在中央环保督察的背景下，地方政府环境治理的行为面临着更多的政治压力，云南省玉溪市D县在2016年中央环保督察以及2018年中央环保督察“回头看”中由于A湖的治理问题被中央屡次点名。强压力模式下，其治理行为是否发生了改变？行为发生改变背后的机制是什么？本文以2014-2016, 2016, 2018中央环保督察期间，D县政府环境治理的行为作为研究对象，重点关注D县政府治理行为的变化以及背后的影响因素。本文认为，对于中国环境政策的执行问题，必须在政策执行的经典理论上，关注中国政治体制，以及环境治理困境对于政策执行行为的影响。因此，本文通过梳理国内外经典的政策执行模型，从“压力型体制”的视角，结合当前中国环境治理的现状，提出了以Matland 模糊-冲突模型为基础的分析框架。 在实证方面，本文采用访谈和参与式观察为主的定性案例研究方法，以A湖的治理作为切入点，通过追踪2014-2016, 2016, 2018三个阶段下中央环保督察期间D县环境治理政策模糊性与冲突性的变化，来分析并解释D县政府政策执行行为产生变化的原因。研究表明，在弱政治压力下，政策的高模糊性与低冲突性解释了地方政府试验性执行的行为，在强政治压力下，政策的高模糊性与高冲突性是导致地方政府环境政策象征性执行的主要原因。当政治压力逐渐增强，伴随着政策的模糊性的降低，以及冲突性的升高，地方政府的行为由象征性执行向政治性执行进行转变，然而，这种转变在带来一些实质性成果的同时却伴随有高昂的治理成本，并且也没有解决环境的问题。与此同时，中国体制下的压力对于试验性执行以及象征性执行所发挥的作用有限，而对于政治性执行所带来的影响更为显著，模糊性越低的政策更易受到压力传导的影响。

Under the environmental inspections launched in early 2016, the local government is facing more political pressure to implement environmental rules. County D of Yuxi City, Yunnan Province, was repeatedly criticized for its dereliction of duty in protecting the Lake A in 2016 and 2018 environmental inspections. Under the strong pressure, has its governance behavior been changed? What is the mechanism behind for the changes of implementation? This paper takes the environmental governance behavior of county D government as the research object, covering three phases, 2014-2016, 2016 and 2018, focuses on the changes of government’s behavior and the influencing factors behind.The paper reviews the classical policy implementation models at home and abroad, from the perspective of "pressure system", and puts forward an analytical framework based on Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model. From the angle of demonstration, this paper uses the qualitative case study method and analyzes the governance of Lake A by tracking the degree of policy ambiguity and conflict in three periods of time: 2014-2016, 2016, and 2018, aiming to explain the reasons for the changes of county D government policy implementation behavior.The research shows that under the weak political pressure, if a policy exhibits a high ambiguity and low conflict level, the local government conducts experimental implementation. Under the strong political pressure, the high level of ambiguity and conflict of policies are the main reasons for the symbolic implementation. When political pressure gradually increases, with the decrease of policy ambiguity and the increase of conflict, the behavior of local governments changes to political implementation. However, despite some substantive results being reached, the political implementation also brings high governance costs and does not solve environmental problems. At the same time, the pressure under the Chinese system plays a limited role in experimental and symbolic implementation, but the impact on political implementation is more significant, and the less vague the policy is the more vulnerable it is to pressure transmission.