本文采用了2008-2013年中国A股上市公司年度数据来研究上市公司高管是否财会经历对公司业绩预告精确度的影响，本文的研究主要得到了以下三个结论：（1）具有财会经历的CFO更倾向于发布精确度较低的业绩预告，这表明风险规避效应超过了专业背景效应，具有财会经历的CFO即使有能力做出更精确的业绩预测，但出于对诉讼风险的担忧以及职业安全的考虑，往往也会选择发布较不精确的预测信息，以避免预告出错；（2）然而，同样的效应在CEO和整个高管团队身上并未发现，也即是说，相比CEO和整个高管团队，CFO作为业绩预告披露的最直接负责人，其财会经历对业绩预告精确度的负向影响更大；（3）此外，相比自愿性披露样本，在强制性披露样本中CFO财会经历对业绩预告精确度的负向影响更强。这可能是由于被强制要求披露业绩预告的上市公司法律诉讼风险相对更大，为了规避风险，具有财会经历的CFO相比在自愿性披露情况下会选择披露精确度更低的业绩预告。本文的研究结论对资本市场参与者而言具有一定的参考价值：（1）对于投资者而言，本文的研究结论有助于投资者正确解读上市公司业绩预告信息的背后其管理层的意图和动机，以便做出正确的投资决策；（2）对于监管层而言，本文的研究结论发现具备财会经历的CFO往往为了规避处罚，采取牺牲信息精确度以减少出错率的信息披露策略，这种情况在被强制要求披露业绩预告的上市公司中尤其严重。因此，我们的研究启发监管机构建立健全有关业绩预告精确度的监督与处罚机制。

The paper uses the annual data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2013 to study the influence of the company's senior management's financial and accounting background on the precision of the performance forecast. Three main conclusions are drawn here: (1) The CFOs with financial and accounting background are more likely to publish less precise performance forecasts. Even if CFOs with financial and accounting background have the ability to make more precise performance forecast, due to the concerns about litigation risks and considerations of occupational safety, they often choose to publish less precise prediction information to avoid making mistakes. (2) The same effect is not found on the CEOs and the entire executive teams. That is to say, compared to the CEOs and the entire executive teams, as the directly responsible person for the performance forecast, the CFOs have a greater impact on the precision of performance forecast. (3) Compared with the voluntary disclosure sample, the CFOs’ financial and accounting background has a stronger negative impact on the precision of the performance forecast in the mandatory disclosure sample. This may be due to the fact that listed companies that are obliged to make mandatory disclosure of performance forecasts have a higher risk of legal actions. The conclusion of this study has certain reference value for the participants in the capital market: (1) For investors, Our research could help them to correctly interpret the information contained in the performance forecast of the listed company; (3) For the supervisors, our findings also inspire the regulatory agencies to improve the supervision and punishment mechanism of the performance forecast.