本文的研究意义在于填补了政治激励对于经济增长影响机制的中间过程研究空白，具体而言，提出了：在五年一届的政府任期中，地方官员任期同投资增长呈现出显著的“三上二下式”倒U型分布特征，这主要是由地方官员的实际任期所致。中国做对了激励结构，形成了中央和地方政府行为默契，理性的政治家懂得“顺势而为”。任期制是现代民主政治的重要体现。中国政治任期制度有别于西方，改革开放以来干部任期制逐步确立，中国地方政府每届任期为五年。但已有研究注意到，中国地方官员实际任期往往不满五年。中国地方官员实际任期与投资增长呈现怎样的周期性关系特征？固定资产投资是中国经济奇迹的重要现象，也是中国经济增长的主要动力来源，时下中国经济进入新旧经济转换阶段，从中国政治商业周期的视角探究中国地方官员实际任期与投资增长的关系兼具理论意义与实践价值。

This paper fills in gaps in the pilot process of political motitive’s influencing mechanism to China’s economic growth. Specifically, this paper put forward that there exists constant inverted-U style with three-years-up and two-years-down feature between local officials’ political tenure and total fixed-asset investment increase statistically in one government tenure of five years, which results from local officials’ real tenure. China has made the right incentive structure to create the tacit cooperation. Rational politicians know how to action with the flow.Tenure system is the most obvious representative of modern political democracy. China’s political tenure system is different from the western’s. Since the Reform and Openning-up, China has gradually constructed the tenure system, each China’s local level government’s political tenure is five years. However some researchers have noticed that China’s local officials’ real tenure is shortly far away from five years. Then what featured relationship indeed exist between China’s local officials’ real tenure and investment increase? Fixed-asset investment is an vital phenomenon of China economic miracle, meanwhile major power source to China`s economy growth. Nowdays, China’s economy has beening shifting from the traditional growth stage into the new growth stage, the empirical study of the featured relationship between China’s local officials’ real tenure and investment increase with the perspective of China’s political business cycle, is both of the vital value for theory and practice.