守法义务问题是法哲学理论中的难题。为解决这个问题，哲学家需要说明受众为什么需要把法律权威的要求看作一个内容独立的且具有优先性特征的行动理由。现有各种理论无法成功论证守法义务，这似乎意味着我们不得不接受哲学无政府主义的主张，即不可能存在正当的权威或国家。拉兹的服务型权威观为我们思考守法义务问题和回应哲学无政府主义者的挑战提供了一个良好的起点。他论证了正当权威何以可能，并把权威的正当性以及受众的守法义务的基础建立在依赖命题、常规证成命题和优先命题之上。 本文检讨了拉兹通过服务型权威观来为受众的守法义务提供基础的努力。本文区分了正当权威和正当化权威。本文将首先论证拉兹的通常证成命题为什么无法证成权威。随后，本文论证了即使通常证成命题能够证成政治权威，它仍然无法为政治权威提供正当性。拉兹和康德主义者一样，都忽视了证成和正当性的差异以及之间存在的裂缝以及受众的意志的重要性。因此，这种只依赖政府的品质来奠定政治权威的正当性以及公民的守法义务的努力必然会失败。 服务型权威观的失败使我们有机会得以重新审视守法义务的价值。一方面，我们不应该夸大了守法义务的重要性。不存在守法义务并不意味着个人可以随意的违反法律。另一方面，它提醒我们政治权威自身的品性不足以让我们有义务去服从它。最后，这一失败也使我们能够有机会重新审视法律在社会中的作用。即使不存在守法义务，法律仍然能够保护我们的重要利益，鼓励并保障有价值的社会合作。

The Obligation to obey the law is a hard question in legal philosophy. To solve this problem, theorists need to explain why subjects should regard laws as content-independent and peremptory reasons for action. However, none of them have managed to do it so far, it seems that we have to agree with the philosophical anarchists who believe that there is not any legitimate state. Joseph Raz’s service conception of authority provides us with a good start to answer the problem and meet the challenge of philosophical anarchism. He argues that legitimate authority is possible and bases the legitimacy of authority and legal obligation on the three normative these：dependent thesis，the preemptive thesis and the normal justification thesis. This article will discuss whether Raz’s theory can success to provide the obligation to obey the law a firm foundation. I will argue that his NJT can neither justify an authority, nor can it legitimatize an authority. Raz, making the same mistake as Kantian, fails to notice the difference between justification and Legitimacy. Therefore, his attempt, taking merits of authority as the main source of legitimacy and legal obligation, will necessarily fail. The failure of the service conception of authority gives us a good chance to reflect on the role of obligation to obey the law. On the one hand, we should not exaggerate the importance of legal obligation. That there is no obligation to obey does not mean that people can act against laws at will. On another hand, it reminds us that the quality of political authority itself is not sufficient for imposing us an obligation to obey it. This failure also invites us to reconsider the role of law in our society. Law can protect our vital interests, and support valuable social cooperation without subjects' general obligation to obey it.