家族企业是家族逻辑与企业逻辑的对立统一，这种矛盾体造成家族企业的二元性，家族涉入可能提供竞争优势，也可能产生消极后果。家族企业面临代际传承、税制变迁等挑战。构建家族企业治理体系对维持企业延续、保护企业利益相关者具有积极作用。家族企业治理由企业治理与家族治理两个部分组成。企业法与家事法在家族企业治理中都具有重要作用。企业治理与家族治理都需要正式治理机制与非正式治理机制的互动与协调。家族企业治理是一个复杂的现象，应该运用社会资本理论及组织制度主义等多个理论视角。处于不同阶段、制度环境的家族企业存在差异，应该区分封闭型家族公司治理与上市型家族公司治理。封闭型家族公司不是经济理性人达成的公司契约，而是强关系契约，具有强关系治理、弱契约治理的特点。家族权威、利他主义、信任、互惠等家族规范在封闭型家族公司治理中发挥重要作用，决定公司内的权力、责任分配。司法案例研究表明，法院充分考虑了家族公司关系治理的特殊性。应该注重家族关系在契约解释中的意义，保护家族成员更高的信赖与期待。关系治理有其内在的边界与局限。上市型家族公司受到正式治理机制的约束。家族控制的一个目的是维护家族的社会情感财富。双层股权结构是维持家族控制权的重要形式。是否允许企业家族通过信托保有优级表决权对家族控制的稳定性具有重要影响。独立董事是家族企业内部唯一不受控制家族支配的治理力量，独立董事可能发挥监督、资源支持及调停等功能，应该从独立于控制家族的角度重构独立性标准。应该从治理的角度规范家族公司的CEO继任，要求上市公司制定并披露CEO继任计划。家族治理在家族企业治理中发挥重要作用，能够明确家族成员的期待，减少家族纠纷，提升企业绩效。家族宪法等非正式治理机制与家族信托等正式机制共同促进企业家族的治理水平。家族信托等法律构造能够实现家族与企业一定程度的分离，缓冲家族纠纷对企业的影响，但同时会造成双重代理问题。家族治理受到家族社会资本状况及家族权力配置成本的影响。不同于强制性的公司治理模式，家族企业治理的制度化具有多种可能路径。税收、家族企业治理准则、家族专业组织及专业人士都可以引导与促进家族企业治理实践。法政策上应该为家族企业治理提供多样化的组织类型，降低家族企业治理的成本。大午集团的案例表明，我国家族企业已经开始治理实践，但更强调非正式治理机制。

The family business is the unity of family logic and business logic; the contradiction of tow logics causes the duality of family businesses. Family involvement may provide competitive advantages but also may have negative consequences. Family businesses face challenges such as intergenerational inheritance and tax system changes. Building a family business governance system has a positive effect on maintaining corporate continuity and protecting corporate stakeholders. Family business governance consists of two parts: corporate governance and family governance. Enterprise law and family law play an important role in family business governance. Both corporate governance and family governance require interaction and coordination between formal governance mechanisms and informal governance mechanisms. Family business governance is a complex phenomenon and should use multiple theoretical perspectives such as social capital theory and organizational institutionalism. Family businesses in different stages and institutional environments have differences. We should distinguish between closed family corporate governance and listed family corporate governance. A closed family company is not a corporate contract reached by economic rational actors, but a strong relationship contract, which has the characteristics of strong relational governance and weak contractual governance. Family norms such as father authority, altruism, trust, and reciprocity play an important role in the governance of closed family companies and determine the distribution of power and responsibility within the company. Judicial case studies show that the court has fully considered the particularity of family company relational governance. Judges Should pay attention to the significance of family relations in the interpretation of the contract, and protect the family members' higher trust and expectation. However, Relational governance has its inherent boundaries and limitations. Listed family companies are subject more to formal governance mechanisms. One of the purposes of family control is to preserve the social and emotional wealth of the family. The dual-stock structure is an important form of maintaining family control. Whether to allow the family to retain superior voting rights through trusts has an important impact on the stability of family control. Independent directors are the only governance force within the family business that is not dominated by controlling families. Independent directors may play the role of supervision, resource support, and mediation. The independence standards should be reconstructed from the perspective of the controlling family. The succession of CEOs of family companies should be regulated from a governance perspective, requiring listed companies to develop and disclose CEO succession plans. Family governance plays an important role in family business governance, which can clarify the expectations of family members, reduce family disputes, and improve corporate performance. Informal governance mechanisms such as the family constitution and formal mechanisms such as family trusts promote the governance of corporate families. Legal structures such as family trusts can achieve the separation between family and business, buffering the impact of family disputes on enterprises, but at the same time, it will cause double agency problems. Family governance is influenced by the family's social capital status and the cost of family power allocation. Unlike the mandatory corporate governance model, the institutionalization of family business governance has many possible paths. Taxation, family business governance guidelines, family professional organizations, and professionals can guide and promote family business governance practices. The legal policy should provide a variety of organizational types for family business governance, which could reduce the cost of family business governance. The case of DaWu Group shows that China's family business has begun to practice family business governance, but they usually emphasis more on informal governance mechanisms.