功利主义、康德主义和亚里士多德主义是当代伦理学理论的三大主要路向，威廉斯对三者都有批评。因之，威廉斯往往被学界看作是一个批判者，相对而言，其正面的伦理学思想往往隐而不彰。本文试图以其本真性概念为核心，将威廉斯的伦理思想阐释和重构为一种与以上三种路向皆有不同的本真性伦理学。本文首先讨论了威廉斯对功利主义和康德主义伦理学的批评。威廉斯认为，只要我们认可并尊重以个人筹划或承诺来定义的完整性，那么我们必然会发现功利主义将造成对完整性的破坏：对友谊、家庭关系、有意义的生活理想等等来说，功利主义所采取的后果主义化约方式或者是对其构成直接的破坏，或者是对其作出扭曲的解释。功利主义的弊病在于忽略了行动与行动者之间的内在关联。康德主义伦理学对此有所推进，它将实践理性置于其伦理学理论的中心位置，从而为行动是如何出自行动者提供了一种解释。然而，康德主义伦理学将实践理性仅仅限定在道德这个孤立封闭的领域内，因而忽略了道德之外的诸多其他伦理和实践的维度。康德主义哲学由此成为“奇特的道德建制”的理论表达，仍然难免破坏完整性。在对威廉斯的行动哲学加以阐释的基础上，本文以内在主义的方式来理解行动理由，进而又关联于行动者的品格、绝对欲望和根本筹划来理解行动，从而就为“行动是如何属于行动者”提供了一个更为可信的理解架构。这个架构与完整性思想是一脉相承的，它包括本真性的行动、本真性的自我（认同）以及本真性的生活。在此基础上，本文指出，卢梭式的孤独的自我发现的模式并不足以理解本真性。无论是对行动的责任的理解还是对本真自我和本真生活的理解，都无法摆脱运气和命运的影响。并且，我们必须且唯有在一个包含特定的地方性视角的伦理意义视域中才能理解本真性。在坚持本真性的同时，我们仍有可能借助社会、历史的反思来进行自我理解和自我批判。那种对伦理生活的科学的基础主义的理解方式是错误的，那种以无所依凭的自我决定来理解本真性的思路也是错误的。最后，借助威廉斯对亚里士多德的批评以及他与亚里士多德主义者的对话，本文想特别强调，人之自然本性有多样的实现方式，它们体现为多样的生活方式，并且有可能相互冲突，这个现代性的处境是本真性伦理学的重要背景。
Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics and virtue ethics are three main approaches of contemporary ethical theory, all three have been critiqued by Williams. Therefore, Williams is generally considered as a critic, while relatively his positive ethical thought tend to be neglected. Concentrated on Williams’ concept of authenticity, this dissertation tries to interpret and reconstruct his thought as an ethics of authenticity, which is different from the three above approaches.First, Williams’ critique of utilitarianism and Kantian ethics is discussed. According to Williams, if we accept the integrity defined by personal project and commitment, then we will find that Utilitarianism is an inevitable threat to integrity. The reductionism of Utilitarianism either directly violates our friendships, family relationships, and the meaning of our lives or explains them in a distorted way. The deficiency of Utilitarianism is its ignorance of the intrinsic relation between action and its agent. Kantian ethics is on its way to overcome this problem by taking practical rationality as the center of ethics, it therefore provides us an explanation of how an action can be attributed to its agent. However, Kantian ethics regard practical rationality as independently and exclusively corresponding to morality, thus the ethical and practical field other than morality is ignored. As a result, Kantian ethics turns out to be an expression of “the peculiar morality institution” which also inevitably violates integrity.Based on an interpretation of Williams’ philosophy of action, this dissertation argues that internalism is the only way to understand reasons of action and that an action should be understood in terms of its relationship with an agent’s character, categorical desire and ground project. Thus, I try to present a more convincing theoretical framework to understand how an action can be attributed to its agent. As a continuation of the train of thought of integrity, this framework includes explantions of authentic action, authentic self (identity) and authentic life. Furthermore, I clarify that, first, authenticity cannot be de identified by lonely self-discovery, which is Rousseau’s model. Second, luck and fate are inevitable when we try to make sense of one’s action, one’s authentic self and authentic life. Third, only through a certain ethical horizon based on a local perspective can we hope to make sense of authenticity. At the same time, socially and historically reflection can still help us to understand and criticize ourselves. It is wrong to understand ethical life in a scientific and foundationalist way and understand authenticity as a baseless self-decision. Finally, based on Williams’ critique of Aristotle and my reconstruction of the dialogue between Williams and Aristotelians, I want to emphasize that human nature can be realized in various ways. Accordingly, there are plural life forms which may conflict with each other, this is an important background of modernity that why we need an ethics of authenticity.
