方法专利权穷竭主要存在三个层次的问题：第一，方法专利是否存在权利穷竭问题？换言之，如果存在，理由何在？如果不存在，障碍何在？这种障碍能否消除？第二，方法专利权穷竭的适用范围如何界定？换言之，出售何种产品会导致方法专利穷竭？该产品需要具备哪些特征和要素？第三，方法专利权穷竭是否具有强制性？换言之，专利权人能否通过合同限制或排除权利穷竭？目前，我国司法界对第一个层次的问题持否定答案，否认方法专利权穷竭，其理由在于《专利法》第六十九条第一项中未明确规定方法专利可以适用权利穷竭。而学术界对该问题的讨论层次不一、观点纷杂、结论不清，这凸显出将上述三个层次的问题放在统一框架内讨论的必要性。为方法专利权穷竭寻求统一的理论框架，将对法院相关司法实践提供参考。 本文拟采用卡梅框架基本理论，对三个层次的问题依次进行回答。第一个层次上，本文认为权利穷竭的本质是高交易成本下的责任型规则，是法律对专利权人和购买者在产品上的权利所划定的法定权利边界。其目的在于降低交易成本，促进后续交易的发生，增进社会福利。实践中的障碍源于法院的狭义解释，这可以通过对《专利法》第六十九条第一项作扩大解释，将方法专利纳入权利穷竭适用的范围加以解决。 第二个层次上，本文认为方法专利可以随体现其专利的产品售出而穷竭。该产品需要具备两个基本特征，一是该产品需要体现方法专利的必要技术特征，二是该产品的销售价格能够合理反映方法专利的使用对价。 第三个层次上，本文认为售后限制合同本质上是专利权人与特定购买者对权利的处分和交易，原则上应被认定为有效。仅当售后限制合同对第三方产生不容忽视的负外部性时，法院才应作为第三方予以干涉。与售后限制合同有关的负外部性，主要包括司法的额外成本、市场福利的减损成本以及社会公众的信息成本。法院应综合考虑以上三种负外部性，当特定售后限制合同所导致的负外部性显著高于其社会收益时，法院宜认定售后限制合同无效。反之则应尊重当事人的合同自由，认定合同对权利穷竭的排除作用有效。

The application of the patent exhaustion to method patents has three levels of issues. The first level is whether it can be applied, what necessity to be applied or what obstacles not to be applied, and whether the obstacle can be eliminated. The second level is how to apply the patent exhaustion, that is, if applicable, what products sold can make method patents exhausted, and what features the product needs to have. The third level is whether the application is compulsory, that is, whether the patentee can restrict or exclude the application of the patent exhaustion through a contract. At present, China's court holds a negative answer to the first level of question, that is, to deny that the patent exhaustion can be applied to method patents. The reason is that the Article 69 of the Patent Law does not explicitly stipulate that patent exhaustion can be applied to method patents. As for Chinese academia, scholars have different levels of discussions, diverse views, and ambiguous conclusions, which makes it necessary to discuss these three levels of issues in a unified framework in order to find the optimal solution. At the same time, this may be consultative for the standards that our courts could adopt in judicial practice in order to maximize the social welfare. This article will use the basic theory of the Calabresi-Melamed Framework to answer the three levels of issues in turn. On the first level, this article considers the patent exhaustion as a liability rule under high transaction costs, and it is a kind of right boundary defined by the law between patentees and buyers on the products. The purpose of patent exhaustion is to reduce the transaction cost so as to promote the occurrence of subsequent transactions, and thereby improve the social welfare. From the perspective of reducing transaction costs, there is no obstacle to the application of the patent exhaustion to method patents. However, it is the narrow interpretation of the law by the courts in judicial practice that becomes the fundamental obstacle to the application. And the "patent product" in the Article 69 of the Patent Law can be explained more broadly, so that method patents are included in the scope of patent exhaustion. On the second level, this article claims that method patents can be exhausted with the sale of products that essentially ‘embody’ method patents. The product needs to have two basic characteristics. One is that the product must embody the essential technical features of the method patent. Two is that sale price of the product is equivalent to the value of using the method patent. On the third level, this article suggests that the after-sale restriction contract is essentially the disposition and transaction of the rights by the patentee and the specific purchaser. It is a kind of agreed delineation of the right boundary on the product by the two. In principle, it should be regarded as valid. However, if the contract has negative externalities to the third party, that is, the third party bears additional and uncompensated costs, the court should intervene as a third party to prevent it. There are mainly three kinds of negative externalities that may be generated by the after-sale contract, including additional cost to justice, impairment cost to market welfare, and extra information cost to the public. The court should comprehensively consider the above three types of negative externalities. When the negative externalities caused by a specific after-sale restriction contract are higher than the benefits it brings to the society, the court should determine that the after-sale restriction contract is invalid, otherwise, it should respect the parties' freedom of contract to justify the effectiveness to exclude the application of patent exhaustion by the patentee.