股东派生诉讼，是指公司董事、高级管理员人员或第三人侵害公司利益而公司怠于主张权利时，符合法定条件的股东按照法定程序、为了公司的利益以自己的名义直接向法院提起诉讼的法律制度。中国公司法在2005年修订后确立了派生诉讼制度，正式给予股东法定权利以自己名义代公司提起诉讼。然而，在过去十五年间，股东派生诉讼的案件并不多 。本文采取实证分析的方法，探究股东派生诉讼实际提起数量不多的原因。发现问题的根本原因在于：(1) 原告资格的认定过时，(2) 案件受理费用过高及 (3) 诉讼费用补偿制度上的不明确。最后借鉴外国处理相关问题的经验，对完善中国股东派生诉讼制度提出意见和建议。

Shareholder derivative action is a lawsuit brought by qualified shareholder, acting on behalf of and for the benefit of the company, against the directors, managements or others. The derivative action is brought to remedy wrongs committed against the company, which the company is not willing to pursue itself. The PRC Company Law, after the reform in 2005, for the first time explicitly affords shareholders the right to take on derivative action. However, the mechanism has been rarely instituted in the past fifteen years. In view of that, this paper undertakes a practical and analytical review of the shareholder derivative action mechanism in China, to find out the reasons behind the paucity of reported cases. It is observed that (1) the unpragmatic standing requirement, (2) the expensive filing fees and (3) the uncertainties in the funding arrangements, inter alia, contribute to the scarcity of derivative actions. To address the above issues, proposals are put forward, drawing from other jurisdictions’ experience for inspiration and comparison.