐渐爆发，改革成果也随之丧失。咸同以降，新的俸制改革在清政府内外交困的背景下应运而生。一方面，地方上建立起一套以督抚为主导、以局所财政为依托，与传统俸制并行的官俸体系。另一方面，以总理衙门为代表的近代新设机构也在借鉴西方工资制度的基础上建立起不同于传统俸制的俸薪体系。私人收入和办公经费的分野在改革实践中逐步得到明确，中央和地方也在这一过程中展开了争夺财权的博弈。此外，官俸作为组织管理中一项重要的激励手段，由于赏项太少，而罚项又因过严、过密而在实践层面难以落实，导致清代官俸的赏罚之制无法发挥应有的激励作用，还给相关人事管理制度的执行带来了负面影响。总的来说，清代官俸固有的公私双重性导致了其在支用过程中公私不分的问题，进而产生“薄俸”的假相，实现私人收入和办公经费的彻底分离是有清一代俸制改革的核心问题和总体趋势，而官俸赏罚作为清代激励机制中的一种主要手段，始终处于失效状态。
Guanfeng (Official salary) is one of the most important legal income of Chinese bureaucrats. The level and structure of officials’ salary as well as the transition of salary system are directly related to the daily live and work of every bureaucrats. And they also have indirect influence on the flow of fiscal power and the atmosphere of officialdom. Systems of Qing Dynastry were inherited from Ming Dynasty. During the Era of Shunzhi and Kangxi, Qing salary system was also established based on Ming salary system. Civil and military officials, central and local officials, Manchu and Han officials used different salary standard respectively. Although the category and amount had discrepancies, the structure of officials’ salary all consisted by three parts, basic salary, living allowance and office allowance. Basic salary and living allowance were determined by the rank of bureaucrats while office allowance depended on the work’s complexity and busy degree. There were signs that the nature of Qing bureaucrats’ salary was not only private income, but also kind of office funds. Sometimes it was even used to pay local public affairs. The dual nature of Qing officials’ salary and the mismatch between amount of office allowance and actual administrative needs led to the insufficiency of their legal income. To the era of Yongzheng and Qianlong, represented by ‘Haoxian gui gong’ and the appearance of silver honesty system, bureaucrats’ salary system of Qing Dynasty experienced the first round of large-scale reform. Meltage fees was preserved in the province silver treasury and be divided in two parts as honesty silver and public saving silver, which increased bureaucrats’ work allowance and separated the expenditure of local public affairs from traditional range of salary expenses, partial achieved the aim that to separate the public and private use of bureaucrats’ salary expenses. Transporting all the meltage fees to the province silver treasury first, and then redistributing them to every prefectures and counties let the province government obtain a sum of money that could be allocated flexibly in a certain period, which caused the emergence of provincial finance in Qing Dynasty. During the era of Jiaqing and Daoguang, follow-up problems of first round reform gradually broke out and the fruits of reform lost rapidly. From the era of Xianfeng and Tongzhi, new reforms were carried out under the background that Qing government faced both internal and external predicaments. On one hand, province governments started to establish a set of official salary system which dominated by the governors and supported by ‘Ju-Suo’ finance. The system was paralleled with the traditional system. On the other hand, new departments established in late Qing period represented by Ministry of Foreign Affairs also built up new salary system based on Western experience. The distinction between private income and office expenditure became more and more clear at that time. In this process, central and local governments also launched a game for fiscal power. Futhermore, as one of the most important incentive means in organizational management, officials’ salary in Qing Dynasty did not played the role effectively since the reward was little while the punishment was too hard and too much. This situation also led to some negative impacts on relevant personnel management system. In conclusion, the dual nature of Qing bureaucrats’ salary resulted in the confusion of public and private expenditure in the process of official administration. To make private income and office expenses completely separated was the core aim and general trend of the salary reform in Qing Dynasty. Besides, the reward and punishment of official salary were invalid as an incentive measure during this period.
