银行信贷融资在我国仍是企业最主要的融资方式，提升信贷筛选效率与配置效率是经济稳增长、调结构、转方式的重要组成部分。本文从银企关系、政治联系的角度研究了商业银行信贷筛选效率的影响因素。 首先，本文以2003年—2015年A股非金融上市企业及其贷款银行的配对贷款数据作为样本分别对银企关系、政治联系对于银行信贷配置决策、企业信贷可得性进行了实证研究。在银企关系方面，通过固定效应模型与Logit模型的回归分析发现：银企关系建立时间越长，企业关系银行数目越多，则企业贷款占总资产比例越高；而在企业贷款担保条件方面，一年以上的银企关系、更多的关系银行以及更多贷款申请次数都与企业更低的抵质押物提供概率相关。同时，银企关系的效应在不同规模的企业之间与企业信息价值变化时其对信贷可得性的效应也产生了差异。另外，企业的各类财务指标也对信贷可得性具有显著影响。 在政治联系方面，本文从企业所有制形式与实际控制人政治身份两个类型进行了研究，发现从企业年末贷款率的角度，企业所有制形式对于银行信贷筛选与配置决策没有显著影响，而民营企业实际控制人政治身份则对贷款率，特别是短期贷款率具有显著正向效应。从企业贷款担保条件的角度看，银行在对民营企业贷款申请的抵质押物提供上确实会要求的更苛刻，特别是对以不动产为主的抵押物提供概率民营企业显著更高，间接提高了民营企业的信贷融资成本；控制人具备政治身份的企业则提供成本相对较低的质押物概率更高，提供抵押物概率更低。 在验证了银企关系、政治联系确实会影响银行信贷配置决策以后，本文进一步通过分析二者与企业未来质量的相关关系检验了二者对于信贷筛选效率的效应。固定效应模型的回归分析结果显示，银企关系越紧密，企业的偿债能力越高；而具有政治联系的企业其偿债能力与不具备联系的企业并没有显著区别。在企业生产率水平方面，发现银企关系长度、银企关系规模与企业全要素生产率之间的正相关关系具有一定显著性；而际控制人政治身份对企业全要素生产率没有显著的影响，并且民营企业的全要素生产率显著高于公有制企业。以上结果表明，银行在信贷筛选时通过银企关系能够有效获取企业未来质量的相关信息，提升信贷筛选效率，而政治联系则无此效应。
Bank credit is still the most crucial source of financing for enterprises in China. Hence, improvments in credit screening and allocation efficiencies are fundamental elements to achieve the policy goals of “Growth Model Transformation, Structural Adjustments, and Steady Growth”. This paper examines the influential factors of credit screening efficiency of commercial bank in terms of bank-firm relationship and political connection. With a sample consists of non-financial A-share listed firms and matching loan banks during the period of 2013-2015, the effects of bank-firm relationship and political connection on credit availability and banks’ credit allocation is studied respectively. Test results from a fixed-effect model and a Logit model shows that longer relationships with a bank and relationships with multiple banks are positively correlated with firm’s loan-to-asset ratio. As for guarantee terms, a pre-existing relationship, more relationship banks and repeated loan applications are linked to a more favorable collateral requirement. Further tests suggest that relationship’s effectiveness differs with respect to firm’s listing board of A-share stock and when the value of firm-related information changed. Also, financial ratios still hold effects on credit availability, indicates commercial banks in China implement credit allocation using a combination of transaction-based and relationship lending technologies. The effects of two types of political connections, forms of ownership and political affiliation of larg shareholder, are identified in the tests subsequent to relationship studies. Empirical results show that private enterprises are treated equally in the context of credit allocation, while their large shareholder’s political affiliation is positively correlated with firm’s loan-to-asset ratio. Moreover, private enterprises are suffering from more strict collateral requirements, their probability of providing collaterals are significantly higher than state-owned enterprises(SOE) and other non-private sectors. In contrast, political affiliations would incur a higher pledge probability and a lower mortgage probability at the same time. After providing empirical evidence of bank-firm relationship and political connection affecting credit allocation, this paper studies their effects on credit screening efficiency via firm’s future debt-paying ability and total factor productivity(TFP). Results indicate that the closer firm’s bank relationships are, the more capable it could repay its bank loans in the future, yet political connected firms don’t exhibit similar pattern. Tests on productivity suggest, length and scope of bank-firm relationship are positively correlated with firm’s future TFP. However, political affiliation has no significant effect on TFP and non-private firms’ productivity level are lower. To summarize, bank-firm relationship is mechanism that banks could lean on to gather valuable information about firms more efficiently, making credit screening more effective; but political connection has no such effect.
