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现代资本维持原则下的股权回购 ——对赌判例的展开

Share Repurchase under Modern Capital Maintenance ——Based on Earn-out Agreement Cases in China

作者:皮正德
  • 学号
    2017******
  • 学位
    硕士
  • 电子邮箱
    740******com
  • 答辩日期
    2019.06.03
  • 导师
    朱慈蕴
  • 学科名
    法学
  • 页码
    77
  • 保密级别
    公开
  • 培养单位
    066 法学院
  • 中文关键词
    股权回购,案例研究,资本维持原则,对赌协议,双重身份
  • 英文关键词
    share repurchase,case study,capital maintenance,earn-out agreement,dual identity

摘要

2014年最高院将甘肃世恒案作为公报案例似乎宣告着“与公司对赌”的投资协议的死亡,但是随后就出现了反转世恒案的贸仲裁决,之后出现的许多法院判决也并没有完全秉持最高院在世恒案中所体现的立场,支持对赌协议的判决比例有逐年上升的趋势,甚至连最高院自身对于对赌协议态度也发生了一些变化。在我国这些案例有相似的案件事实,适用相同的法律制度,却产生了形态各异的判决与裁决结果,笔者对对赌协议的效力及公司的股权回购进行了深入的研究后发现,这些割裂的裁判态度暴露出了三个严重的问题:第一,我国司法界对于对赌协议所代表的股权回购问题认知混乱;第二,陈旧的资本维持原则观念已经无法满足商事创新的需求;第三,支持对赌协议的判决忽视了公司的团体性,也忽视了投资方股东所具有的“股东”与“债权人”的双重身份,在回购的程序上存在着严重瑕疵。笔者试图以对赌协议为样本,对公司股权回购制度进行分析并提出建议,并且在此过程中探讨现代资本维持原则的应有之意。本文通过案例研究的方法对2009年—2019年3月的对赌案例进行了全面的总结与梳理;以利益衡量的方法对法院在裁判中所进行的说理进行拆解分析,并且提出了现有制度框架下更优的解决方案;以比较法研究的方法探讨股权回购制度与资本维持原则的历史流变,选取可以嫁接至我国商事环境中的优秀作法予以借鉴;以类型理论拆解公司股权回购这一资本性交易的“本质属性”,在此基础上分析资本维持原则的功能,并提出现代资本维持原则的应有之意——在公司独立运营过程中,未经法定程序,公司资产不得随意流出;最后,本文以理论分析的方式提出了对于股权回购的立法建议:基于全文分析给出了两个层面的判断标准,同时提出了股权回购的程序性建议。笔者认为,在股权回购这一问题上,制度设计宜疏不宜堵,对于有利于制度利益及社会公共利益的商事创新,应当予以肯定并架设相应制度。笔者建议以行为策略为基础,架设两层股权回购的判断标准:第一层标准是基于市场交易信赖的偿付能力标准,第二层标准是基于法人人格独立的运营能力标准,将第一层标准交由法院进行客观判断,将第二层标准交由董事会进行决策。这样避免了法院过度干涉公司商业判断,同时保障了公司最大限度的自治空间,符合商事法的基本原则。另外一条退而求其次的道路就是借鉴新加坡公司法与美国《统一欺诈转移法令》的处理模式,由收回投资的股东直接承担相应的责任。

After the Supreme People’s Court made the Gansu Shiheng case as a bulletin case, the valuation adjustment agreement with the company seems invalid.After two years, there were cases decided by the CIETAC reversed the Gansu Shining case, and there were also many cases decided by the court reversed the Supreme People’s Court, in the past 10 years, the proportion of case which supports the valuation adjustment agreement with the company has risen, even the Supreme People’s Court itself doesn’t stick to the bulletin case.In our country, those cases have the same fact which means the results should be same, but the courts’ judgments are different from each other.After studying the agreements, the share repurchase system and the verdicts, I find three serious problem.First, it seems the judges in our country don’t have a clear cognition of the valuation adjustment agreement and share repurchase. Second, the traditional capital maintenance couldn’t meet the needs of business innovation. Third, those cases which support the agreement ignore not only the procedure of share repurchase and the community attribute, but also the dual identity of the Investor as a shareholder and a creditor. I try to analyze the share repurchase through the valuation adjustment agreement.By the way, I try to explore the modern capital maintenance rule.The paper studies all the relevant case from 2009 to 2019, and summaries the results and the reasons in the cases. The paper analyses all the reasons through benefit measurement and proposes a better solution. The paper explores the history of share repurchase rules and the capital maintenance, learning the good practice of other countries which could be grafted to our law system. The paper researches the essential characters of share repurchase through type theory, and proposes the main meaning of modern capital maintenance——while the company is running independently, the company’s asset must not flow out without legal procedures. In the end, the paper proposes the legislative advice of share repurchase:not only a two-tier judging criteria, but also the procedure of share repurchase.When it comes to the share repurchase, the legislation should provide a good system rather than forbid. Especially those commercial practices which benefits the market, they should be affirmed. The paper proposes the regulation should be on the base of behavioral strategy. The ideal judging criteria should be two-tier. The first tier bases on the solvency test which rooted in the market transaction trust. The second tier bases on the running test which rooted in the independent personality of its legal personality. The first tier should be judged by the court and the second by the board of the company. In this way, the court won’t invade the business judgment of the company, at the same time the company has more autonomy. The design is also adhere to the basic principle of business law. There is also another way, once the creditor suffers loss, the shareholder who returns its share to the company should take the responsibility, which learns from the Company Law of Singapore and the Uniform Fraud Transfer Act in America.